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ABSTRACT 
Due to widespread corporate scandals and failures around the world, there has been a 
renewed interest in the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. The 
majority of research concerning corporate governance and its effect on firm 
performance has been undertaken in developed countries and markets, particularly the 
UK and the US, but relatively little evidence is provided in the Middle East, specifically 
Jordan. This study investigates the effect of the corporate governance on firm 
performance of the Jordanian industrial and services companies during the period 2000 
to 2010. This study primarily employs the agency theory to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. The agency theory is concerned 
with the agency problem between principals and agents (i.e. shareholders and managers, 
respectively), which undermines value maximization. It has been argued that the board 
of directors, ownership concentration and managerial ownership are efficient corporate 
governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and 
management. 
Multiple regression panel data analysis is the main tool of analysis in this study. The 
statistical method used to test this impact is Generalised Least Square (GLS) Random 
Effects models. The study is based on the three sets of data: (1) a sample of 115 firms 
listed in the Amman Stock Exchange; (2) corporate governance data collected from 
Osiris database; and (3) data generated through the annual reports of the firms. 
Empirical investigation reveals a mixed set of results. Our findings fail to reveal any 
significant impact for the board size on firm performance. However, CEO duality tends 
to have a positive effect on the firm performance, which indicates that the Jordanian 
firms perform better if the chairman and the CEO roles are combined in a single 
individual. It was also found that NEDs have a negative impact on firm performance, 
which is inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis of agency theory, which holds that 
the NEDs play an important role in the board as a source of experience, monitoring 
services, reputation and expert knowledge with the likelihood to improve firm 
performance. Furthermore, our findings report positive and negative impacts of 
managerial ownership and ownership concentration on firm performance (respectively). 
Finally, our findings reveal a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 1:  BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance 
in Jordan. Corporate governance has been an important research area, which deals with 
the various governance arrangements used to control the corporation within the 
objective of maximizing shareholders (owners) wealth. A literature review reveals this 
importance, and highlights problems with conflict of interest between shareholders and 
the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When there are asymmetric information 
problems and imperfect contractual relations between managers and shareholders, 
managers have incentives to pursue their own objectives at the expense of shareholders. 
For example, managers might implement financial and investment strategies or may 
spend more on luxury projects for their own interests rather than increasing the value of 
the company. Furthermore, this conflict may result in transfer pricing, whereby assets of 
the company that they manage are sold to another company that they own below the 
market value. 
Effective corporate governance should fundamentally guarantee shareholders' value by 
ensuring the appropriate use of firms' resources, enabling access to capital and 
improving investor confidence (Denis and McConnell, 2003). This is related both to 
internal organisation and external market conditions; firm‘s responsiveness to external 
conditions is largely dependent on the way the firm is managed as well as the efficacy 
of the firm‘s governance structure (Gregory and Simms, 1999). Some authors (e.g. 
Rwegasira, 2000; Nam et al., 2004) have argued that good corporate governance 
prevents the expropriation of company resources by managers, ensuring better decision 
making and efficient management. This results in better allocation of company 
resources and, ultimately, improved performance. 
The majority of research concerning corporate governance and its effect on firm 
performance has been undertaken in developed countries and markets, particularly the 
UK and the US, but relatively little is known about corporate governance in the Middle 
East, where different cultural and economic considerations prevail. In recent years, 
despite the conflict within the Middle East as a whole, considerable progress has been 
witnessed in the Jordanian economy. In the 1990s and 2000s, significant effort was 
made by the government of Jordan to attract investors and help the economy of the 
country integrate with the global economy; for example, capital markets were 
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liberalised and structures of corporate governance were reformed (ASE, 
2007).Furthermore, three major institutions were established in Jordan to make the 
regulatory environment more robust, to improve transparency, accountability and 
disclosure, and to enhance the quality of the corporate governance overall; namely, the 
Securities Depository Centre (SDC), the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) and 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). Thus, using 115 Jordanian listed firms in Amman 
Stock Exchange during the period from 2000 to 2010, this research has the aim of 
providing an investigation of the impact of corporate governance on firm performance 
in Jordanian industrial and services companies. 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
This study employs the agency theory as the main theory to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. The agency theory is concerned 
with the interests of the shareholders by reducing the agency problem which will lead to 
increase value maximization. Therefore, agency theory provides a direct link between 
corporate governance and financial performance. The overarching interest of 
shareholders is from value maximization. Therefore, with a view to the objective of the 
thesis to investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance, the 
narrow definition is more relevant since it provides a direct link between corporate 
governance and financial performance. Both the narrow definition of corporate 
governance and the agency theory provide theoretical justification for the link between 
corporate governance and firm performance and allow the testable hypotheses on the 
different corporate governance mechanisms in terms of improved financial 
performance. Further details are provided in Chapter 2.  
1.3 Research questions 
Liu and Fong (2010) state that one of the most important mechanisms of corporate 
governance is the board of directors. In many researches, independence is recognized as 
one of characters of a good board (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gillan, 2006). Members of 
the board of directors are representatives of the shareholders and their responsibility is 
to make sure that managers are working in the best interests of the owners (Liu and 
Fong, 2010). Corporate governance frameworks should ensure the strategic guidance of 
company and the effective monitoring of management by the board (OECD, 2004). The 
board of directors is responsible for monitoring managerial behaviour to reduce the 
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conflict between the shareholders and managers to achieve adequate returns for the 
shareholders (OECD, 2004). Therefore, the board of directors is accountable for acting 
in the best interests of shareholders and managers. Accordingly, an effective and 
independent board is more likely to monitor the top management to align the interests of 
the shareholders and managers. Thus, if interests are aligned, this will reduce the 
conflict between managers and the shareholders leading to better firm performance. 
With the development of the Jordanian market, and because of the increase in the 
number of listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), efforts were/are 
required to enhance the effectiveness of the boards of Jordanian companies. Clearly, the 
impact of the board of directors upon the performance of a firm is a salient 
consideration and so the first research question for this study is to provide an 
investigation of:  
The impact of the board of directors (namely board size, CEO duality 
and non-executive directors) on firm performance of the Jordanian 
companies. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the ownership structure of a corporation, 
especially the role of equity ownership of managers, is a mechanism to align the 
manager‘s interest with that of owners. In developing countries, the ownership is highly 
concentrated, where the rights of the shareholders is weak due to insufficient regulations 
or the absence of them within the relevant laws (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 1999). Jenson and Meckling (1976) argued that higher ownership concentration 
could induce the prioritisation of self-interest by large shareholders and the consequent 
expropriation of firm resources (i.e. wealth), resulting in increased conflict and 
decreased firm performance. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Brown et al. 
(2011) argued that, from the efficient monitoring perspective, large shareholders who 
hold large proportion of shares have the ability and the incentive to exert control and to 
compel the management to take action and, as a result, decrease the conflict in order to 
maximize the owners‘ value and, thereby, improve company performance. In Jordan, it 
is common that most of the shares are concentrated in the hands of controlling large 
shareholders (e.g. individuals/family shareholders or companies) (ROSC Jordan, 2004).  
In this regard, then, the second question for this study to investigate:  
The impact of the concentrated ownership/large shareholders on firm 
performance. 
16 
Moreover, literature on corporate governance has argued that the identity, objective 
function, nature and behaviour of shareholders varies for different types of owners, 
which might affect firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Thomsen and 
Pedersen; Douma et al., 2006). Different types of investors are characterised by 
differences in wealth, risk aversion and, correspondingly, in the importance they attach 
to shareholder value in relation to other objectives. Shareholder interests have impacts 
on investment decisions and owner preferences (Cubbin and Leech, 1982; Hill and 
Jones, 1982; Hansmann, 1988, 1996; Nickel, 1997). Conflicts of interest can arise when 
owners' economic interests and relations with the firm become misaligned with the 
fundamental firm objective of value maximisation. For instance, dual roles can occur, 
such as when governments are owners and regulators, or when banks are both owners 
and lenders (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1997). Consequently, such stakeholders have 
numerous objectives that can compromise the more basic role of stakeholders as 
principals. Thus, in addition to the impact of the large shareholder, it is also important 
to know who this shareholder is (e.g. individual/family, companies or government). In 
this regard, then, the third question is to investigate:  
The impact of the identity of the shareholder (individual/family, 
companies and government) on firm performance. 
Finally, it has been argued that foreign investment in emerging markets is special. This 
is because foreign investors transfer managerial skills and better technology and allow 
firms to access financial resources easily (Taylor, 1990; Ghazali, 2010; Sulong and Mat 
Nor, 2010). This might help in reducing the conflict between managers and 
shareholders and affect firm performance. The liberalisation of the Jordanian market is 
among the most advanced in the MENA, having been on-going since the mid-1990s 
(OECD, 2006). Thus, the effects of foreign investment can be uniquely assayed for 
Jordanian firms, more than for comparable MENA markets. The Jordanian market has a 
notably high proportion of foreign investors; indeed, the Jordanian capital market has 
some of the highest foreign investment rates in the world (OECD, 2006). Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) reported that Jordan was in the top three countries in the MENA in 
terms of attracting foreign investment. Al-Muhtaseb (2009) observed that average Arab 
foreign investment in Jordan is one of the highest in the region. Mansur (2008) points 
out that, according to Jordan Vision 2020, to maintain a nominal GDP growth rate of 8 
percent per annum, Jordan needs to attract over US$119.29 billion in investment over 
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twenty years, or US$5.96 billion per year. Therefore, the last research question is to 
investigate:  
The impact of the foreign investors on firm performance. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
The Jordanian setting is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, this 
study might help us to enhance our understanding of corporate governance in term of 
agency theory in developing country specifically, in Jordanian industrial and services 
companies, and if there any possible improvements that could be made to deal with. 
Secondly, Jordan is a developing country, thus the findings of this study may benefit 
many other developing countries with similar political, cultural, environmental and 
economic conditions, particularly in MENA. Thirdly, following the financial crises 
around the world and increasing the number of companies listed in ASE from 161 in 
2000 to 277 by 2013, the Jordanian financial sector regulations have been strengthened 
by issuing different laws and the Corporate Governance Code. Therefore, such reforms 
might strength the financial environment and affect the firm performance. Fourthly, the 
liberalisation of the Jordanian market is among the most advanced in MENA, having 
been on-going since the mid-1990s. Thus the effects of foreign investment can be 
uniquely assayed for Jordanian firms, more than for comparable MENA markets. The 
Jordanian market has a notably high proportion of foreign investors; indeed, the 
Jordanian capital market has some of the highest foreign investment rates in worldwide 
(OECD, 2006). Finally, the findings of this study also provide a window into the 
prevailing situation of corporate governance in Jordan which is of interest to local and 
international investors, managers and academic researchers considering the roles of 
corporate governance frameworks. 
1.5 Research approach 
The theoretical overview aims clarifying what the adopted theoretical model that the 
agency theory suggests as likely answers to our research questions. The empirical 
literature on the effects of corporate governance is reviewed to establish the state of 
knowledge about what has been empirically established with regards to these specific 
research questions and the plausible explanations for the results. This empirical review 
helps to better positive the study and is used in several distinct ways. First, the 
alternative explanations for differing results complement. The theoretical framework in 
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that they provide alternative explanations for possible empirical results with regard to 
the research questions. These alternative theories are building sketched in the theoretical 
overview. Second, the empirical studies provide a starting point for conceptualisation of 
the underlying issues and suggest possible way to measure the different facets of 
corporate governance mechanisms. These measurement issues are later discussed in 
details in the empirical chapter. Finally, the empirical review builds upon the theory in 
providing a preliminary conceptual model for investigating the research questions. 
The chapter on the corporate governance in Jordan helps identifying the workings of 
corporate governance and clarifying the relevance of the research questions. This 
overview chapter is designed to allow re-examinations of the research themes and the 
intended corporate governance mechanisms. Where appropriate these will be reviewed 
and amended to allow for reliable examination of the research questions. The 
conceptual issues of the measurement of the corporate governance variables are 
addressed through a critical review of theory, empirical literature and the Jordanian 
experience. The discussion further leads to an empirical model used in the study. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
The rest of the thesis is structured into seven chapters and organised as follows. Chapter 
two presents the definition of corporate governance from a narrow and a broad 
perspective. The chapter reviews the theoretical framework, and it identified that agency 
theory provides a testable hypothesis that might help in the investigation of the agency 
conflicts and in the possible solutions to reduce governance problems. The chapter also 
reviews stewardship theory and resource dependence theory as alternative explanations 
for corporate governance mechanisms. A review of corporate governance issues in 
developing countries is then presented and corporate governance models in the West are 
explored.  
Chapter three reviews the theoretical and the empirical literature that studied the effect 
of internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. There is a large 
body of finance literature that investigated the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance; however, confusion still exists over the findings as to 
whether specific corporate governance mechanisms can maximize shareholder wealth 
and improve firm performance. This chapter reviews the effect of the Board of Directors 
(board size, CEO duality, and non-executive directors), and the ownership structure 
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(concentrated ownership/large shareholders, the identity of shareholders‘ ownership - 
individual/family, companies, government ownership, managerial ownership and 
foreign ownership) on firm performance. 
Chapter four reviews the Jordanian background in terms of the most important aspects 
of the Jordanian economic environment, as well as a review of the development of the 
industrial and services sector in Jordan (namely telecoms and IT, energy, transport and 
media and advertising). In addition, there is a review of the most important reforms by 
the government (JSC, ASE, SDC, disclosure, shareholders rights and the Jordanian 
Corporate Governance Code). 
Chapter five describes the data used in this study. The data that relates to our research 
objectives was extracted from two sources: The Osiris database; and manually collected 
from the Jordanian companies‘ annual reports. The sample selection procedure is 
described and the criteria that have been adopted to construct the sample are explained. 
The variables are divided into three categories (firm performance, corporate governance 
variables, and control variables). For each category, the data sources, variables‘ 
construction and measurement are explained.  
Chapter six explains the research philosophy, methodology and the specification tests 
that were used in the study. 
Chapter seven comprises two main parts. The first part of the chapter presents a 
summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and the control 
variables. The second part of the chapter will deal with the main inferences which were 
drawn from the analysis. The results are presented separately according to the research 
questions.  
Chapter eight presents the conclusions and the recommendations of the thesis. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on the key findings, research limitations and potential 
areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the various definitions of corporate governance introduced by 
different research scholars then reviews the theoretical framework of the study. The 
agency theory is the main theory used in this study, as the theoretical framework to 
investigate the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. Finally, literature 
pertaining to different corporate governance issues in developing countries and models 
is reviewed. 
2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance 
It is worth noting that the term corporate governance has become more popular recently 
from different perspectives such as professional bodies, regulators and academics. 
Further to this, due to the increasing concern of corporate fraud and fraudulent financial 
reporting, the concept became popular in both developed and developing economies. 
There is a considerable debate about the definition of corporate governance among 
researchers and scholars. In regard to the various definitions, researchers and scholars 
classify corporate governance definitions in either narrow or broad sense. Narrow 
definitions are based on satisfying the interests of the shareholders. However, broad 
definitions extend the previous definitions and are based on satisfying the interest of the 
stakeholders (i.e., employees, customers, suppliers and government) (Gillan, 2006; 
Letza et al., 2004; Sternberg, 2004). 
The definition fundamentally relates to the epistemological assumptions involved 
(Gillan, 2006). For example, corporate governance can be viewed from the 
shareholders‘ perspective, which essentially means the principals‘ motivation to 
maximize their value, or from the organizational perspective, in terms of controlling 
mechanisms to regulate and maintain business operations (Zingales, 1997). Similarly, 
Tricker (1984, p.10) writes: ―Governance is different from management; and involves 
setting the corporate direction, involvement in executive action, supervision and 
accountability.‖ Thus corporate governance extends beyond the narrow confines of 
management, and comprise the systemic control, rules and regulations of companies 
according to Gillan and Starks (1998, p.382). 
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According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance ―deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment‖. It is generally impossible for principals in a modern public firm to be 
charged with responsibility for corporate operations, hence they delegate agents to 
manage operations in their interests. Naturally in this milieu governance problems such 
as conflicts of interest occur, particularly if shareholders are disappointed by their return 
on investment. Principals must weigh the costs of monitoring and controlling agents 
(agency costs) against the costs they are likely to incur from negative managerial 
behaviours in the absence of efficient monitoring and control. 
Thus, corporate governance issues arise due to the necessity of counteracting agency 
problems (Hart, 1995), and fundamentally from shareholders' attempts to protect 
themselves from the expropriation of their wealth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).Keasey et 
al. (2005, p.251) defined corporate governance as: 
―The set of mechanisms – both institutional and market based – that 
induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that make 
decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make 
decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the 
suppliers of capital)‖. 
This broad definition is based on the organizational context, which is too general. In 
other words, the broad definition does not provide theoretical frameworks that can 
establish testable hypotheses or relationships. A widely used framework to 
conceptualise the relationship between firm performance and organizational structure is 
agency theory, which was described by Denis and McConnell (2003) in terms of being 
an expression of property rights in corporate governance by principals; any 
understanding of firm structure must start with the proviso that shareholders are the 
principals (i.e. owners) in the organization. This study employed the agency theory as 
the main theory to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. The agency theory deals with the interests of the shareholders with 
relation to the agency problem and the underlying target of value maximization. On the 
most basic level, reduced agency problems contribute to increasing share value and thus 
positive performance. This narrow conceptualisation emphasises the interests of the 
shareholders, whose overarching interest is value maximization. Therefore, with a view 
to the objective of the thesis to investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance, the narrow definition is more relevant since it provides direct link between 
corporate governance and financial performance. Both the narrow definition of 
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corporate governance and the agency theory provide theoretical justification for the link 
between corporate governance and firm performance and allow the testable hypotheses 
on the different corporate governance mechanisms in terms of improved financial 
performance. 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
The agency theory is the primary paradigm used in this study, as the theoretical 
framework to explore the effect of corporate governance (i.e. the relations between 
owners and managers) on firm performance. The agency theory deals with the interests 
of the shareholders by reducing the agency problem which leads to increased value 
maximization. The overarching interest of shareholders is value maximization. 
 
A key advantage of agency theory is that it reduces the parameters of study to 
consideration of two parties: the agent and the principal. This renders the perspective of 
shareholders (i.e. principals) simpler for analysis, as they are primarily motivated by 
return on investment or firm value. The general view of the agency theory is that 
conflicts of interest arise in the relationship due to the divergence of managers‘ 
(assumed rational but opportunistic) from the shareholders‘ interest. The theory 
provides a powerful theoretical basis and testable hypotheses for explaining the 
relationships and suggesting solutions for the agency problems between shareholders 
and managers to mitigate agency conflicts and enhance shareholder returns, resulting in 
better firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to literature, the sources of such problems are related, for instance, to 
managers‘ investment decisions – under investments or over-investments, free cash 
flow, earning retentions, shirking – that diverge from the positive net present value rule 
(Dhumale, 1998; Jensen, 1986, 1993; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). 
The ability of management to devise and implement strategic decision making is key to 
firm performance, and to motivate managerial personnel their compensation is generally 
high in terms of remuneration, consistent with the proviso of agency theory that 
managers are prone to act in their own interests, potentially at the expense of the 
interests of firms/shareholders, if their objectives are misaligned due to inadequate 
monitoring, bonding and compensation (Liu and Fong, 2010). In agency theory, 
corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in ensuring the alignment of 
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the interests of the principal and the agent, thus enriching the firm‘s capability to 
maximize shareholder wealth and thereby improve firm performance. 
The ownership structure of firms, particularly in terms of the board of directors, is the 
main feature mitigating the inherent dichotomy between principals and agents to 
improve firm performance. Organizational factors affecting firm performance include 
board size, CEO duality and the presence of non-executive directors (NEDs), as well as 
mechanisms related to the ownership structure, such as large shareholders or 
concentrated ownership, the identity of shareholders (individual/family ownership, 
companies‘ ownership and government ownership) and managerial ownership. 
Stewardship theory and resource dependence theory provide different explanations for 
the mechanisms by which the board of director's functions and how it affects firm 
performance and in some aspects there is overlap between these theories and agency 
theory. However, in terms of the effect of the ownership structure on firm performance, 
stewardship and resource dependence theories do not provide any testable hypotheses or 
explanations. The concept of the alignment of interests between principals and agents 
forms the crux of the agency theory perspective, which suggests that in order to align 
the interests of managers with shareholders it is important to create incentives for the 
managers to increase value maximization. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that this 
incentive is expected to motivate agents‘ efforts to create total surplus. Hence, aligning 
the interests between the two parties can resolve the agency problem and achieve the 
main goal of the shareholders (value maximization). 
The following sections discuss these theories and explain corporate governance 
mechanisms in terms of each theory. The following chapter presents a more 
comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical literature in order to explain how 
every corporate governance mechanisms might affect the firm performance. 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Large corporations, particularly publicly listed companies, generally have an 
organisational framework wherein there is a fundamental separation of ownership and 
control between principals and agents. In the relationship between them, the owners 
(principals) hire managers (agents) to run the firm in their best interests, compensating 
the latter for their efforts, generally in pecuniary form (e.g. salary and bonuses)( Hart, 
1995; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sappington, 1991). Conflicts of interest can arise in 
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this relationship due to the divergence of the interests of managers and shareholders. 
The potentially problematic relationship between principals and agents has been 
conceptualised and explored using the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
The fundamental premise of agency theory is that conflicts of interest arise in corporate 
relationships due to the divergence of the interests of managers and shareholders 
(whereby the agents are assumed to be rational but opportunistic). The core assumptions 
of agency theory are that: (1) managers may maximize their own utility instead of 
enhancing shareholder value (Demsetz, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976); (2) contracts 
are not costless when writing and enforcing (Fama and Jensen, 1983); (3) information is 
distributed asymmetrically between principals and agents; and (4) the parties have 
limited or bounded rationality. Consequently, the theory holds that due to the 
asymmetric information distribution between managers and shareholders, principals 
cannot correctly measure the efforts of managers who know the details of the operations 
of the firm (i.e. it is at the expense of the shareholders, although both parties might incur 
some costs). 
Agency costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual losses (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Monitoring costs are the costs incurred by shareholders for monitoring 
the conduct of managers. Bonding costs are financial or non-financial costs of setting up 
systems or structures intended to ensure that managers act in the best interests of the 
shareholders or compensate them accordingly if they do not (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Residual losses occur due to the mismatch of actions promoting the self-interest 
of the principal and the agent, despite (i.e. due to the failure of) monitoring and bonding 
activities. Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that residual loss is in fact the value of profit 
lost because the contract‘s full enforcement costs exceed its benefits. 
The agency theory views the relationship between shareholders and managers as the 
classical principal-agent relationship, in which owners hire managers to run the firm in 
the best interests of the former, while the latter is rewarded for their effort (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995; Sappington, 1991). The performance or outcome depends 
on the extent of the agent‘s efforts and the risks involved, but the efforts of the agent are 
not fully observable to the principal, thus information asymmetry makes it difficult for 
the principal to measure the efforts made by and to correspondingly compensate the 
agent, which implies greater reward for the risk-averse agent due to less incentive to 
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make effort (Sappington, 1991). In this incentive-risk puzzle inherent in the agency 
relationship (Hart, 1995); the relevant issue is how to determine the optimal balance 
between efficiency and risk-bearing. The principal might thus employ other monitoring 
schemes in order to control the desired action of the agent and incur monitoring costs to 
reduce information asymmetry (Arnorld and De Lange, 2004; Sappington, 1991). 
The problem of information asymmetry itself is related to adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Principals face adverse selection problem because they cannot 
correctly verify the skills or abilities the agent claims to possess at the time of 
contracting (i.e. hiring), thus they might not be able to select the best applicant or to 
know whether the agent is performing the related duties properly or not (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The moral hazard agency problems, first proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), arise when managers might not make the required managerial efforts in the best 
interests of the principal. Since the principal might not know this fully, they need 
information to monitor the effort level and measure it in order to reward it correctly. 
According to literature, the sources of such problems are related to numerous factors, 
such as managers‘ investment decisions (under- or over-investments), free cash flow, 
earning retentions and shirking that diverge from the positive net present value rule 
(Dhumale, 1998; Jensen, 1986, 1993; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). In practice, both principals and agents face a trade-off between incentives, 
whereby the agent should be motivated by creating attractive performance-based 
rewards; and risk sharing, whereby the agent needs to be protected from risk by low 
performance based incentive. Therefore, agency problem stems from the incentive-risk 
sharing puzzle (Hart, 1995). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the principal-agent relationship and explored the 
ownership structure of corporation, especially the role of equity ownership of managers 
as a mechanism to align the manager‘s interest with that of owners. Moreover, Fama 
and Jensen (1983) described the role of the board of directors in monitoring the 
potential opportunism of executive managers in large corporations. Thus agency theory 
is mainly concerned with the institutional arrangements (ownership structure and 
organisational structures) that affect agency conflicts. This closely relates it to property 
rights, since the effects of the distribution of property rights are important in analysis of 
principal-agent relationships. 
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The salient features of the principal-agent paradigm are that it: (1) suggests explanations 
and the solutions to the different types of agency problems; and (2) provides both 
dispute avoidance approach by crafting incentive-alignments and conflict resolution 
approach of crafting governance mechanisms. 
In terms of corporate governance mechanisms of the board of directors (board size, 
CEO duality and NEDs), agency theory proposes that NEDs play an important role in 
monitoring and supervising executives, due to the assumption that they are independent 
and concerned with their own reputations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). NEDs can thus add 
value to firms due to their external knowledge and expertise as well as their monitoring 
function (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Similarly, resource dependency theory 
attributes improved firm performance to NEDs due to their input for decision making 
(e.g. investment and strategic planning decisions), and their networking value with the 
external environment and other stakeholders. Thus, both agency theory and resource 
dependency theory predict a causal, positive relationship between firm performance and 
the presence of NEDs (i.e. board independence), while stewardship theory conversely 
holds that insider directors can better monitor management that NEDs due to their 
enhanced knowledge of firm operations (Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990). 
Additionally, stewardship theory holds that the part-time/ceremonial position of NEDs 
in many cases inhibits their monitoring function and renders their contribution to 
decision making negligible (Bozec, 2005). Thus, in contrast to agency and resource 
dependency theories, stewardship theory holds that NEDs are likely to affect firm 
performance negatively. 
NEDs can also contribute to increasing the size of the board, which has the advantage of 
a wider pool of expertise but which contributes to poor decision-making and 
communication, reflected in the relatively poor performance of larger boards (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen,1993). As board size increases, the problems of coordination 
and communication also increase, consequently decreasing the ability of the board to 
monitor the management and thereby exacerbating the agency problem (Eisenberg et 
al., 1998). Furthermore, agency theory proposes the separation of the chairman and 
CEO from the same position because the primary considerations of the former include 
remunerating the CEO and overseeing the board; thus the combination of these roles in 
one person can result in increasing agency problems by diluting the effectiveness of 
monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993). However, stewardship theory proposes that an 
effective management is based on the principle of the unity of command, thus it is 
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advisable for the chairman and the CEO to hold the same position according to this 
perspective. This is because when responsibilities and decisions are restricted to one 
person, this might facilitates greater understanding and knowledge of the company 
operations and better decisions which will result in reduce the agency problems and 
thereby impact the firm performance positively (Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Donaldson 
and Daives, 1991). 
On the other hand, when considering the ownership structure mechanisms, agency 
theory posits that incentives for agents are necessary to align their interest with 
principals (i.e. to encourage managers to prioritise the maximisation of shareholder 
value). As managerial ownership increases the interests of the shareholders and 
managers become more aligned, thus the incentive for opportunistic behaviour 
decreases, thus agency problems decreased (Jensen, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, large and controlling shareholders contribute to the mitigation of the 
agency problems because they have the incentives, motivations and capacity to monitor 
the managers for the shared benefit of control (Vishny and Shliefer, 1986, 1997). 
Conversely, resource dependency and stewardship theories provide no testable 
hypothesis concerning the ownership structure. Therefore, resource dependency and 
stewardship theory will be included only where testable hypotheses are pertinent, while 
agency theory will be employed as the main theory guiding this analysis. 
In short, agency theory suggests that due to the separation of ownership and control in 
modern firms, agents are less likely to always work in the interests of principals. To 
reduce this divergence of interests, shareholders will have to use internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to monitor managers and thus induces rational managers to 
fulfil their function of maximising the value of shareholders, improving firm 
performance. This latent structural factor must be complemented by deliberate efforts to 
monitor and control managers, with corporate governance mechanisms that identify any 
potential problems as well as rewarding positive behaviours and good performance by 
managers. The resultant costs of residual loss, bonding and monitoring agents 
(managers) are known as agency costs. Presuming that agency costs ensure that 
managers do not pursue their self-interest while neglecting shareholders' interests, 
agency costs reduce the agency problem and contribute to improved firm performance. 
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2.3.2 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory focuses on psychological and sociological methods of oversight, 
rather than the economic (pecuniary) tools of agency theory. The former holds that 
organisational members have some form of positive collective identity that engenders 
trustworthy behaviour (Davis and Donaldson, 1997). Muth and Donaldson (1998) 
concur in that financial gain is not necessarily the sole driver of managerial behaviour, 
and in addition managers require some discretion to effectively manage business for 
shareholders. Consequently, separate ownership is not viewed as a weakness in 
stewardship theory as cooperative behaviours are held to be the latent/intrinsic 
behaviour of managers (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991), and they are 
subject to an array of motives in addition to financial gain (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) observed that inside board member managers are more likely 
that outside directors in large organisations due to the deep insight into organisational 
activities enjoyed by the former. Stewardship theory posits that concern for their own 
reputations and career progression inhibits agents from acting against the interests of 
shareholders, thus agency costs should be inherently minimised (Donaldson and Davis, 
1994). The contribution to firm performance of stewards relates to the context in terms 
of socio-cultural and psychological factors (Clarke, 2004). For example, managers are 
considered more likely to perform better with greater empowerment and job 
satisfaction, which is a psychological factor. Socially, managers (along with most 
personnel in a successful organisation) typically self-identify as organisational 
representatives and thus they consider the power accorded them by principals to be a 
tool to enable the organisation and other employees to achieve the organisational goals. 
In terms of the situational perspective, it is anticipated that managers perform optimally 
in an environment that is involvement-oriented (i.e. in which accomplishment of tasks, 
control and thinking are combined in a single process). If the organisational culture has 
a collectivist orientation, this will obviously have implications on the long-term 
relationship and loyalty managers have towards the firm (Clarke, 2004). Stewardship 
theory supports that an insider-dominated board is more effective due to more in-depth 
knowledge of organisational operations, such as access to data and technical expertise 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Additionally, CEO-Chairman duality will make 
leadership and control, particularly regarding decision making and strategy (e.g. 
investment) more consistent, which is presumed to contribute to greater effectiveness 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
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Because the inside directors have more comprehensive and deep knowledge of daily 
operations within firms, their decisions are better informed. According to stewardship 
theory, they are therefore preferable to NEDs due to their more accurate knowledge of 
firm performance. With fewer inside directors, boards have reduced insight into the 
company's situation and progress, rendering them reliant on information furnished by 
the management, with little or no contextual knowledge to make any decisions 
independent of the recommendations of managers; NEDs suffer from this same lack of 
knowledge as the board in general. Reduced ability to monitor managers and the 
making of less informed decisions by boards comprising outsiders means that such 
boards are unlikely to improve firm performance to the same extent as boards with a 
larger number of insider directors according to stewardship theory. 
2.3.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
The perspective of the resource dependence theory is more materialist and less 
organization-centred. It is primarily concerned with firms‘ access to resources, such as 
expertise and capital. According to resource dependence theory, structures of corporate 
governance such as the board of directors affect firms‘ access to resources essential for 
firm performance (Pfeffer, 1973). Resource dependence theory particularly favours 
boards with a high composition of NEDs, due to the wider expertise and knowledge 
they can provide, as well as improved networking with the external environment and a 
generally improved reputation (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Thus NEDs can facilitate access to the political and business contacts, capital and 
information (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003), by enhancing networking with external 
stakeholders, including customers, governments and other companies (e.g. creditors, 
suppliers and buyers); thus NEDs improve access to resources (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2003), which put simply enables cheaper access to inputs and thus positively affects 
firm performance. 
Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that the diversity of the board 
size and the background of the outside directors are very important elements in 
managing the company needs for any capital in the future or to manage environment 
contingency. Pearce and Zahra (1992) also assert that diversifying the board will help 
the company to survive by benefiting from the exchange of company resources and its 
external environment. In addition, they report that the presence of the outside directors 
will result in improving the organization efficient strategies by providing the firm with 
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new viewpoints and perspectives, which will ultimately improve the financial 
performance. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) confirmed on Pearce and Zahra‘s (1992) 
study by pointing that firms‘ links help them secure their business interests in the event 
of environmental uncertainty. 
In addition, the resource dependence theory clarifies the methods that firms use in order 
to gain access to financial resources. In terms of solvency problems companies are 
highly advised to appoint representatives of the financial institutions on their boards 
(Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988). However, if the firm is in high levels of bank debt, it is 
likely they will appoint an officer of the creditor bank inside the board to facilitate 
access to finance. In other words, it is an easier way of access to credit (Thompson and 
McEwen, 1958). Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) report that there is a significant 
relationship between the identities of the financial representatives and a firm‘s 
borrowing strategy. 
Moreover, Kaplan and Minton (1994) identified that firms often wish to appoint 
financial directors on the board if the prices of the stocks or the performance of the 
company deteriorate. In addition, inside directors are recommended to be replaced with 
experienced outside directors when the firm performance worsens (Hermalin and 
Weishbach, 1988). The resource dependence theory uses the external linkages of the 
board in order to add value to the firm and improve the firm performance (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Hitt et al. (2000) argued that emerging 
market countries suffer from low availability of capital, high costs, poorly developed 
financial markets and volatility in economic development. These conditions produce a 
resource gap between firms in emerging markets and those in developed markets. 
Therefore, companies are forced to find a creative way to benefit from the external links 
of the board. In other words, in developing countries it is always important for 
companies to have links with external resources. 
In conclusion, resource dependence theory holds that the operational environment of the 
firm is reflected in its board structure (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, et al, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972), 
which entails that directors are selected according to their ability to facilitate access to 
required resources. Thus, it should be possible to identify firm dependencies from the 
board composition; for example, the presence of financiers in the board of directors 
suggests that firms seek cheap access to capital, from which it can be inferred that they 
plan large investment or that they are in financial difficulty (Hillman, et al, 2000). 
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Generally, a board with diverse members with varied links to external resources can be 
expected to have greater access to such resources, which enhances firm performance 
and value. 
Table 1: Summary of the role of the board of directors 
Theory Role of Board Implications for board 
Agency Managerial control Independent boards mechanism for shareholders 
to retain ownership, control rights and monitor 
performance 
Stewardship Managerial 
empowerment 
The board controlled by management is 
empowered and manages 
corporateassetsresponsibly Resource 
Dependence 
Search for external 
resources 
Board with strong external links is aco-optation 
mechanism for firms to access external resources 
2.4 Corporate Governance Issues in Developing Countries 
Oman et al. (2004) and Allen (2005) argue that corporate governance in emerging 
markets has lately attracted much attention due to the weaknesses of corporate 
governance in developing countries, which was an important reason for a series of 
economic crises that affected these countries. Emerging markets tend to have quite well-
developed physical financial infrastructure including central banks, commercial banks 
and stock exchanges, but to have less well-developed processes and systems of 
accounting, governance, regulation and other financial infrastructure, and less efficient 
markets with less liquidity than the world's most advanced systems. These differences 
lead to greater uncertainty and risk, and they enhance the international diversification 
possibilities for investors from all countries in the world (Kearney, 2012).  
Tsamenyi et al. (2007) have argued that there are a multitude of problems facing 
developing economies, including risk and uncertainty, political instability, weak 
legislation, high levels of government intervention and low levels of protection for 
investors. As such, there is a necessity for effective structures of corporate governance 
to be adopted. There have been a number of suggested measures to help improve 
governance structures including improving the strength and transparency of capital 
market structures to increase the overall confidence of investors, improving the 
performance of domestic firms, and encouraging growth through the use of equity 
instead of debt (Reed, 2002).  
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Furthermore, the poor corporate governance and the close relationship between 
business, banks and government are one of the major problems that have led to crony 
capitalism (Singh and Zammit, 2006). Nenova (2009) points out that the main 
challenges in terms of corporate governance for the developing countries are: (1) value 
transfer (from non-controlling shareholders or stakeholders) to dominate large 
shareholders; (2) ineffective disclosure practices; (3) weak legal framework; and (4) 
audit problem.  
A consensus has been reached amongst practitioners and scholars that the optimal form 
of governance is specific to the firm; as such, the context for the operations of a 
particular firm dictate the best structure for governance, even for firms that compete in 
the same sector of the market place (Ararat and Dallas, 2011). Numerous aspects of 
emerging markets have been shown to have fundamental importance in influencing the 
choices made with regard to the governance of a firm, such as the ownership structure, 
development of the financial market and the quality of the public governance (Fan et al., 
2011; Ararat and Dallas, 2011; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). The degree of 
enforcement of the law is affected by the quality of the public governance, and various 
forms of corruption can proliferate if public governance is weak. Corporate 
transparency and the quality of corporate governance are influenced by these factors 
and, overall, weakness in the legal context for business can often hamper the 
development of the financial market (Fan et al., 2011). Often, free cash is invested in 
new businesses controlled by shareholders as a result and this, obviously, can lead to 
expropriation of wealth by those shareholders and negative impacts on the financial 
health and performance of the firm (Ararat and Dallas, 2011). The challenges faced by 
corporations are determined, to a large extent, by the overall level of development of the 
political economy and the prevailing ownership structures for institutions (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2013).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) have argued that the concentration 
of ownership is high in emerging markets, where the rights of the shareholders is weak 
due to the lack, or inadequacy, of the regulations provided by the relevant laws. In 
countries where ownership is concentrated among just a handful of major shareholders, 
agency problems occur because of a misalignment of interests between managers and 
owners and, thus, agency problems are inherent with large or small shareholders. 
Agency problems can exist between one or more owners and managers and, 
furthermore, even if it is assumed that managers and large shareholders are the same 
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person, as is common in family companies, conflict still exists because of the potential 
misalignment of interests between managers and owners. Therefore, if it is assumed that 
the ownership is concentrated then agency theory can explain the conflict between 
managers and owners. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that when the ownership 
structure is concentrated, large and controlling shareholders contribute to the mitigation 
of the agency problems because they have the incentives, motivations and capacity to 
monitor the managers for the shared benefit of control (i.e. to the mutual benefit of all 
shareholders, whether large or small). On the other hand, large controlling shareholders 
might collude with managers to expropriate the firm resources and work for their own 
benefit which will result in increasing the agency problems leading to lower firm 
performance (Johnson et al., 2000).  
Moreover, it has been shown that the nature of the relationship between the board and 
business performance is determined by ownership structure (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013). The ability of a board to act on behalf of the shareholders and monitor managers 
effectively is of crucial importance for a corporation in emerging markets where 
corporate governance mechanisms tend to be weak (Douma et al., 2006). In listed firms 
in emerging economies, it is common for controlling families to occupy key managerial 
posts, and the succession planning of a firm is usually focused upon the appointment of 
other family members to managerial roles rather than external professionals (La Porta et 
al., 1998). The presence of family members on a company board, especially the founder, 
has been associated with better performance levels within certain countries; 
relationships can be of prime importance with tight connections amongst the business 
elite within countries such as Thailand. On the other hand, a more positive effect upon 
performance from the presence of outsiders has been shown within other markets, such 
as that in the Korean Republic (Fan et al., 2011). A high degree of independence for the 
board has been commonly recommended within corporate codes for governance, such 
as the UK Combined Code, and in the Cadbury Report. It is considered that there ought 
to be a high level of independence from the management within a board, with non-
executive directors forming a high proportion of the members and the roles of chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer being split, so that monitoring can improve and agency 
problems can reduce (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ararat and 
Dallas (2011) have also argued that when family members dominate boards they can 
become ineffective as there is not enough constructive criticism directed at the 
controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders can be inclined to pursue agendas 
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that are of little or no benefit to shareholders, with poor strategic decision-making 
having a negative impact upon the company.  
Findings from research undertaken in emerging markets have been mixed, with the data 
focused on the relationship between the performance of a firm and the mechanisms of 
corporate governance being inconclusive. Arrangements for governance in one state 
could offer optimal protection for the investor, whereas it could be suboptimal 
elsewhere. The level of concentration of ownership likely to affect control of the 
management and, hence, business performance, changes between countries as a result of 
differing regulatory contexts and varied degrees of effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanisms. In addition, as Ararat and Dallas (2011) have demonstrated, there may be 
more trust in knowledgeable external ‗friends‘ than in ‗independent‘ directors, in certain 
instances. Based on the aforementioned issues for the emerging market, this study will 
look more closely at measuring the impact of the ownership structure and the board of 
directors on firm performance in Jordan. Further details in the next chapter, supported 
by empirical studies, provide an explanation of these issues. 
2.5 Corporate Governance: International Principles and Practices 
Previous studies (Short et al., 1999; Franks and Mayer, 2001; Rosser, 2003; Solomon, 
2010) identified two main models of corporate governance: the outsider (or Anglo-
Saxon) model, which is used in US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; and the 
insider (or Continental) model, which is used in Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Finland. The salient features of the insider 
and outsider models are shown below in Table 2. 
The insider model of corporate governance is categorised by high reliance on bank 
finance, weak legal protection of minority shareholders, weak disclosure, concentrated 
ownership, a dominate part for the stakeholders in the ownership and management in 
the firms and limited freedom to merge or acquire (Rosser, 2003). Moreover, Solomon 
(2010) argues that the companies in the insider model are owned and controlled by a 
small number of major shareholders. He reports that those shareholders may be a small 
group of shareholders (e.g. lending banks), members of the companies (e.g. founding 
families) and the state. In addition, Solomon (2010) points out that the insider model 
referred also to relationship-based systems because of the close relationship between 
corporations and their dominant shareholders. 
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From first glance, it would appear that a close relationship between the management and 
the shareholders would limit the agency problem; there is little effort to align the 
interests of the company management and the shareholders if they are the largely same 
persons. However, other corporate governance problems appear to surface in such 
scenarios, such as with regard to the low level of separation of ownership and control 
(particularly in family companies) (Solomon, 2010). There may be an expropriation of 
the minority shareholders interest because of the problem of information asymmetry 
because the minority shareholders are unable to gain any information about the 
company operations due to lack of transparency. In such situations, vague financial 
transactions and the misuse of the assets are common (Solomon, 2010). 
Table 2: Characteristics of insider and outsider corporate governance systems 
Model Insider Outsider 
Owners  Insider shareholders Outsider shareholders 
Ownership structure Concentrated Dispersed 
Separation of 
ownership and 
control  
Little Separated 
Control over 
management 
Insider 
shareholders 
Managers 
Hostile takeover 
activity  
Rare Frequent 
Protection of 
investors  
Weak Strong 
Shareholders’ rights Potential for abuse of power Potential for shareholder by 
majority shareholders 
democracy 
Shareholders voting Shareholder voting 
Majority of shareholders tend 
to have more voice in their 
investee companies 
Shareholders characterized 
more by exit than by voice 
Source: Solomon (2010, p. 196) 
In contrast to the insider model the outsider model is characterised by high reliance on 
equity finance, strong legal protection of shareholders (especially minority 
shareholders), dispersed ownership, a diminished role for employees, creditors and 
other stakeholders, strong bankruptcy regulations, substantial freedom to merge and 
acquire and strong requirement for disclosure (Rosser, 2003). Albeit outside (Anglo-
Saxon) model companies are owned by outside shareholders such as individuals or 
financial institutions, they are managed and controlled by their managers (Solomon, 
2010). As a corollary, Berle and Means (1932) point out that this will result in 
separation of ownership and control. The agency problems resulting from this 
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separation have been explained previously in this chapter (subsection 2.3.1). Different 
researchers (Fukuyama, 1992; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000; Rosser, 2003) argue 
that globalisation played a central role in merging the different corporate governance 
models across the globe and assimilating them to the Anglo-Saxon/outsider model. 
Therefore, all jurisdictions as a corollary can be expected to transfer to the Anglo-Saxon 
or the outsider legislative setup. 
Singh (2003) reports that most emerging markets are imperfect. He points that these 
markets suffer from information asymmetry, accounting transparency, governance and 
corruption to a much greater extent than markets in developed countries. Bruner et al. 
(2002) argue that one of the most substantial reasons for the economic crises in the 
emerging markets is the weakness of the corporate governance practices. Singh and 
Zammit (2006) asserted on the above studies arguing that the most important 
imperfections of the emerging business are: (1) poor state of competition; (2) poor 
corporate governance; and (3) the close relationship between business, government and 
banks. Therefore, Singh (2003) believes that it necessary for emerging markets to 
improve their standards of corporate governance. Klapper and Love (2004) recommend 
that these markets to encourage companies to have good corporate governance practice. 
As discussed later in chapter four, Jordan underwent widespread economic and political 
reforms from the 1990s and into the 2000s, in an effort to show that the Jordanian 
companies are well governed. In addition, an attempt was made to apply the corporate 
governance principles in their companies. This motivated the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC) to issue the JCGC in 2006 (more details are discussed about this in 
chapter four). The JCGC has implemented many different corporate governance 
principles and standards that already exist worldwide in the international codes. In 
particular, the recommendations of the JCGC were heavily extracted from those of the 
OECD and the UK‘s Cadbury Report (1992), particularly the suggestions and 
recommendations of the internal corporate governance structure. The JCGC was 
influenced by the Cadbury Report (1992) and the OECD guidelines (2004) with 
particular regard to: 
1. Committees formed by the board of directors; 
2. Shareholders rights; 
3. Disclosure and transparency; 
4. The duties and the power of the audit committees; and 
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5. The separation between the chairman and the CEO. 
2.6 Summary 
Corporate governance is the system by which firms are directed and controlled. It deals 
with the ways suppliers of finance can ensure that they will get a return on their 
investment (Cadbury Committee, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Because the 
literature includes several definitions to clarify the meaning of corporate governance 
from different perspectives and understandings, this chapter defined corporate 
governance from two perspectives: shareholder and stakeholder. With a view to the 
objective of the thesis to investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance, the narrow definition is more relevant since it provides direct link between 
corporate governance and financial performance. This chapter reviewed agency theory, 
resource dependence theory and stewardship theory. The study used the agency theory 
as the main theory for this study to explore the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The objective of reviewing these theories is to find 
how corporate governance mechanisms are explained from the perspective of every 
theory. Finally, the chapter reviews corporate issues in developing countries and 
models. 
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CHAPTER 3:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
In the classic principal-agent model, the divergence of incentives whereby managers are 
prone to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholder value maximization 
causes agency problems. The main reasons managers can be anticipated to expropriate 
shareholders (thus necessitating agency costs) are related to their own job security, 
status and remuneration; managerial behaviours in this regard are generally linked to 
company size rather than firm performance. In order to monitor the activities of agents, 
agency costs are incurred by principals (and overall by the firm, representing a costly 
burden to general performance) in order to reduce the information asymmetry and assay 
the level of effort and performance of managers. The most obvious component of 
agency costs in this regard is monitoring costs arising from gathering information on the 
behaviour and actions of managers. Managers also bear bonding costs, which are 
difficult for principals to practically observe, which thus result in making efforts at the 
expense of their own utility and implementing the contractual terms in order to reduce 
the agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory provides a useful tool 
for providing insight into the suggestions for corporate governance mechanisms or 
arrangements that would mitigate the agency problems to enhance the principal returns. 
It also provides insight into why agents might be rewarded with performance-based 
incentives in the form of share ownership, and the role of external significant owners in 
exerting monitoring control in order to mitigating agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency problems can be reduced by numerous 
corporate governance mechanisms in the agency model aiming to align the interests of 
owners and managers (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Internal governance mechanisms have been explored by numerous studies, 
particularly regarding board and ownership structures and the ways in which the 
intrinsic misalignment between the interests of shareholders and the managers can be 
aligned in order to improve firm performance. If agency problems resolved it is more 
likely the shareholders and managers interests are aligned thereby value maximization 
and better performance. 
The mechanisms proposed to reduce agency problems and to increase managerial 
incentives to align the interests of shareholders and mangers are explored in this 
chapter. Specifically, the main mechanisms that have used in this study to achieve this 
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aim are; board structure (e.g., board size, CEO duality and the presence of NEDs) and 
ownership structure (e.g., large shareholders or concentrated ownership, the identity of 
shareholders and managerial ownership). In addition, the study will investigate the 
impact of foreign investors on firm performance. 
3.2 Board of Directors 
The fundamental role of the board of directors is to monitor the managerial side of the 
firm and to minimize the problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship. In this 
sense, principals are the owners, agents are the managers and the board of directors act 
as the monitoring mechanism. If the interests of the agent and the principal are 
misaligned, an agency problem exists. There is always the potential for agency 
problems, mainly that agents will pursue their own objectives at the expense of the 
principals, for which reason principals appoint members of the board of directors as 
well as agents to ensure that the firm is working in the interests of its owners. This 
divergence of interests and the need to oversee agents causes the firm to incur agency 
costs, including monitoring and bonding costs as well as and residual losses (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Ultimately, the principals bear these costs, thus the reduction of 
agency costs is part of the duty of maximizing shareholders‘ value. 
The board of directors is the apex of hierarchical corporate control systems, and its 
primary role is to monitor the management by agents on behalf of principals 
(shareholders) who elect its members. The more power and control the board exercises 
over managers, the less opportunity managers (agents) have for activities not geared to 
the maximization of shareholder value (Liu and Fong, 2010). Thus the board of 
directors is essentially a monitoring mechanism to protect principals‘ interests (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). An independent board is generally viewed favourably as part of an 
efficient governance mechanism, because independence from management clearly 
enhances the ability of the board to exercise its function of overseeing the former on 
behalf of principals (Liu and Fong, 2010). 
Consequently, the board of directors has the power to engage, dismiss and compensate 
top-level managers, to ratify and monitor important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Gillan, 2006; Yermack, 1996; Booth et al., 2002; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009) and to 
ensure that executive directors are pursuing the interests of principals. According to 
Fama (1980), the board of directors is viewed as important tool or devise to scrutinize 
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the company manager‘s decisions. From the agency theory viewpoint, the role of the 
board of directors is to provide the most effective device to attain corporate governance 
that ensures their interests; in other words, it is instituted primarily in order to mitigate 
agency problems (Fama, 1980). Resource dependency theory sees the board of directors 
as a co-optative mechanism with the role of calibrating the firm with external 
environmental demands (Aguilera and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009). In the list it is 2009 
Agency theory thus relies on a more basic understanding of human nature in contracting 
agreements and accords agents a more important role in firm performance. 
Solomon (2010) recommended some principles to be complied in the construction of 
boards, to ensure the best structure: meeting frequently, effective communication 
between board members and shareholders, willingness to consider suggestions from 
each other, high level of integrity, concern about financial risks and awareness and 
rationale to solve financial problems, and to take any course of action to improve the 
efficiency of the company. Walker (2005) stated that a significant concern to which 
attention should be given in the construction of a board structure is the appropriate 
appointing and compensation of directors. Ingely and Walt (2002) supported the 
promotion of the diversity of the board by focusing on some criteria to select the 
appropriate directors: qualified individuals of both genders, and members with diversity 
of experience. The effectiveness of a board is measured by the extent to which it adds 
value to the company. These suggestions are reflected in acceptance governance 
practices, for example the UK Combined Code states that: 
―The board‘s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company 
within a frame work of prudent and effective controls which enables risk 
to be assessed and managed. The board should set the company‘s 
strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources 
are in place for the company to meet its objectives and review 
management performance. The board should set the company‘s values 
and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and 
others are understood and met‖. (UK Combined Code, 2006, p. 3) 
Directors‘ responsibilities have been classified into three groups: control, services and 
resource dependence. Because the managers‘ responsibility is to work in the best 
interest of shareholders, the control role demands the directors to be responsible to hire 
and fire the managers and the CEO and to make sure that managers are working in the 
best interests of the shareholders (Monks and Minow, 1995). The service role consist of 
directors counselling and advising the CEO and any top managers in relation to any 
administrative, managerial issues and framing the company strategies (Johnson and 
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Daily, 1996). Resource dependence theory holds that the board is a fundamental 
assistant of the company. It is important to contact external linkages to have more 
resources to improve firm success. In order to improve the success of the firm, it is 
important that directors satisfy this role by counsel or representation with other 
institutions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
As a solution to the conflict between the board and the CEO in general, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that the majority of board members should be NEDs, who are 
supposed as independent and can act as mediators in disagreements among top 
executives and search for the replacements of the internal managers. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) propose that if the board of the director is independent, this will 
motivate the directors inside the board to monitor the CEO behaviours. Therefore, it is 
important for the directors to preserve for their independence to maintain their 
monitoring role in order to replace poor performing CEOs managers. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) suggested that the major conflict within the boardroom is between the 
directors and the CEOs, since the latter have the incentive to control the board in order 
to maintain their positions and to increase their interests and benefits. 
Following the prevailing theme elaborated upon above, namely the context in which the 
optimum boardroom is composed of executives to run the day-to-day operations of the 
firm and NEDs to monitor executives, the important research issue which emerges 
regarding the board is how to make the effectiveness of the board of the directors as an 
internal monitoring control mechanism. Affirming the importance of this issue, the 
Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC, 2006) provides recommendations that 
the board size should comprise between five and thirteen members, with a sufficient 
balance of skills and experience. The roles of the CEO and the chairman should be 
separated from each other (i.e. no CEO duality) and one-third of the board should be 
NEDs. Due to these JCGC (2006) specifications, the board size, CEO duality and the 
percentage of the NEDs were consequently chosen as variables for the board structure 
for this study. 
An effective board successfully monitors the management and is an important tool to 
facilitate board members‘ commitment to firm strategies to reduce the managerial 
activities unaligned with shareholder interests. Consequently, the quality of the board 
decisions ultimately affects firm performance and value; better monitoring of 
management makes it more likely that managers will act in the best interests of the 
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shareholders, which means that profitability of operations will be increased along with 
the value of shares, reducing the agency conflict between managers and shredders. The 
major concern of shareholders is to maximise the return on their investment. The 
following sections discuss three different mechanisms (e.g. board size, CEO duality and 
non-executive directors) and their impacts on firm performance. 
3.2.1 Board of directors’ sub-committees 
Corporate boards‘ efficiency is enhanced by board committees (Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
Harrison (1987) stated that there are two main board committee types: monitoring or 
oversight, and management supporting or operating. Operating board committees advise 
management and the board about major business decision. Their monitoring 
counterparts are intended to protect shareholder interests by providing objective, 
independent review of corporate executives and affairs. A key monitoring function of 
the board of directors according to the agency theory paradigm is to ensure proper 
auditing of corporate activities (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), as well as proper appointment and remuneration of senior management and 
directors (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
Concurring with the agency model, the Cadbury Report (1992) argued that board 
committees are an additional control mechanism to encourage increased accountability 
and optimum financial management of firms, with increased protection of shareholder 
interests (Cadbury, 1992). Harrison (1987) argues that shareholder protection and 
generally responsible behaviour can be induced in corporate boards due to the 
successful application of board committees. The specialist functions of board 
committees thus promote the credibility, legitimacy and accountability of corporate 
governance. Hence, the board committees will help in reducing the asymmetric 
information and the conflict between the principal and the agent leading to lower costs 
and higher returns for the shareholders and better firm value (Weir et al., 2002). 
The practical implications of board committees are reflected in the fact that a significant 
proliferation in their use has occurred since the early 1980s (Harrison, 1987), and most 
corporate governance codes advocate such committees (e.g. Cadbury Report, 1992; 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002‘ UK Combined Code, 2006), mainly related to functions 
concerning nomination committees, remuneration and auditing. However, although 
some theoretical literature claims that such committees can positively affect 
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performance (e.g. Harrison, 1987; Sun and Cahan, 2009; Wild, 1994), and monitoring 
committees are increasingly prevalent in practice, their actual impacts on financial 
performance remain unclear. 
Unlike operating committees, which are usually dominated by insiders, NEDs usually 
form the bulk of monitoring board committees, thus rendering them more reliable in 
protecting minority shareholders‘ interests ( Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999b). Additionally, 
the smaller size of board committees means they can meet more frequently, enabling 
meaningful analysis and discussion, and promoting efficient decision-making 
(Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005). The prevalence of NEDs in board committees also 
incorporates external expertise and knowledge into the decision-making process of the 
board (Harrison, 1987), freeing the main board to focus on strategic interests. The 
specialist functions of board committees thus promote the credibility, legitimacy and 
accountability of corporate governance (Weir et al., 2002). 
The audit committee mainly functions to regularly meet with auditors (internal and 
external) to review audit processes, financial statements and internal accounting 
controls. Clearly this contributes to the reduction of information asymmetry and 
consequently agency costs by allowing for the timely disclosure of verified accounting 
information to shareholders (Klein, 1998). The potential for financial fraud is minimised 
by audit committee monitoring, which consequently increases investor confidence and 
firm value. Audit committees require more transparency from management, thus 
enhancing the quality of financial disclosure (Klein, 1998), particularly to shareholders, 
thus reducing the agency problem. Understanding the internal control evaluation 
process is clearly essential for an audit committee to assay features such as audit plan 
and to discover negative behaviours (e.g. fraudulent activities) and errors (Caplan, 1999; 
DeZoort, 1998). 
The determination of the compensation of senior personnel by the remuneration 
committeealso reduces the agency problem incentivising managers in alignment with 
shareholders' interests (Klein, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000). Improper monitoring of 
remuneration for executives can induce them to conspire with the CEO to award 
themselves higher compensation, thus independent directors should be the sole arbiters 
of remuneration committees, both to protect shareholders and to ensure that 
remuneration is an instrument for improving performance (Gregory, 2002; Monks, 
2001; Vafeas, 1999;Yermack, 1997). However, such independent directors often consult 
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external experts to inform their remuneration decisions, which can be undermined if this 
advice is delivered inappropriately (Monks, 2001). 
The nominationcommitteeminimises agency conflict by improving board independence 
and the quality of appointed directors (Vefeas, 1999b; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998). 
Nomination committees play an important role to strengthen the board composition via 
the director selection procedure (Cadbury Report, 1992). In this sense, the ability of the 
NEDs to perform their monitoring role on the management depends on the board 
recruitment process and their independence (Vafeas, 1999). The possibility of conflicts 
of interest for outside directors in evaluating CEOs arises due to a lack of nominating 
committees; clearly this scenario is prone to result in CEOs receiving excessive 
remuneration (Westphal and Zajac, 1995), consequently undermining firm performance 
(Harrison, 1987). This form of agency conflict can be reduced by improving the 
application of nominating committees (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). 
However, other authors have declared that board committees can have negative impacts 
on firms‘ financial performance. Most obviously, board committees intrinsically result 
in extra costs by their very existence, costing firms in terms of remuneration and 
facilities for committee members, managerial time and travel expenses (Vefeas, 1999a). 
Secondly, extensive managerial supervision can undermine executive initiative and 
vision (Conger et al., 1998; Goodstein, et al., 1994; Vefeas, 1999a, 1999b). Thirdly, it 
could be superfluous by replicating the duties and responsibilities of corporate boards. 
Finally, the increasing lack of specific expertise among board members (i.e. greater 
heterogeneity) will promote conflicts and undermine boardroom cohesion. 
There have been some empirical studies concerning the impacts of audit committees. 
Wild (1994) examined market reactions before and after their establishment with a 
sample of 260 US-listed firms from 1966 to 1980. He found a statistically significant 
improvement in share returns following audit committee establishment, suggesting that 
the committees increase managerial accountability to shareholders. Using a sample of 
606 large US-listed firms, Vefeas (1999b) found a positive relationship between the 
quality of new director appointments and the establishment of nomination committees, 
suggesting that the latter improve board quality, consequently improving board 
effectiveness in monitoring and advisory functions. A sample of 220 large British-listed 
firms was used by Main and Johnston (1993) to study the role of remuneration 
committees. They found that remuneration committees were linked to higher executive 
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pay and reduced shareholder value. Using a sample of 486 US-listed firms for the 
period 1992-1993, Klein (1998) examined the connections between audit, 
compensation, and nomination committees‘ establishment and financial performance; 
she found no statistically significant relationships, and demonstrated the robustness of 
her results despite changes in committees‘ membership composition. Similarly, Bozec 
(2005) and Vefeas and Theodorou (1998) found no empirical relationship between 
financial performance and the presence of board committees. 
Hence, every committee is linked to specific functions; if all committees in a firm fulfil 
their duties by oversee and monitor the management activities objectively this should 
decrease agency conflicts and improve the alignment of shareholder and manager 
interests, resulting in value maximization for the shareholder wealth and improved the 
firm performance. 
This study does not examine the impact of board sub-committees for Jordanian 
companies because no data are available from annual reports and the Osiris database 
concerning them. The researcher endeavoured to contact the companies to conduct 
interviews by calling and emailing them in order to collect information regarding 
whether they have such committees and their composition. However, of 115 companies 
approached, only 19 responded, most of which stated that they do not have such 
committees within their board structure. This is because companies were voluntarily 
required to have board committees before 2006. In 2006 the JCGC stipulated that the 
board of directors must form audit, remuneration and nomination committees, which 
came into effect from the beginning of 2007. However, the concept and term of ‗board 
committees‘ is still new for these companies, and few have tried to establish them. This 
is related to the nature of the company and complexity of the business. Furthermore, the 
JCGC is voluntary, so there is not statistical information available from the Jordanian 
company control department to ascertain the extent to which companies have actually 
implemented this recommendation. 
Since this study began in 2000 the researcher was unable to examine the effect of these 
committees; however, it is clear that board committee structure in Jordan is a rich area 
for further investigations. 
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3.2.2 Board size 
When the concept of boards is accepted, it can be intuitively assumed that a larger board 
is preferable, as this enables the inclusion of more diverse board members brining 
different areas of expertise; however, increased board size causes increased problems of 
coordination and communication, undermining board effectiveness in monitoring agents 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998; Jensen,1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Additionally, larger 
boards have been fodunt o be characterised by decreased ability of directors to criticise 
top managers and to analyse and discuss firm performance seriously (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). 
Jensen (1993) proposes that large boards are more likely to face high costs to monitor 
the firm and they are less likely to have effective function when the size of the board 
more than seven or eight people. The agency model suggests that as board size becomes 
large, the agency problem related to director freeriding increases and ―the board 
becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management process‖ (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). In large boards it is more likely to be controlled by the CEO rather 
than the board monitor and control the management. This will give the managers the 
spaces to pursue their own interests instead of aligning the interests of the shareholders 
and managers leading to increase the agency problems and thereby lower firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Kholief (2008) argues that as board size 
becomes larger it will be more difficult for board members to reach a consensus due to 
the more diverse opinions and ideas. Therefore, large boards are slower and less 
efficient in making decision. All of these actions might increase the agency conflict, 
because with less coordination and communications this will lead to decrease the board 
members ability to control and monitor management which might result in worse firm 
performance. 
In the same vein, Ahmed et al. (2006) argue that formulating and adopting new ideas 
and agreeing on different opinions are less likely to take place in large boards, which 
will result in less improvement of the board function to provide the manages with good 
ideas and contributions. Thus, the conflict in the board means that board members are 
less likely to work in the interests of the shareholders therefore agency problem 
increase. Cascio (2004) concluded that to-date there is still a debate about the optimal 
size of the board. In other words there is no specific formula that should be adopted or 
followed to define the number of directors inside the board: some studies support the 
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smaller boards and other studies find larger boards are more beneficial. Yermack (1996) 
reported that large boards are characterised by less coherence and poorer 
communication which might decreased the board members ability to monitor the 
management efficiently. This cause greater agency problem and costs resulting in lower 
firm performance. This cause greater agency problem and costs resulting in lower firm 
performance. Thus, related to the agency problem, large boards lead to more directors‘ 
free-riding problems, increasing the sharing costs and internal conflicts among 
directors. Therefore, these problems will result in increasing the agency problem and 
thereby lower returns and worse firm performance. 
However, CEO domination is characteristic of smaller boards, as the more powerful 
position of CEOs in such boards enables them to override decisions made by the board 
in accordance with their own interests, increasing agency problems and correspondingly 
undermining the performance of the firm (Miller, 2003). This result also confirms 
resource dependency theory‘s proposition, implying that large boards, due in part to 
their effective linkage (Pfeffer, 1972) and diversity (Goodstein et al., 1994), increased 
the likelihood of firm‘s performance by improving firm‘s ability to co-opt the turbulent 
environment (Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1988). This is in accordance with the aspect of 
resource dependency theory that affirms that the diversity and more effective cohesion 
of large boards boosts firm performance by transcending challenging market conditions 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1988; Pfeffer, 1972); the shortfall in 
linkage among smaller boards can deny undermine their access to credit. Additionally, 
large boards mitigate the agency problem by performing their strategic function more 
effectively, which is essential during periods of financial turbulence or distress to 
reduce agency problems (Mintzberg, 1983). Under such circumstances, the lack of 
diversity in smaller boards increases uncertainty concerning strategic development 
(Goodsteing et al., 1994; Mintzberg, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). This ultimately 
increases the agency problem and undermines performance in firms with smaller 
boards. 
Previous studies (Arosa et al., 2010; Dalton et al., 1999; Gales and Kesner, 1994; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; John and Senbet, 1998; Lehn et al., 2009; Yawson, 2006) 
found that large boards provide wider diversity of backgrounds, diversity in 
communications skills, experience and business contacts outside the company. Dalton et 
al. (1998) report that larger boards allow the directors to exchange more highly qualified 
counsels and presents extra scope for the possibility of correlation with different 
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external linkages. Large board also plays an important role in improving and enhancing 
the outcomes of the decisions because of sharing of ideas and contributions, which leads 
to provide the management with new ideas and opinions which might result in reducing 
the agency problem leading to better performance (Lehn et al., 2009). 
Empirically, the evidence regarding the relationship between board size and firm 
performance is mixed. Anderson et al (2004) found a negative relationship between the 
board size and the firm value. They outlined that financial markets react positively to 
the announcement of a board downsizing. Conversely, the announcement of increasing 
the number of directors in the board leads to reducing the equity value. They stated that 
this is not the general outline that can be applied to all companies, as it is not a linear 
reaction. They concluded that the companies who were affected negatively were small- 
and medium-sized companies, while large companies did not suffer from the same 
problem. 
Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship between the board size and firm 
performance, measured by Tobin‘s Q for 452 large US public firms during the period 
1984 to 1991. He omitted the utility and financial companies from his sample because 
of the government regulations adopted by boards of directors in such companies. The 
study found that a small board has more favourable values for financial ratio. Also, 
Yermack (1996) stated that the incremental cost will increase as long the number of 
board members increases, and the company will have higher market value if the number 
of the board is smaller. He proved that corporations and companies are more valued in 
the capital markets by testing different independent variables, for instance board 
composition, the presence of growth opportunities, diversification and company age. All 
of those independent variables did not change the result that the small boards are better 
from the large ones in improving firm performance. Small boards have been found to be 
more productive than large ones, evidenced by decreased efficiency when board size 
increases, which is attributed to barriers in coordination and processes (Dahya et al., 
2002; Guest, 2008; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Yermack, 1996). However, Eisenberg et al., (1998) argued that Yermack‘s (1996) 
sample concentrating on large firms means that his findings cannot be transposed to 
smaller firms, which vary according to differences in the cultural environment. 
Eisenberg et al., 1998) studied 879 small- and medium-sized Finnish companies for the 
period 1992 to 1994, and found a negative relationship between the board size and the 
firm profitability measured by return on assets (ROA). In accordance with Yermack 
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(1996), different studies (Bozec, 2005; Cheng et al., 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Guest, 
2008 Vefeas, 1999a) confirmed that small boards are more likely to be associated with 
lower agency costs leading to better performance. 
In contrast, other researchers reported that increased board size impacts the firm 
performance positively.Larmou and Vafeas (2010); Sheikh et al. (2012) found that 
when the board size increases the market responds favourably. In their study they report 
that large boards provide better monitoring for companies with poor operating 
performance due to their diversity of backgrounds and communications skills. Sanda et 
al., (2005) studying a sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms during the period 1996 to 1999, 
found a positive correlation between the board size and the firm profitability as 
measured by return on equity (ROE). Their results support that large boards have better 
access than smaller ones to the external environment by offering better chances to have 
wide resource for finance and raw materials. This is in line with resource dependence 
theory that large boards offer greater access to their firm external environment, which 
facilitate and secure critical resources (e.g. raw materials and finance) and reduces 
uncertainties (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found a positive 
relationship between the board size and the firm performance as measured by ROA, 
which is in contrast with their prior finding of a negative relationship between board 
size and the firm performance measured by Tobin‘s Q. The later result is consistent with 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Beiner et al., (2006) and Coles et al., (2008). This 
divergence takes place because of the perceptions of the investors and the management 
for the large boards which is based on large boards enhancing the knowledge of the 
business. Basically, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that the wider knowledge base 
inherent in larger boards facilitates better business decisions to reduce the agency 
problem. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) also found a positive relationship between 
the board size and the firm performance of 72 Zimbabwean listed firms for the period 
2002 to 2004. They demonstrated that their results stayed fixed and unchanged even if 
using inflation adjusted data. This indicates that large boards provide important role of 
effective monitoring in uncertain economic and political periods to reduce agency 
problems and improve firm performance. Finally, Ho and Williams (2003); Mangena 
and Chamisa (2008) and Topak (2011) reported that there is no relationship between the 
board size and firm performance. 
As can be seen above from the mixed results, there is no consensus as to whether larger 
or smaller boards are better to monitor the firm. Thus, board size issue is primarily 
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concerned with the board ability to monitor and control managers. Therefore, if 
monitoring is implemented it is more likely managers‘ behaviours will be controlled 
and agency problems are reduced which might result in better firm performance. In 
other words, if the managers have restricted parameters to do what they are supposed to 
do, it is difficult for them to deviate from the interests of the owners due to the close 
monitoring from the board members which should lead to take decisions and actions to 
maximize the value of the shares and thereby better performance. 
In Jordan, the JCGC was released in 2006 to build and develop the capital market and 
for improving the regulatory framework. It states that: 
―The administration of the Company is entrusted to a board of directors 
whose members shall be not less than five and not more than thirteen, as 
determined by the Company‘s memorandum of association.‖ (JCGC, 
2006, p. 7) 
In Jordan, the legislators identified that the size of the board should be between five and 
thirteen. However, some companies may not follow these instructions and 
recommendations. This is because not all the companies have the same size and the 
same nature of work. Therefore, the size might vary from company to another company. 
3.2.3 CEO duality 
Another board of director variable that might increase or reduce the agency problem is 
CEO duality. CEO duality refers to the board leadership structure in terms of whether 
the CEO and the chairman are the same person or not. In order to study the impact of 
CEO duality on firm performance, two paradigms will be employed in this section: 
agency and stewardship theories. The agency theory supports the idea of separation 
between the CEO and the chairman, to increase board independence from management, 
which (theoretically) results in better performance due to better monitoring and 
overseeing (Jensen, 1993). On the other hand, stewardship theory argues against 
separation, because it is based on duality. According to the stewardship paradigm, 
effective management is based on the principle of the unity of command. . This is 
because when responsibilities and decisions are restricted to one person, this might 
facilitates greater understanding and knowledge of the company operations and better 
decisions which will result in reduce the agency costs and positive impact on firm 
performance (Adams et al., 2005; Arosa et al., 2012; Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Davis et 
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al., 1997; Donaldson and Daives, 1991; Finkelstein and D‘Aveni, 1994; Peng et al., 
2010). 
From the agency theory perspective, the chairman has an important role and duties in 
the board in monitoring, running board meetings, making sure that all the issues that 
related to the company are listed in the agenda to be discussed in the board meeting, 
hiring and firing, and replacing the CEO if the latter is deemed to be negligent in 
serving the interests of the shareholders; the CEO ordinarily manages the company and 
is responsible for implementing the firm strategies and policies (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Due to this perspective, the chairman responsibilities and tasks inside the board 
remunerating the CEO and overseeing the board. So by combining these roles in one 
person can result in increasing agency problems by diluting the effectiveness of 
monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Mallette and Fowler (1992) pointed out that 
combining the two roles of the CEO and the chairman in same person will lead to 
increasing their control overall, and will reduce the power of the board. . In other words, 
CEO duality will lead to the entrenchment of managers or the CEO and curbs the 
independent director‘s ability to monitor and to fulfil their governance role. This will 
increase the conflict between the principal and agent therefore the CEO duality is more 
likely to affect the firm performance negatively. Therefore, to ensure the board 
independence it is recommended to split the two positions from each other by providing 
efficient checks and balances over the managerial behaviour (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Ehikioya, 2009; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). This might help in preventing 
managers from pursuing their own benefits and self-interests to the advantage of the 
shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that separation of the roles of the chairman 
and the CEO demarcates the boundaries between the management‘s decision control 
function and the monitoring function of the NEDs. 
The UK Combined Code also recommends the separation of the role of CEO and 
chairman, stating that: 
―There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the 
company between the running of the board and the executive 
responsibility for the running of the company‘s business. No one 
individual should have unfettered powers of decision‖. (UK Combined 
Code, 2006, p. 4) 
On the other hand, from the stewardship theory perspective CEO duality might impact 
the firm performance positively as he has specific knowledge about the company, its 
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investment opportunities and its strategic direction it is more likely he can help to 
optimize decision-making (Weir et al., 2002). Brickley et al. (1997) and Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) suggest that if the chairman is also the CEO he will provide his 
knowledge to the directors, which will help them to play their advisory role more 
effectively therefore it is more likely duality will affect the firm performance positively. 
More decisive and cohesive strategic decisions can be made with CEO duality by 
circumventing conflicts between the CEO and chairman (Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley et 
al., 1997; Harris and Helfat, 1998 
If the stewardship theory is accepted, the CEO is actively engaged and motivated to lead 
the firm effectively according to stewardship behaviour (Boyd, 1995), thus CEO duality 
is anticipated to benefit firms, particularly in complex or challenging conditions 
(Chahine and Tohme, 2009).CEO duality is more common in small firms due to them 
tending to have more concentrated ownership structures and corresponding integration 
of roles (Machold et al., 2011). Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) propose that CEO duality 
will help in reducing the costs that related to extra compensations or managerial 
remunerations. In addition, CEO duality improves the accountability of the firm by 
providing easier methods to identify and to blame the CEO with any poor performance 
(Bozec, 2005; Abor, 2007; Sheikh et al., 2012). 
Empirically, Rechner and Dalton (1991) in their study of 141 large companies (Fortune 
500 firms) used accounting measurements such as ROE, Profit Margin PM and ROI 
from 1978 to 1983 and found that firms with separated boards perform better than firms 
that have CEO duality in their boards. Dahya et al. (1996) investigated the CEO duality 
in the UK for listed companies; they found the stock market is more favourable when 
the two roles are split from each other. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) studied the effect of 
the role of CEO duality on the firm performance for 347 Malaysian listed firms. They 
report that splitting the two roles from each other will result in better financial 
performance. Chahine and Tohme (2009) in their study of 127 initial price offerings 
(IPOs) firms used a sample from the Middle East and North Africa to investigate the 
relationship between initial under-pricing and the CEO duality, finding that firms that 
combine the two roles in same person have more potential to face under-pricing. These 
findings support the agency view that splitting the two roles will remove the constraints 
on the board members to perform their role effectively to monitor the management 
opportunistic behaviour. In other words, splitting the two roles will reduce the CEO 
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power to take advantage for his own interests rather than the interests of the 
shareholders‘ interests or the company. 
In contrast, other studies (Boyd, 1995; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Elsayed, 2007; Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003) found a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Boyd (1995) reported that combining the roles leads to better decisions 
without interference by any other party. Donaldson and Davis (1991) claim that CEO 
duality provides a unified leadership of the firm that facilitates greater understanding 
and knowledge. These findings are consistent with the view that CEO duality enhances 
decision making by focusing on the firm objectives to improve performance. Finally, 
Bozec (2005) in his study of a sample of 25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2000 did not 
find any impact on the sales, return on sales, assets turnover and sales efficiency. In 
addition, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) did not find any significant relationship between 
the CEO duality and the firm performance measured by Tobin‘s Q for 347 Malaysian 
Listed firms. Similarly, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) did not find any impact for the 
CEO duality on the financial performance for 81 South African listed firms from 1999 
to 2005. 
As we shown above, the previous studies‘ results are mixed with regard to the CEO 
duality. From the agency perspective CEO duality might result in inefficient supervision 
of managerial opportunism, exacerbating the agency problem and facilitating CEO 
domination of the board, undermining the monitoring function of the latter, which 
affects firm performance negatively. On the other hand, CEO duality might be an 
advantage to the firm performance. This is because CEO duality might provide a unified 
leadership of the company that facilitate better knowledge and understanding of the 
company decisions and operations. 
In Jordan, the recommendation of the JCGC 2006 recommended to split the two roles 
from each other. 
3.2.4 Non-executive directors (NEDs) 
The nature of board composition and its impact on performance is highly debatable. 
Directors can be classified either as executive (i.e. personnel simultaneously assuming 
the roles of managers and directors) or non-executive directors, and each category is 
characterised by different incentives and behaviours (De Andres et al., 2005). A 
combination of both is advised by most national and international corporate governance 
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codes (e.g. the Combined Code in the UK, the OECD Code and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in the US). Agency theory affirms that sufficient monitoring mechanisms are necessary 
to protect shareholders from the self-interest of management, and the optimum 
regulators for this are NEDs. It is therefore expected that a higher proportion of NEDs 
in a board indicate improved monitoring and consequently reduced agency problems 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Some authors have cited other 
features of NEDs (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998; Linck et al., 2008; Raheja, 2005). Raheja (2005) argued that 
executives are intrinsically beneficial to boards due to their experience and firm-specific 
information, but they can be motivated by self-interest at the expense of the firm and 
shareholders; conversely, NEDs provide independent monitoring and improve firm 
performance, but they have less detailed knowledge about the daily operations of firms 
compared to executives. The emergent consensus is that a diverse, vigilant and strong 
board of directors exerts a positive influence on firm value, particularly due to improved 
strategic decision-making and innovation (Gabrielsson, 2007a). The more effective 
monitoring role of NEDs and their function as disciplinarians of managers was 
acknowledged by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), but they found no significant 
relationship between the proportion of NEDs in the board and firm performance. A 
greater proportion of NEDs improves boards‘ power over CEOs (Gabrielsson, 2007a) 
thus the monitoring function of boards under agency theory favours the presence of 
NEDs to safeguard shareholders‘ interest and to oversee executive activities (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000). 
Other theoretical perspectives (besides agency theory) have been invoked to explain the 
roles and composition of boards. The resource-based view focuses more on the service 
role, whereby boards are a strategic resource to secure critical firm requirements, and 
are responsible for the coordination of inter-organisational dependencies (Pfeffer, 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to resource dependence perspective, the 
resources and capacities of firms‘ internal environment is essential for competitive 
advantage, and the board has a fundamental advisory role in this aspect (Daily and 
Dalton, 1993; Teece et al., 1997), particularly NEDs who can bring external knowledge 
and skills to the management team (Garcia et al., 2010; Machold et al., 2011). 
Fundamentally, NEDs under the resource dependency perspective function not to 
control managers but to enhance the resource and service needs of the CEO (Fiegener et 
al., 2000), including compensating for the deficiencies of the latter (Huse, 1990). 
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The advisory role of the board is therefore connected to the service role and strategic 
networks (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000). NEDs can thus be perceived as nodes 
linking the external and internal environments of firms to enhance managerial functions 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). This explains why NEDs are typically 
powerful and notable people who exploit their personal networks to increase the 
reputation, legitimacy and ultimately value of firms (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). NEDs can also overcome the human resources shortfall common among 
complex firms (Daily and Dalton, 1993), improving decision making as well as 
increasing supervision (Huse, 1990). Thus it can be expected that NEDs should function 
to mediate conflict/misalignment between managers and owners, maximizing 
shareholder wealth and ultimately improving firm performance. 
Conversely, it is the view of stewardship theory that NEDs are less able to monitor 
managers than insider directors due to their lack of specialist knowledge of firms‘ 
internal operations. Baysinger and Hookisson (1990); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); 
Weir and Laing (2000); Bozec (2005); Jiraporn et al., (2009) argue that the NEDs are 
commonly part-time workers, this will undermine their ability to monitor and advise the 
board because of the lack of the information that they have, and the lack of information 
concerning daily activities will reduce the NEDs‘ ability to apply their function 
efficiently. As a result, board dominated by high levels of NEDs will result in decisions 
with lower quality, and this in turn will result in negative impact on firm performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Hart (1995) argue that NEDs often lack information 
about the firm, do not bring the requisite skills to the job and they are too busy in their 
companies to contribute effectively. This might result in reduce their monitoring 
function to monitor the management behaviour who might start to work for their own 
interests rather than the interests of the shareholders and the company. This will 
increase the agency problem leading to negative impact on firm performance. Weir and 
Laing (2000) and Higgs Report (2003) report that because NEDs are part-time workers, 
they are unfamiliar with all the operations and business in the company, which results in 
their inability to comprehend the complications and difficulties that face the company. 
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) argued that it is difficult for NEDs to improve the firm 
performance for different reasons. Firstly, in some companies it may be there some 
private connections between the chief executive director and the NEDs; therefore this 
reduces the contributions of the latter. Secondly, by appointing some NEDs in some 
boards for long periods, their incentive to perform their jobs in a positive way is 
56 
reduced. Finally, in some boards the NEDs could be executive directors in other 
companies, which also undermine their incentive to execute their role efficiently. 
Although agency theory suggests that NEDs‘ representation improves firm 
performance, empirical evidence shows mixed results (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; 
Gordini, 2012; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Gordini (2012) examined the effect of 
outsiders on firm performance measured by ROA and ROI for a sample of 950 Italian 
small family firms (SFFs) from 2007 to 2009. Gordini reported a positive relationship 
between them and reports that the NEDs improved firm performance and added value to 
the firm through their contributions such as skills, experiences and their linkage to the 
external resources. Khan and Awan (2012) found a positive significant relationship 
between the outside directors and the firm performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
Tobin‘s Q. They conclude that the greater the percentage of outsiders in the board will 
result in better firm performance and add value to the firm. This is because of the close 
monitoring and their valuable advices and contribution to the company. These findings 
are consistent with the view of agency theory and resource dependence theory, namely 
that NEDs are effective monitors and a disciplining device for managerial behaviour. 
Conversely, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bozec (2005) and Yermack (1996) provided 
evidence of a negative relationship between the NEDs and some performance measures. 
The third stream of this relationship provides evidence for no relationship between 
NEDs and firm performance (e.g. Arosa et al., 2012; Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Kumar and Singh, 2012). Thus, from an agency 
perspective, the NEDs are essential for the monitoring function as a safeguard for the 
shareholders‘ interests to monitor the manager‘s behaviours to reduce the agency 
problems to improve firm performance. This notion was supported also from the 
resource dependence theory view; NEDs provide the board with external experience, 
skills, knowledge and linkages to external network relationship. This will compensate 
for the skills of the internal directors and contribute with more ideas and knowledge. 
This might help in reducing the agency problem and affect the performance positively. 
As a result, if the NEDs perform their monitoring tasks and duties effectively, the 
likelihood of preventing management from expropriating the firm assets will be 
increased. This underlines the appropriateness of NEDs as a trustworthy regulatory 
mechanism in boards to ensure that managers function to maximise shareholders‘ 
wealth. 
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On the other hand, according to the stewardship theory perspective, due to the lack of 
the information that the NEDs have and because they are part time workers the 
proponents for this view, it can be assumed that this will reduce their ability to apply 
their function efficiently, and thereby impact the firm performance negatively. The 
boards in Jordanian firms have a one-tier board structure; both executive and non-
executive directors sit on the same board. According to the JCGC (2006), the board size 
should range from 5 to 13 members and an NED is defined as ―an employee of the 
Company nor receiving a salary therefrom‖. In addition, according to the Code ―at least 
1/3 of the board members must be non-executive, to comply with the board committees 
requirements‖. 
3.3 Ownership Structure 
The modern understanding of the principal-agent relationship can be traced to the 
seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). They observed that during the late-19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 centuries, traditional family ownership had been supplanted as the 
predominant modus operandi of US business by modern publicly traded companies, and 
that this had the effect of separating ownership from control of companies. A new class 
of managers had emerged in control of US firms, meaning that the dispersed small 
shareholders were effectively powerless. This work was particularly pressing in the 
context of the 1930s Great Depression, as corporate governance and managerial 
behaviour were key issues in the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Thus from the inception of 
modern studies of corporate governance, it has been assumed that a latent divergence 
exists between the interests of shareholders and of managers, and that without proper 
structure capricious managers can act at the expense of principals, based on the premise 
that corporate governance fundamentally determines firm outcomes (Berle and Means, 
1932). 
Agency theory posits that managers are agents of shareholders (principals) and they run 
the firm on behalf of the owners, thus engaging in a principal-agent relationship. 
Extensive literature indicates that there is an intrinsic conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers, because the latter being engaged by the former to serve 
their own objectives of value maximization. It has been frequently observed that 
managers diverge from shareholders‘ interest and reduce and/or appropriate 
shareholders‘ wealth for their own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). 
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Agency theory provides deeper analysis of the conflict between shareholders and 
managers, which provided a framework to explain the reduction of shareholder wealth 
in the settings of the principal-agent relationship, whereby owners (principals) delegate 
managers (agents) to run firms on their behalf, leading to agency problems or conflicts 
since both parties are utility maximizers in their own interests, and the interests of 
managers often diverge from their contractual obligation of maximizing shareholder 
returns (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Grossman and Hart (1986) argued that when the 
ownership structure of a firm is overly diffused, shareholders are less likely to monitor 
management decisions closely, because they have less incentive to do so given that the 
potential benefits of such monitoring are outweighed by the agency costs of monitoring; 
clearly this situation is likely to undermine performance. 
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that when the ownership structure 
is concentrated, large and controlling shareholders contribute to the mitigation of the 
agency problems because they have the incentives, motivations and capacity to monitor 
the managers for the shared benefit of control (i.e. the mutual benefit of all 
shareholders, whether large or small). Moreover, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) observed 
that as ownership concentration increases, the degree to which benefits and costs are 
borne by the same owner increases, hence it can be inferred that large shareholders are 
more likely to be active in corporate governance to prevent information asymmetry 
between principals and agents due to their larger stakes in firms due to the greater risk 
incurred by their larger ownership. Thereby, if agency costs decreased it is more likely 
shareholders will get higher retunes on their shares and more profit. 
However, Jenson and Meckling (1976) argued that according to agency theory, major 
shareholders with high ownership concentration can prioritise their own interests, which 
can cause agency problems between managers and shareholders. Jenson and Meckling 
(1976) suggested that managerial ownership can be a solution to this agency problem, 
circumventing conflicts between management and shareholders by rendering both 
parties a single entity. Managerial interests can clearly be presumed to achieve greater 
alignment with those of shareholders with significant managerial ownership. However, 
Demsetz (1983) cautioned that when managers own a large stake this could lead them to 
take decisions preferential to their own individual interests as a large shareholders rather 
than in the interests of other (smaller) shareholders (entrenchment effect). 
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Furthermore, the pertinent literatures on corporate governance consider the issue of 
shareholder identity (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Douma 
et al., 2006; Xu and Wang, 1997). The cited authors argue that the identity, objective 
function, nature and behaviour of the shareholder vary for different types of owners. 
This fundamentally relates to the root issue in agency problems, the different interests 
of different parties (e.g. decision-making opportunities, investment objectives and 
resource endowments), which “determine their relative power, incentives and ability to 
monitor managers” (Douma et al., 2006). The interests and actions of the identity of 
shareholders preference might have significant impacts on corporate strategy, operations 
and performance (Douma et al., 2006; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Tihanyi et al., 
2003). Thus, in addition to how much equity a shareholder owns, it is also important to 
know who this shareholder is (e.g. individual/family, company or government). 
Different types of investors are characterised by differences in wealth, risk aversion and 
correspondingly in the importance they accord to shareholder value in relation to other 
objectives. Shareholder interests have impacts on investment decisions and owner 
preferences (Cubbin and Leech, 1982; Hansmann, 1988). Conflicts of interest can arise 
when owners‘ economic interests and relations with the firm become misaligned with 
the fundamental firm objective of value maximisation. For instance, dual roles can 
occur, such as when governments are owners and regulators, or when banks are both 
owners and lenders (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1997). Consequently, such stakeholders 
have numerous objectives that can compromise the more basic role of stakeholders as 
principals. 
For example, small shareholders might be interested in capital gains, whereas 
companies might be interested in control and dividends. However, if companies are 
pension funds or insurance companies, they might be interested in fixed income to 
cover their cash flow requirements. Moreover, James (1999) states that family 
companies may exert control over the firm because they act on their own behalf. This is 
because the problems will be solved by the family loyalty. In addition, he states that 
family ownerships also invest in firm-specific human capital. This will increase the 
company value, thereby, increasing the firm performance. On the other hand, family 
firms might be risk averse due to the large amount of capital they have in the company 
which will reduce firm value and firm performance. Similarly, government ownership 
in a company might incentive them to pursue non-economic goals and political goals 
which might reduce the firm performance. However, Eckel and Vermaelen (1986) 
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propose that government ownership might benefit minority shareholders. This is 
because when government owned firms that mean they are concerned over long-term 
investment which will result in lower cost of capital and improve firm performance. 
Business organisations in Middle Eastern countries (including Jordan) are characterised 
by high concentration of ownership, often in the form of family-controlled businesses. 
In this context and based on the agency perspective outlined above (the managers-
shareholders conflict), this study aim to measure the effect of ownership concentration 
(large shareholders), managerial ownership and the identity of the ownership on firm 
performance of Jordanian industrial and services firms listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange for the period 2000 to 2010. Corporate governance and investor protection 
are lower in Jordan than in the developed countries. Hence, we hope that the findings of 
this study in terms of ownership structure might add contribution to the relation between 
the above mentions variables and firm performance in a developing country namely 
Jordan. The following sections review the relationship of the large shareholders, the 
identity of shareholders (i.e. individuals/families, companies and government) and 
managerial/director ownership on firm performance. 
3.3.1 Ownership concentration (large shareholders) 
Ownership concentration is higher in developing countries, where investors have less 
protection (La Porta et al., 1999;Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This can imply a stronger 
incentive and ability of principals to monitor agents, reducing managerial opportunism 
(La Porta et al., 1999;Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued 
that the equity of ownership has been suggested as a control mechanism to control 
managers by shareholders to mitigate agency conflicts within the firm. They state that 
this internal control mechanism is significant in determining the shareholders wealth, 
firm objective and the level of discipline of managers. In such a context, a large 
shareholder appears as the shareholders best way to control and monitor the managers. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that when the ownership structure is concentrated, 
large and controlling shareholders contribute to the mitigation of the agency problems 
because they have the incentives, motivations and capacity to monitor the managers for 
the shared benefit of control (i.e. the mutual benefit of all shareholders, whether large or 
small). High concentration of ownership is not necessarily a disadvantage to firm 
performance. As mentioned previously, shareholders with greater stakes in a company 
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have greater incentive to control and monitor managers or insiders (Holderness, 2003). 
This represents the positive outcome of the self-interest of large shareholders, known as 
the shared benefits of control hypothesis. For example, large shareholders may exert 
influence in the appointment of independent directors or have advisory voting on 
executive pay packages. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) suggested that large shareholders bear monitoring costs, and 
their share of benefits will be proportionate to their cash flow rights (dividends or 
capital gains), and the pursuant benefits of monitoring by large shareholders is accrued 
by all shareholders proportional to cash flow rights. Other factors being constant, a rise 
in blockholder stake endows large shareholders with a greater interest in increasing firm 
value (Holderness, 2003). Indeed, it has even been argued that in such situations small 
shareholders "free-ride" firm success achieved by larger shareholders while bearing no 
monitoring costs, thus obtaining benefits disproportionate with their input to the firm. 
Different studies in developed and developing countries (e.g. Hiraki et al., 2003 for 
Japanese firms, Gorton and Schmid, 2000 for German companies, Claesses and 
Djankov, 1999 for Czech companies, Xu and Wang, 1999 for Chinese listed firms and 
Barberis et al., 1996 for Russian firms) found a positive relationship between 
concentrated ownership and frim performance. The result of the positive relationship 
might support the idea of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998), who 
stated that since the investor protections is weak in emerging markets, ownership 
concentration might play an alternative corporate governance mechanism in these 
markets. Therefore, concentrated ownership means more control in the hands of large 
shareholders, which translates into better monitoring of managers in the interest of all 
shareholders. 
However, Jenson and Meckling (1976) with regard to agency theory observed that 
higher ownership concentration could induce the prioritisation of self-interest by large 
shareholders and the consequent expropriation of firm resources (i.e. wealth), resulting 
in decreased firm performance. Clearly when there is a higher risk of expropriation 
there is more incentive for majority/dominant shareholders to avoid information 
disclosure and such firms are likely to have weak monitoring controls (which facilitate 
expropriation). The expropriation effect arises because majority shareholders are 
motivated ―not only the benefits [they] derived from pecuniary returns but also the 
utility generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of [their] entrepreneurial activities‖ 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A clear example of this in family-controlled firms is the 
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desire of majority shareholders to pass on control and majority ownership of the firm to 
subsequent generations (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). In developing economies, 
majority ownership of large firms is often used by concentrations of power (e.g. 
families) to create what called "non-pecuniary income", such as ―the ability to deploy 
resources to suit one‘s personal preferences‖ (Demsetz and Lehn (1985). In addition to 
having concentrated ownership of firms, majority shareholders are able to dominate the 
executive and management structure of firms by filling key positions; such owner-
managers are in a position to execute activities that benefit them but which may be 
detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders and the firm performance. Thus, the 
fundamental problem of concentrated ownership is the opportunities for nepotism that 
arise from it. 
Grossman and Hart (1980) suggested that the private benefits of control that are not 
shared by small shareholders are more pertinent to large shareholders than general firm 
success. The private benefits of control are related to the expropriation hypothesis, 
which suggests that a secondary form of agency costs are borne by firms with 
controlling large shareholders at the expense of smaller shareholders (La Porta et al., 
2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In cases with multiple blocks of major shareholders 
the situation becomes more complex due to the diverse interests of different large 
shareholders, with the possibility of both positive and negative outcomes for firm 
performance (Pound, 1988). 
Expropriation can occur due to the entrenchment of owner-managers, who can continue 
to control firms despite poor performance (Daniels and Halpern, 1996); also, if 
managers are major shareholders, they are expected to block any hostile takeover 
attempts (Stulz, 1988), which represents an agency costs amounting to expropriation of 
minority shareholders by undermining firm performance. Large blockholders also can 
have a tendency to project their personal preferences onto organisational actions, even if 
these are against the company ethos/goals as a whole (Holderness and Sheehan, 1998; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Different studies in developing countries (Chen et al., 2006 for Hong Kong firms, 
Gunasekarage et al., 2007 in China and Gursoy and Aydogan, 2002 of Turkish 
nonfinancial firms) found that firms with concentrated ownership are not associated 
with better operating performance or higher firm valuation. The negative relationship 
between the concentrated ownership and firm performance might be because highly 
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concentrated ownership in the hand of large shareholders might potentially lead large 
shareholders to worry more about their own interests rather than those of other 
shareholders and firm performance as a whole. 
As we show above, literature shows mixed results about the relationship between the 
large shareholders and firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that from 
the efficient monitoring hypothesis and the convergence of the interest hypothesis, large 
shareholder who held large shares have the ability and the incentive to exert control and 
to compel the management to take actions to improve the company performance. Based 
on the expropriation hypothesis, due to the diverse interests of different large 
shareholders, there is a possibility of both positive and negative outcomes for firm 
performance (Pound, 1988). Business organisations in Middle Eastern countries 
(including Jordan) are characterised by high concentration of ownership, often in the 
form of family or companies controlled businesses. In this context, this study will 
investigate the effect of the large owners on the firm performance. This study will use 
the 5% cut-off level, based on the JCGC and the Jordanian Company law (JCL) 
classification of large shareholders as those who own 5% or more of a firm. 
3.3.2 The identity of large shareholder 
As we show above, the identity, objective function, nature and behaviour of the 
shareholder vary for different types of investors. This variety result due to the investor‘s 
preference, goals and risk aversion which might raise conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shareholders with 
different identities who own large proportion of shares might impact the firm 
performance. The following sections review the relationship of the identity of 
shareholders (i.e. individuals/families, companies and government) on firm 
performance. 
 Individual/family ownership 
Firms with high concentrations of ownership are often in the form of individual- or 
family-controlled enterprises. In such firms, the high concentration of ownership 
induces the large shareholder to try and maximise firm value due to their private wealth 
interest, providing an incentive to reduce agency costs (Anderson and Reeb 2003). In 
publicly listed companies in developing countries, a large number of shares are 
generally controlled by a small number of families (Claessens et al., 2000). Even in the 
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US, Anderson and Reeb (2004) documented that more than one-third of the largest 
companies are categorized as family control firms. In addition, 44% of the Western 
European firms are controlled by families (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Despite the 1997 
economic shock, highly concentrated ownership remains common among Asian and 
Middle Eastern firms. Indeed, Asian firms have been found to resolutely resist diffusion 
of ownership despite economic difficulty or the potential benefits of less concentrated 
ownership (Claessens et al., 2000). 
Potential drawbacks of family ownership relate to the potential disconnect between the 
controlling family‘s personal interests and firm (i.e. small shareholder) interests, which 
could have effects such as a tendency to take sub-optimal investment decisions (Fama 
and Jensen, 1985), as well as utilising opportunities for personal enrichment such as 
benefiting from insider benefits like private rents at the expense of firm value 
maximization, thus working against the interests of minority shareholders (Faccioet al., 
2001). When families or individuals own large stakes in companies, this often reflects a 
lack of diversity in their assets (Andres, 2008). Additionally, nepotism is rife in family-
controlled firms, with family members or their personal associates appointed to key 
managerial and executive positions. . In other words, it is more likely when the 
company is a family firm, family members will take the managerial positions. The poor 
managerial talent and the low expertise of family members can result in difficulties to 
enter new markets and new investment opportunities. This might result in poor 
decisions which might increase the agency problem, leading to lower returns. Thus, 
inappropriate selection of family members as functionaries will directly or indirectly 
affect firm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2005, 2009). 
While the appointment of members of a family clique to positions of authority in firms 
is not in itself a drawback, if such appointees are not capable or less capable of fulfilling 
these roles compared to other personnel then clearly firm performance (and value) is 
undermined. In practice, family domination of a firm often promotes "use of the firm‘s 
resources to provide family members with employment, perquisites, and privileges that 
they would not otherwise receive" (Schulze et al., 2003). By installing incompetent 
relatives as members in the board, extreme compensations for themselves and explicit 
theft will help to expropriate minority shareholders‘ interest (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Firm-level nepotism often occurs in a broader milieu of corruption and weak 
governance (e.g. legal protection for minority shareholders). 
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The MENA region is notorious for nepotism, and family expropriation of firms at the 
expense of minority shareholders is commonplace (Wiwattanakantang, 2001), enabled 
by the carte blanche control accrued by clique blockholders (La Porta and Shleifer, 
1999). Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) and McVey and Draho (2005) point out that 
highly concentrated ownership by family members may be linked with the managerial 
entrenchment effect. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) confirm that by large stakes of 
companies being owned by family cliques motivates them to act in their own private 
interests instead of the company interest, to the detriment of minority shareholders. This 
information asymmetry and blatant probability of exploitation means that outside 
investors are anticipated to seek assurance from insiders that proper corporate 
governance mechanisms are applied to protect their interests, and to solicit greater 
disclosure from such firms to assess risk. Minority shareholders in such situations, as 
well as being personally cautious, should seek legal protection and increased monitoring 
of business operations. 
However, Faccio and Lang (2002); Denis and Denis (1994); Ward (1988) argue that 
different reasons make family companies outperform non-family companies. Family 
managers have more knowledge about their firm; therefore this knowledge will help 
them take better investment decisions (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Furthermore, Family 
names and identities are invested in such firms, inducing trust and loyalty among 
customers, employees and suppliers (Denis and Denis, 1994; Ward, 1988), along with 
creditors, giving such firms access to cheaper capital compared to firms with diffused 
ownership (Anderson et al., 2003). Therefore, this might help in aligning the interest of 
the management and shareholders, thus decreasing the principal-agent conflict and 
improve firm performance. 
As discussed previously, the board of directors is the apex of the internal control 
system, with the power to ―hire, fire, and compensate the CEO and to provide high-level 
counsel‖ (Jensen, 1993). Family entrenchment in key positions and domination of the 
board inhibits the latter‘s effectiveness in its role of monitoring management. 
Independent non-executive directors (INEDs) are therefore necessary to effectively 
monitor family-controlled firms. If the NEDs perform their monitoring roles and tasks 
efficiently, this might help in monitoring the behaviours of the managers to reduce the 
agency problem and thereby maximize the shareholders‘ value leading to better 
performance. 
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A basic method for outsider investors to assess corporate governance in firms having 
high concentration of ownership is to consider the composition of the board in terms of 
the proportion of family members and INEDs. If INEDs cannot perform their fiduciary 
duties and restrain the worst scenario of poor corporate governance by family cliques, 
the expropriation of minor shareholders is probable, and the consequent suppression of 
firm value (Beiner et al., 2006; Claessens and Fan, 2000). However, a high 
concentration of family ownership is not necessarily a red flag signalling nepotism and 
expropriation; good corporate governance (e.g. INEDs and good disclosure practices) 
and other factors promote investor confidence (Defond and Hung, 2004; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005). Voluntary disclosure of board composition in family-owned firms or the 
appointment of large proportions of independent directors signals awareness and 
concern about good corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders. 
 Companies ownership 
Koh (2007) defined companies‘ investors as specialised money managers with rational 
control over assets (i.e. mutual funds, insurance companies, bank trusts and pension 
funds). Koh (2007) asserted that there is a positive relationship between the companies‘ 
ownership and firm performance. Companies‘ ownership allows the company to reap 
more chances and to control and monitor the management. In addition, it will help to 
achieve such benefits in the interest of the value of the company. 
It is assumed that companies‘ ownership play an important role in controlling the firm 
according to the proportion that they own in the company. Therefore, it is important to 
shed light on their responsibility as a fiduciary duty to monitor the firm in regard to 
their holding (Mallin, 2001). Having large portion of shares in the company motivate 
them to be more efficient in influencing the management policies and strategies to 
improve the firm performance (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Davis and Steil (2001) argue 
that companies ownership display features such as: (1) risk diversifications ;(2) favour 
for liquidity; and (3) the ability to control large volume of transactions due to their large 
ownership of shares. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shares owned by company play significant 
role in affecting the management decisions. They state that small shareholders, who are 
usually individuals, favour their returns in the form of capital gain. However, 
companies‘ ownership, because of the corporate taxes, they might prefer to receive 
dividends. Therefore, companies ownership have the motivation to gather information 
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related to the company in order to monitor the management, thereby reducing agency 
costs and reduce agency problem and thereby increasing firm value (Grossman and 
Hart, 1980). However, Hart (1995b) points out that there are two disadvantages from 
owning large shares in one company. Firstly, holding large numbers of shares will 
reduce the opportunity to invest outside the company. In other words, companies‘ 
ownership will lose the chance to diversify their investment among different 
investments. Secondly, companies‘ ownership may alleviate the agency problem but 
they cannot exclude it. 
Brickley et al. (1988), Almazan et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2006) classified 
companies‘ ownership to two groups. The first group is pressure-sensitive such as banks 
or insurance companies who have prospective business relations with firms. In order to 
ensure their connections, they might to be less interested to argue with management 
decisions. Pound (1988) states companies‘ ownership might cooperate with managers 
because the benefits that result from supporting them are higher than the effective 
monitoring gain. In addition, he points that companies ownership prefer short term 
returns instead of long term retunes. This might allow managers to act for their own 
interests leading to increase the agency problem and thereby lower firm value. The 
second group is pressure-insensitive such as independent investment advisors and 
investment companies who are less liable to pressure from the company that they invest 
in. Thus, they are in better position to discipline, monitor and control the firm managers. 
Similarly, McConnell and Servaes (1990); Nesbitt (1994); Smith (1996); Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999); Gillan and Starks (2000) report that it is more likely companies 
ownership will impact the firm performance positively. They argue that companies‘ 
ownership are more sophisticated than any other shareholders. They are more 
professional regarding capital markets, business and industries and they are better 
informed. Therefore, they have the ability to exert control and monitoring on managers 
decision more effectively and less costly. As a result this will lead to reduce the agency 
problem and maximize the value of the shares. 
Cornett et al., (2007) state that pressure-insensitive allow companies ownership to exert 
pressure on firm manager‘s behaviours depending on their large portion of shares to 
improve firm performance. They found there is a significant positive relationship 
between companies‘ ownership involvement and operating cash flow returns. 
Specifically, this relation exists between the operating cash flow returns and the number 
of companies‘ ownership for those with no relationship with the firm (pressure-
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insensitive). However, companies‘ ownership that has relations with the firms 
(pressure-sensitive) has no influence on the operating cash flow returns. 
 Government ownership 
Global economic liberalisation since the 1970s and 1980s ensured the privatisation of 
most government-owned firms (i.e. public assets), but forms of government ownership 
can be found mainly in former socialist countries, such as Eastern Europe, Russia 
(where nationalisation is resurgent in some respects, e.g. gas utilities) and China. The 
long-term impacts of changing ownership structures, particularly between government 
and private ownership, are controversial (Grout and Stevens, 2003).Porta et al. (1999) 
claimed that the incentive for a government to own shares in a firm might be related to 
political objectives (e.g. putting the risk of paying the losses of the firm on the public). 
In contrast, the government might hold a large portion of equity in a firm in order to 
exert control on the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Ramaswamy (2001), and Orden 
and Garmendia (2005) argue that government ownership has a negative impact on firm 
performance compared to other types of firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
point out that government ownership is subject to agency problems. This is because the 
tendency of managers to seek their own self interests. Also, instead of commercial 
objectives such as profit maximization, the government (politicians/bureaucrats) tend to 
use firms‘ assets to achieve political objectives. In other words, the government is more 
interested in controlling ownership rights rather than cash flow rights. This divergence 
and bureaucracy might lead to the absence of incentives for decision-makers to pursue 
profit maximization. Megginson and Netter (2001) report that in the competitive 
markets, private owned firms are more profitable and more efficient than government 
owned firms. Similary, Najid and Abdul Rahman (2011) claim that government owned 
firms generally lack innovative and entrepreneurial drive. In addition, government 
owned firms tend to be more politically rather than commercially motivated, leading to 
poor financial firm performance. Moreover, Mak and Li (2001) argue that government 
owned firms suffer from weak monitoring and accountability. Therefore, they are less 
likely to adopt good governance mechanisms. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that family controlled firms with substantial 
government ownership may perform better compared to family firms without 
government ownership. This is because the government has a direct interest in the 
ownership of these family firms, which suggests that these firms could have a certain 
degree of connection with senior government officials and influential political figures 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In addition, the government might buy large number of 
shares in some companies at prices above their share values. This is when their share 
prices fall during any financial crises in order to reduce the losses in shareholders‘ 
wealth. Furthermore, it is argued that governments have the incentive to get involved in 
specific firms that produce military products (Porta et al., 1999). However Bos (1991) 
argues that government owned firms have positive effect on the firm performance. He 
claims that owning large portions of shares by the government will motivate them to 
monitor and control the firm closely and effectively. This will result in reducing the 
agency costs and increase firm profitability. Government owned firms reduce the 
problems of asymmetric information that result from the imperfect information about 
the value of the company (Eng and Mak, 2003). Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) claim that 
government owned firms will face less pressure to fulfil financial reporting regulations. 
This might influence management to select accounting choices that will improve firm 
performance. La Porta et al. (1999) state that the effect of the government ownership 
might depend on the quality of the government itself as well as other features such as 
the path dependency, which is assumed to vary from country to other country. 
3.3.3 Director/managerial ownership 
While shareholders are interested in maximising their returns, managers are concerned 
with enhancing their personal wealth and their future career opportunities. This will 
result in a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, as the former are 
interested in ensuring that their financial capital is not expropriated or invested in 
unprofitable projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993). The 
expropriation may be manifest in three different ways: investment in projects that 
benefit the managers rather than the interests of the company, manipulation of transfer 
pricing and management entrenchment. Theoretically, the convergence of interest or the 
alignment of interest‘s hypothesis has been suggested as a mechanism to be used to 
align the interests between managers and shareholders. With regards to the alignment of 
interests from the agency theory perspective, Sappington (1991) suggests that in order 
to align the interests of managers with shareholders it is important to create incentives 
for the managers to increase the value maximization. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state 
that the incentive of director/managerial ownership is expected to motivate agents to 
create total surplus, because as managerial ownership increases the interests of the 
shareholders and managers become more aligned, thus the incentive for opportunistic 
behaviour decreases. In other words, the greater the stake managers have in the firm (i.e. 
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share ownership), the greater the costs they will incur for not maximising the wealth of 
shareholders. Hence, aligning the interests between principals and agents resolves for 
the agency problem and achieves the main goal of the shareholders, which is value 
maximization, consequently affecting firm performance positively. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Becht et al., (2003) stated that managers are not interested only in avoiding 
the agency problem, but are motivated by other reasons such as their career growth and 
their reputation. It is well known that managers should consider the importance of their 
reputation and their image to protect it in order for any further opportunities to work in 
the future. 
Different studies (e.g. Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Palia and Lichtenberg 1999; Weir et al., 
2002; Krivogorsky, 2006; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Mangena and Tauringana, 
2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) reported a positive impact of the managerial ownership 
on firm performance. Owusu-Ansah (1998) in his study of a sample of 49 listed 
Zimbabwean firms in 1994 found that director ownership affects the mandatory 
disclosure positively. In addition, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) investigated the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance measured by ROA 
and Tobin‘s Q for a sample of 72 listed Zimbabwean firms from 2002 to 2004. They 
reported a positive relationship. Their findings support the notion that as managerial 
ownership increased the interests of the shareholders and managers become more 
aligned, therefore it is more likely that the agency problem will be resolved, which 
might affect the firm performance positively. However, some studies (e.g. De Angelo 
and De Angelo 1985; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ho and Williams, 2003; Lin, 2002; 
Sanda et al., 2005) found that managerial ownership negatively affects the firm 
performance. Lins (2000) provided evidence of the relationship between firm 
performance and management ownership across firms from 18 emerging markets. His 
results suggested that the separation of management ownership and control had a 
significant negative relation to value in countries with low shareholder protection. The 
final stream introduced by Dalton et al., (2003) and Sheu and Yang (2005) reported that 
there is no relationship between director ownership and firm performance. In other 
words, the director ownership does not affect the firm performance. 
Consistent with agency theory view that managerial ownership is expected to align the 
interests of the shareholders with agents, thus reducing the agency problem and 
maximizing shareholders‘ wealth, leading to better firm performance, this study is going 
to investigate the impact the managerial ownership on firm performance. 
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3.4 Foreign Ownership 
In many developing countries there are limited sources of domestic finance for 
investment (Leuz et al., 2010), which has prompted economic liberalization of stock 
markets in many emerging countries, enabling investment in domestic equity securities 
by foreign investors (Bekaert et al., 2007). This has resulted in large increase in 
investment in emerging markets since the mid-1990s. In common with other countries 
in MENA, Jordan has made great strides in making necessary legislative reforms and 
establishing a legal environment conducive to foreign investment. As confirmed by 
previous literature, foreign investors are inherently at a disadvantage compared to 
domestic investors due to their lack of knowledge and expertise in the local financial 
and legislative environment (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1991; Dvorak, 2005; Stulz, 2005). 
This leads to the home bias of investors, whereby they typically prefer to invest in their 
native countries despite the globalization of financial markets (Chan et al., 2005; 
Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; French and Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999), due to 
legislative inhibitions, differences in corporate governance and information asymmetry 
(Dahlquist et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Giannetti and Koskinen, 2008). 
When firms do invest abroad, they refer to invest with regard to firm-specific 
characteristics (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Stulz, 1999). Kang and Stulz (1997) 
studied the Japanese stock market and concluded that foreign investors tend to invest in 
low-leverage, high export ratio and large firms. Analysing aggregated foreign 
ownership factors in Swedish firms, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) identified foreign 
investors‘ preference for large firms with large cash holdings paying low dividends; 
they also found that foreigners tend to undervalue firms with large ownership. The 
situation is similar in developing countries. In Korea, Lin and Shiu (2003) found that 
foreign investors prefer large firms with a high export ratio. In a pioneering study on the 
increasingly important African markets, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) found that 
foreign investment in Zimbabwe is associated with firm size, profitability, liquidity, 
disclosure, proportion of non-executive directors, institutional ownership, and audit 
committee. 
One of the most common barriers to foreign investment is poor corporate governance. 
Weak corporate governance was identified as a barrier to investment in Swedish 
companies by foreign portfolio investors by Giannetti and Simonov (2006), but weak 
corporate governance is more particularly associated with emerging markets. Based on 
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data from 27 developing countries, Lang et al. (2004) found that poor internal 
governance is a barrier to investment by US investment analysts, including firms with 
concentrated family/management ownership. Firms with such forms of corporate 
governance are thus accorded less value by international investors. Based on US mutual 
funds‘ portfolio holdings in emerging markets, Aggarwal et al., (2005) identified greater 
investment in markets with greater shareholder rights and protection and stronger 
accounting standards. In a large multinational study, Leuz et al. (2008) confirmed that 
US investors invest are deterred by poorly governed firms in markets with weak 
legislative protection; they consequently advised higher standards of disclosure and 
corporate practice to attract more foreign investment. 
Three surveys conducted by McKinsey and Company (2000) concerning how corporate 
governance in developed and emerging markets is evaluated by investors found that 
corporate governance is at least as important as past firm financial performance in 
deciding whether to invest, with three-quarters of investors citing board practices alone 
as a major consideration (particularly the presence of independent directors). Investors 
indicated that they would not invest in firms with poor corporate governance; indeed, 
most would be prepared to pay an additional premium of up to 28 per cent of the share 
price to invest in well-governed companies in emerging economies. 
The Asian financial crisis (1997) and the increasing competition between corporations 
raise the need for good corporate governance. In addition, the Asian financial crisis put 
pressure on the corporations to attract foreign institutional investors and invest in them. 
Foreign investors will avoid investing in any corporation in the emerging market 
countries with weak corporate governance. Because of the several types of risk that 
associated with the companies such as asset risk, accounting risk and strategy risk 
(Clayaman et al., 2011). 
Young et al., (2008) reckon that the existence of foreign investors plays an important 
role in applying the corporate governance in the corporations. They believe that the 
ability of the foreign investors to monitor the corporations is higher than the local once. 
This is because they are ―outside the domestic social networks from which the 
institutional norms of behaviour are generated, and they are therefore more likely to 
push for transparent deals‖ (Young et al., 2008).Therefore, they are in better position to 
improve the firm performance and add value to the firm. Baek et al. (2004) noticed that 
corporations with higher foreign ownership during the Asian financial crisis 
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experienced slightly less reduction in the price of their shares. D‘Souza et al. (2005) 
reported that foreign investors are better in controlling and monitoring the company 
than local investors in terms of less of conflict of interest between them. Furthermore, 
Park (2004) and Kim and Sul (2006) report that there may be a positive relationship 
between the level of dividends and the level of foreign ownership of shares, which 
simultaneously may affect the growth of the corporation. Although the above studies 
did not agree on an optimal level of dividends, they find that the declaration of foreign 
investment exceeding 5% of a firm‘s shares resulted in a positive market response. 
Taylor (1990); Oxelheim and Randoy (2003); Kirkpatrick et al., (2006); Sulong and Nor 
(2010); Ghazali (2010) and Taufil et al., (2013) found that foreign ownership influences 
the firm performance positively. They show that foreign investors give companies 
access to financial resources and managerial talent. In addition, they report that foreign 
investors increase firm value by controlling managerial behaviour. By investigating the 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on the firm performance for 23 developed 
countries, Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that the presence of foreign institutional 
investors is associated with improved corporate governance, by eliminating poorly 
performing CEOs from the management. However, Wiwattanakantang (2001) report 
that foreign ownership might face difficulties to add value to the firm for two reasons: 
(1) if the company is situated in another country, this will present a difficulty for the 
foreign shareholders to control the firm; and (2) most of the firms that have foreign 
corporations as their controlling shareholders are run by professional managers who do 
not hold any stake in the firms 
Usually, local investors have a trend to follow firms that attract foreign investors. Since 
local investors consider that foreign investment is a positive indicator of a firm‘s 
reputation and an effective control system. This will increase the demand for shares, 
which will add value to the firm. Therefore, they are able to attain higher market 
valuation and maximize their shareholder wealth (Choi et al., 2012). 
A number of unique features and characteristics make Jordan attractive for international 
investors in the MENA region, mainly because it is a relatively safe investment 
environment, with political stability, an established financial structure, favourable 
demographics, advanced monetary and fiscal policies and foreign and domestic 
investment laws favourable to international investors. Moreover, Jordan is increasingly 
integrating into the world economy, acceding to the World Trade Organization in 2000, 
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making an Association Agreement with the European Union effective in 2002, a free 
trade agreement with the United States, and numerous investment agreements with 
many countries around the world in addition to being a prime source of investment from 
the GCC countries (as mentioned previously). The country‘s specialised industrial zones 
(with tax breaks and other incentives) and privatisation programme also improve the 
country‘s attractiveness as an investment location. 
Hence, considering the important impact of the foreign investors on firm performance in 
the developing countries, as explained above, this study will investigate the impact of 
foreign investors on the industrial and services companies that listed in Amman Stock 
Exchange for the period 2000 to 2010. 
3.5 Summary 
The chapter identifies the main internal corporate governance mechanisms that have 
been utilized by different studies and reviews literature relating to corporate governance 
in general, with discussion of the general themes of corporate governance in order to 
provide a general picture of corporate governance practices. Internal mechanisms 
include the board of directors (e.g. board size, board sub-committees, CEO duality and 
non-executive directors) and ownership structure (e.g. large shareholders or 
concentrated ownership, the identity of shareholders and managerial ownership). Board 
sub-committees were not devised for testing because of data limitations. In addition, 
this chapter reviewed the previous studies on the impact of the foreign investors on firm 
performance. Building on these various mechanisms, this study developed a research 
framework and variables to test the hypotheses concerning the above mechanisms. In 
the next chapter, a general background of the Jordanian economic environment will be 
set out and general description about corporate governance in Jordan is presented. 
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CHAPTER 4:  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN JORDAN 
4.1 Introduction and Background 
In order to study corporate governance in Jordan it is necessary to start with a general 
background concerning the most important aspects of the Jordanian economic 
environment. 
With an upper, middle-income status for its citizens, Jordan is a country with a 
population of 6 million people and a GNI of 4,390 USD. The country‘s population is 
comprised of 80% urban residents, with 38% of these being under the age of 14, making 
Jordan one of the youngest among the upper-middle income countries (World Bank, 
2013). Jordan has few natural resources, with potash and phosphates being the main 
export commodities, as well as having limited agricultural land and a minimal water 
supply, which has ranked Jordan as the fourth poorest country in terms of water 
resources. 75% of jobs are in the services sector, which produces 70% of Jordan‘s GDP 
(World Bank, 2013). 
Aside from industry contributing as one of the major economic challenges Jordan faces, 
the country‘s government also has to deal with chronic rates of poverty, unemployment, 
inflation and a large budget deficit. As a means to improve economic growth, King 
Abdullah implemented a number of economic reforms such as the opening of the trade 
regime, privatising state-owned companies and eliminating some fuel subsidies, since 
his ascension to the throne in 1999. This has encouraged investment from overseas, and 
has created a number of jobs for local residents. Unfortunately, the global economic 
slowdown and regional turmoil have supressed the GDP growth of Jordan, with a 
negative impact noted in export-orientated sectors, construction and tourism (World 
Bank, 2013). 
2011 saw the introduction of two economic relief packages to be implemented by the 
government, as well as a budgetary supplement, with the view that these measures could 
improve the living conditions for middle to poorer classes. However, the country‘s 
finances were further impacted by a series of natural gas pipeline attacks in Egypt, 
which resulted in Jordan substituting more expensive heavy fuel oils as a means of 
generating electricity. Despite this, Jordan has enjoyed an influx of aid and investment 
from foreign countries, primarily those situated around the Gulf area, which has eased 
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extra-budgetary expenditure. Nevertheless, the budget deficit is likely to remain high at 
10% GDP, excluding grants (UNDP, 2013). 
In order to cope with the deficit in 2012 Jordan‘s dependence on foreign assistance 
continued to grow. Due to the country‘s limited exposure to overseas capital markets, 
Jordan has remained relatively isolated from the international financial crisis, however it 
remains integrated with its neighbours through trade, remittances, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and tourism, with links particularly strong in Arab Gulf economies. 
Policymakers in Jordan are making the most of the demographic opportunity of a well-
educated, young population, hoping to build a dynamic, knowledge-based economy, as 
well as exploring nuclear power generation as a means to forestall energy shortfalls 
(OECD, 2013). 
With its open economy and regional integration methods, Jordan has left itself 
vulnerable to political, economic and social volatility. The recent political disruption the 
Middle East has suffered in recent years has had a significant impact on Jordan, with 
both economic upset and an increasing demand for a stronger citizen voice, greater 
accountability and improvements in living conditions. 2011 saw an increased import bill 
in Jordan due to the higher commodity prices, while falls were reported in tourism 
receipts, FDI and, to some extent, remittances (OECD, 2013). 
Jordan has suffered further financial blows in recent years, with numerous interruptions 
noted in the gas supply from Egypt. This forced the Jordanian government to switch to 
costlier heavy fuel, which was expected to result in a cost of 2.4 billion USD by the end 
of 2012. Despite these economic downturns, Jordan is above average in relation to 
middle-income countries when considering human development, consistently spending 
over 25% of GDP on education, health, pensions and social safety nets. As well as this, 
Jordan also provides a high level of gender parity in access to basic public services. In 
2003, the Jordanian government launched a comprehensive modernisation program, 
which attempted to change the basic education system, better aligning it with the 
knowledge-based economy of the country (World Bank, 2013). 
With such emphasis on educational advancement, the school enrolment rates at varying 
levels of education are relatively high compared to similar income-level countries. The 
country enjoys above average ranks in science internationally, however results in 
mathematics remain below par. The growing population is putting further pressure on 
both the health and educational services, which has resulted in the government setting 
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the target to expand access to higher quality education and to provide key skills in the 
economy. The past decade has seen Jordan endeavour to undertake a variety of 
structural reforms in varying sectors. Successes have been noted in the areas of 
education, health and privatisation/liberalisation and the government has been working 
towards social protection system reforms, which has resulted in marked changes in 
social protection systems, as well as improving the conditions for greater public private 
partnerships in infrastructure and tax reforms, including the improvement of tax 
administration and management. Despite these encouraging statistics, sound economic 
policies and additional reforms are necessary in order to reduce the potential impact 
further international crises could have on the country. Jordan remains vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the international oil market due to the dependency the country has on 
energy supplies from Egypt. In addition, high unemployment and dependency on 
remittances from Gulf economies remains a potential problem, as well as the increasing 
pressure on water and other natural resources (World Bank, 2013). 
In 2011, Jordan experienced its own version of the ―Arab Spring‖, with low-scale yet 
continual demonstrations challenging the government as a means to introduce political 
reform and to address economic governance. The response by the government was to 
gradually reform the system, with Parliament approving constitutional changes in an 
effort to fortify the independence and integrity of Judiciary bodies, improving public 
accountability. In terms of structure, the Jordanian government is attempting reform in 
transparency and accountability, as well as private sector development and public 
finance management, with particular focus on budget and debt management, as well as 
spending efficiency in the public sector. In order to perform well in the economic future 
of Jordan, the government aims to make gradual progress in the implementation of 
structural reforms. In addition, they aim to provide a supportive regional and external 
environment (World Bank, 2013). 
It is generally considered that the biggest trial Jordan will face in the future is the 
opportunity to create adequate conditions for increased private investment as well as 
improved competitiveness in the field. Through addressing this challenge, Jordan can 
aim to deliver the high and sustainable growth that is needed in order to provide 
employment opportunities, thus reducing widespread poverty. Jordan‘s ability to sustain 
the fiscal consolidation program is the key to maintaining good economic performance. 
There are a host of opportunities in the country that are not being fully utilised, though 
many established businesspeople find Jordan to be the perfect place for investment in 
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the region. Thanks to the Investment Promotion Law of 1995, both Jordanian and non-
Jordanian investors are offered equal treatment, as well as guarantees against 
expropriation. The Law provides opportunities for investors to own a project in full or 
in part, excluding some trade and contracting services, whereby a Jordanian partner is 
requested. The law of the country also provides incentives to potential investors, 
including freedom from customs duties, exemption from taxes and tax holidays. In 
addition, investors can enjoy unrestricted transfer of capital and profits. Export-
orientated industries are also afforded further incentives, with all earning from export 
becoming completely exempt from income tax (ILO, 2013). 
Foreign investments have been growing in Jordan largely thanks to the Qualifying 
Industrial Zones (QIZ), where investors enjoy duty free, no quota access to the US 
market for goods produced in the zone. At present, QIZ has ten designated industrial 
parks: the Gateway QIZ on the northern Jordan-Palestine border; the Al-Hassan 
Industrial Estate in Irbid; the Al-Tajamouat Industrial Estate in Amman; the Ad-Dulayl 
Industrial Park near Zarka, the Kerak Industrial Estate, Aqaba Industrial Estate, Jordan 
Cyber City in Irbid, Al-Qastal Industrial Zone in Amman, Mushatta International 
Complex in Amman, and El-Zai Readywear Manufacturing Co. in Zarqa. These QIZs 
produce for the most part light industrial products, including ready-made garments. By 
2004 the QIZs accounted for nearly 1.1 billion USD in exports according to the 
Jordanian government (JIB, 2013). 
Public shareholding companies are affected by the disclosure regulations as outlined in 
the law of financial security. The importance of disclosure arises due to the cultural 
dimensions it provides, as well as the legal side and the development of the financial 
sector. The JSC began to request that companies disclose their board members 
ownership and the salaries of the higher management level, despite the opposition of 
these rules from their companies. Disclosure also provides penalties due to rules and 
provisions not being enough to establish disclosure. These penalties are required in 
order to enforce commitment to disclosure in the firms. Currently a number of these 
penalties have been implemented on companies violating the disclosure rules, such as 
stopping the company from circulating in the ASE and imposing fines. 
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4.2 Industry and Service Sector in Jordan 
Jordan‘s industrial sector comprises manufacturing, construction, mining, and power, 
accounting for around 26% of GDP in 2004 (the first three constitute 16.2%, 4.6% and 
3.1% respectively). In 2002 it was noted that over 21% of the Jordanian labour force is 
engaged in the industrial sector, with the main products being potash, phosphates, 
pharmaceuticals, cement, clothing and fertilisers. Construction is generally considered 
to be the most promising area of the industrial sector, with the past few years seeing an 
increase in the demand for housing and offices for foreign enterprises as a means to 
better access the Iraqi market. In addition, the manufacturing sector has been supported 
by the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was ratified in 2001 by the US 
Senate (World Bank, 2013). 
The US-Jordan FTA is the first in the Arab world, establishing the US as one of the 
most significant markets for Jordan. However, Jordan is not the only country to benefit 
from this agreement, as a number of trade agreements with MENA countries and 
beyond will reap increasing benefits. The Agadir Agreement, a precursor to an FTA 
with the EU, is one of the agreements that will see increasing benefits to Arab countries, 
as well as the FTA with Canada that was recently signed. In addition, the many 
industrial zones in Jordan offering tax incentives, low utility costs and improved 
infrastructure links can help incubate new developments. The relatively high skills level 
is another influencing factor in the promotion of investment in Jordan, which in turn 
will stimulate its economy (OECD, 2013). 
Though there are limited natural resources in Jordan, the country‘s abundant reserves of 
potash and phosphates provide many benefits, especially in the production of fertilisers, 
and it is estimated that these two industries have a combined worth of around $1bn 
(2008). In addition, pharmaceuticals and the export of these were worth around $435m 
in 2007, growing to $250m in the first half of 2008. Textiles have also proven to be a 
significant market, with an estimated worth of $1.19bn in 2007. Though Jordan 
appreciates the value of the industrial sector, there are still a number of challenges the 
country must face. Due to the dependency of importing raw materials, the country 
remains vulnerable to price volatility and constant water and power shortages prove to 
hinder consistent development. However, despite these challenges, Jordan‘s economic 
openness and long-standing progress in the fertilising and pharmaceutical industries 
provide a growth in foreign currency (OECD, 2013). 
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4.2.1 Telecoms and IT 
The telecommunications industry is thought to be worth around JD 836.5m (1.18bn 
USD) per year, focusing on the fixed-line, mobile and data service facilities it provides 
as its core market. This is equivalent to 13.5% of GDP. In addition, the IT sector in 
Jordan is the most developed in the region, largely due to the 2001 telecom 
liberalisation. The most competitive sector of the telecommunications market is the 
mobile sector, and this is currently divided equally between the operators Zain (owned 
by MTC Kuwait) with 39% of the market share, Orange (owned by France Telecoms) 
who has 36% of the share and Umniah, who dominate 25% of the market. 2007 saw end 
of year figures showing that the market trend was leaning towards greater parity, seeing 
Zain‘s share falling in the space of a year from 47% in 2006. This led to Orange and 
Umniah picking up new subscribers and in turn the competition has spurred companies 
to offer more favourable pricing to consumers, with mobile penetration currently 
standing at 80% (Zu‘ubi, 2013). 
His Majesty the King of Jordan is directly leading the ambitious subsequent national 
strategies formed in 2000 as private sector initiatives. The Information Technology 
Association in Jordan (int@j) was created as a means of spurring a private sector 
process that would focus on preparing Jordan for a new economy. It is hoped that 
through IT, the national objectives towards automation and modernisation in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Information Technology in Jordan (MOICT) will be 
reflected. The Jordanian government hoped that this latest strategy will bring Jordan to 
precise objectives by 2013 in this sector (statistics for 2013 are unavailable at present). 
The ICT sector at present accounts for in excess of 14% of Jordan‘s GDP, which 
includes foreign investment and the total domestic revenue from the sector. By 2008 
there was a marked employment growth to 60,000 in ICT and the government are 
continually striving to address employment issues and education related to the sector by 
implementing more opportunities in ICT and ICT training (Zu‘ubi, 2013). 
4.2.2 Energy 
Thought to be amongst the largest of challenges to a developing Jordanian economy, 
energy is currently a major concern to the government. At its peak the price of oil stands 
at over $145, and due to the country‘s lack of domestic resources there has been a 
$14bn investment programme launched in the energy sector. This programme aims to 
limit reliance on imports from the current staggering number of 96%, with a view to 
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increase renewables to provide 10% of the energy demand by 2020 and to implement 
nuclear facilities to meet 60% of energy needs by 2035. In 2007 the Jordanian 
government announced that subsidies in energy (amongst other areas) would be scaled 
back. The government are also opening the sector to increased competition, planning to 
offer new energy projects to international tender (Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, 2013). 
Jordan‘s neighbours offer significant petroleum resources, however Jordan has no such 
resources on offer and thus depend largely on oil imports in order to meet its domestic 
energy needs. In 2003 the invasion of Iraq disrupted the primary oil supply route to 
Jordan, as Iraq had previously granted Jordan huge discounts on crude oil via overland 
truck routes. Since 2003 an alternative supply route has been opened by tanker, via the 
port of Al Aqabah, and Saudi Arabia is now the primary source of imported oil for 
Jordan, with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as secondary sources. 
Though not as cheap as the discounted crude oil supplies from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE offer subsidies on their supplies (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
2013). 
With the cost of oil ever increasing, there has been interest expressed in exploiting 
Jordan‘s vast oil shale resources, which stand as the fourth largest worldwide. These 
shale resources are estimated to total somewhere around 40 billion tons, of which 4 
billion tons are able to be recovered. Jordan‘s oil shale resources could produce 28 
billion barrels (4.5 km
3
) of oil, enabling production of about 100,000 barrels per day 
(16,000 m
3
/d). Consequently, Royal Dutch Shell, Petrobras and Eesti Energia are 
negotiating with the Jordanian government about exploiting these resources. In 2002 
Jordan was estimated to have average natural gas reserves of around 6 billion cubic 
meters, however new estimates suggest that this is actually much higher. In 2003 the 
country produced and consumed an estimated 390 million cubic meters of natural gas. 
Natural gas is increasingly being used to fulfil the country‘s domestic energy needs, 
with the primary source being the Risha gas field, located in the eastern portion of the 
country.The majority of Jordan‘s natural gas reserves are sourced via the recently 
completed Arab Gas Pipeline, which stretches from the Al Arish terminal in Egypt, 
passing underwater to Al Aqabah before it reaches northern Jordan, where it links to 
two major power stations. This pipeline supplies Jordan with around 1 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas on a yearly basis (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
2013). 
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4.2.3 Transport 
The transportation sector in Jordan contributes around 10% of GDP, accounting for 
$2.14bn in 2007. With such a service and industry-oriented economy, the transport 
sector is considered to be of the utmost importance to Jordan‘s finances. In 2008 the 
government formulated a new national transport strategy with the aim of improving, 
modernising and further privatising the sector. This is helped by the uncertain future as 
to the security crisis in Iraq, which results in a bright future for Jordan‘s transport 
sector. It is thought that Jordan will remain as one of the major transit points for goods 
and individuals bound for Iraq, as well as enjoying a large number of tourists by their 
own means. As such, the Jordanian government have endeavoured to increase this 
success, relocating Aqaba‘s main port, developing the national railway system and 
constructing a new terminal at QAIA. However, the rising costs of fuel are estimated to 
have negative effects on operational costs in transport, affecting the sector‘s annual 
growth rate on average by 6%. However, the uncertain fuel prices offer a great deal of 
incentive to boost private investments in alternative modes of transport such as buses 
and trains (Ministry of Transport, 2013). 
4.2.4 Media and advertising 
Though the state remains the biggest influence in Jordanian media, the sector has seen 
significant privatisation and liberalisation efforts in the past few years. The official rates 
reveal that the advertising sector spent around $280m on publicity in Jordan‘s media, 
with 80% of this funding newspapers and the remainder being spent on television, radio 
and magazines. The state-owned Jordan TV (JTV) remains the sole broadcaster in the 
country following the cancelled launch of ATV, however there has been a significant 
rise in the number of blogs, websites and news portals as a means for citizens to access 
information. These growing fields should encourage growth in advertising revenues and 
private initiatives. 
2007 saw a further growth of 30% in Jordan‘s advertising industry and following almost 
a decade of double-digit growth the market is seeing a relative slowdown, illustrated by 
the move between 2007- 2008. Though 2007 saw some major campaigns put in places, 
there was no such improvement in 2008 and the expenditure as a whole in the 
advertising sector has some way to go to catch up with the rest of the region when 
considering the average expenditure per capita. As the sector grows and matures, it is 
thought that the growth figures will naturally decrease gradually. However, between 
83 
2000 and 2007 there was a 260% increase in expenditure, from $77m in 2000 to $280m 
in 2007 (Jordan media and advertising, 2013). 
The Jordanian telecoms sector spent the most on advertising in 2007, dominating 20% 
of the market, followed by the banking and finance sector (12%), the services industry 
(11%), real estate (8%) and the automotive sector (5%). It is thought that the industry 
requires further vocational training in order to take advantage of new media market 
(Jordan Media and Advertising, 2013). 
4.3 Corporate Governance in Jordan 
The remarkable worldwide failures and crises of companies around the world have put 
Jordan in a place to be worried about the collapse of these companies by taking different 
actions in order to enhance the financial environment of the country. 
Although the Middle East region has experienced exceptional instability and war during 
recent decades, the economy of Jordan has exhibited steady growth, witnessed by 
increased volume of trade and market capitalisation, translated into a significant 
increase in the number of firms listed on the ASE (ASE, 2012). This reflects the 
advanced economic liberalisation, corporate governance reforms and encouragement of 
foreign investment enacted by the Jordanian government since the 1990s. 
The establishment of the ASE (est. 1999 for trading public securities), the SDC (which 
safeguards investors and arbitrates transactions) and the JSC (which regulates and 
supervises the equity market) helped to implement and codify legislation and 
regulations (such as the Securities Law of 2002, forefunner of the JCGC in 2006) to 
produce a uniquely amenable investor haven in the Middle East. Disclosure and 
transparency is encouraged and investors are relatively protected. Under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Controller of Companies enforces corporate 
governance legislation. However, despite being advanced regionally, the assessment of 
the World Bank and the IMF (2004) suggested that Jordanian companies‘ governance is 
still insufficiently advanced (ROSC, 2004). This is understandable considering the 
novelty of corporate governance in general, and its relation to government in Arab 
countries. The financial institutional framework in the region is subject both to a lack of 
enforcement capabilities and political interference. Difficulties will continue to be 
experienced in soliciting investment without a comprehensive and enforceable corporate 
governance framework (Sharar, 2006). This corroborates the findings of Glaeser et al. 
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(2001), who concluded that albeit economic liberalisation and market reforms result in 
short-term economic growth in developing economies, weak investor protection, lack of 
enforcement of patchy regulation result in a shortage of equity financing, asset 
tunnelling and security delisting (Coffee, 1999). The following sections review the most 
important developments in this regard in the Jordanian context. 
4.3.1 The Jordanian Capital Market 
Different changes had been introduced in the 1990s, in the regulatory environment since 
the creation of the ASE, JSC and the Securities Depository Centre (SDC). Three 
important bodies had been created in Jordan according to the Securities Law in relation 
to monitoring, regulating and supervising the companies that are listed in the ASE. The 
effect of each three bodies had strengthened with the Instructions of Issuing Companies 
Disclosure, Securities Law of 2002 and Accounting and Auditing Standards for the year 
2004. In addition the Co-operative Compliance Authority has achieved much progress 
by enforcing many basic corporate governance provisions of the Company Law (JSC, 
2007). 
 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
In order to regulate the capital market, the JSC was established in 1997 by the Securities 
Law No. 23. The JSC reports directly to the Prime Minister and has legal 
responsibilities with financial and administrative autonomy. The JSC was originally 
intended to protect investors in securities as well as to regulate and develop the capital 
market to ensure fairness, efficiency and transparency. As such, it protects the capital 
market from the risks it might face. The main objectives of the JSC are to regulate and 
develop the capital market, as well as to protect the ASE investors in securities and to 
protect the capital market from risks. It also aims to upgrade the performance and 
efficiency of the Commission and to increase market awareness. 
The JSC is administered by a board comprised of five full-time commissioners who are 
experienced and specialised in the field of securities. These commissioners are 
appointed via the Council of Ministers supported by a Royal Decree and have a term of 
five years. Amongst their duties the commissioners prepare draft laws and regulations in 
the security sector, as well as to approve instructions and bylaws related to capital 
market institutions. As such they also undertake duties such as granting licenses to 
undertake financial services activities and to certify financial activities and approving 
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the registration of securities and mutual funds. The responsibility of adopting the 
accounting, auditing and performance evaluation standards to be followed by parties 
also falls to the JSC. 
The Securities Law No. 76 in 2002 outlined that the Commission is responsible for 
monitoring companies that issue securities, financial services companies and certified 
financial professionals, the ASE, the SDC, as well as mutual funds and investment 
companies in securities. It is thought by the JSC that the achievements of the Jordan 
capital market are the fruits of extensive studies and experience, as well as both the 
local and external partnerships. It is considered that the openness of the capital market 
institutions to the world development trends combined with their adaptability to the 
market is responsible for the achievements of the security market. Due to this, the JSC 
focuses attention on the fostering of cooperation and the exchange of information with 
Arab and other international organisations. Thanks to a range of information exchange 
agreements, governed by international standards, the JSC is able to achieve its aims, 
further allowing it to develop the capital market. 
The JSC is focusing efforts on the dissemination and consolidation of the culture of 
investment in securities in order to expand the base of investors. This is to be achieved 
through publishing public awareness material through the media, lectures and meetings 
and by allowing student visits from universities and education institutes. Additionally 
the Commission is also attempting to apply the JCGC for shareholding companies listed 
on the ASE, which would boost the confidence of current and potential investors. The 
JSC and other capital market institutions are drawing the bases and criteria for applying 
international corporate governance principles, with particular focus on those issued by 
the OECD. The JSC endeavours to maintain a partnership with judicial and legislative 
authorities and the media as a means of protecting investors and upgrading the capital 
market. Through the use of internal and external training courses, the JSC focuses a 
large amount of time and money into enhancing employee abilities, reflecting positively 
on the national capital market. 
 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
Established in 1999, the ASE is a non-profit, private institution with administrative and 
financial autonomy that acts as an exchange for the trading of security. Comprised of 68 
brokerage forms, the ASE is governed by a seven-member board of directors as a means 
to facilitate the exchange, with daily responsibilities of monitoring and reporting to the 
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board for consultation. It is the duty of the ASE to ensure fairness, transparency, 
efficiency and liquidity for its listed securities whilst also maintaining the guarantee on 
the rights of its investors. As such, the exchange has developed directives to ensure 
proper conduct. As well as creating and maintaining a safe environment for investment, 
the ASE also ensure processes and methods are developed as a means of ensuring 
trading securities on the stock market. In addition, the dissemination of trading 
information to the largest possible number of dealers and interested partners is 
maintained, ensuring that public awareness is enhanced and that the transparency and 
credibility of the stock market is visible. 
In order to ensure international standards and practices are met, the ASE and the JSC 
work closely on matters of surveillance and security. In order to provide the best 
performance in the security sector, they maintain strong relationships with other 
exchanges, associations and international organisations. As such, the ASE are actively 
involved as a member of both the Union of Arab Stock Exchanges and the Federation of 
Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges (FEAS), as well as being a full members of the World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and an affiliate members of the International 
Organisation for Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The ASE ensures further 
investment in the sector by providing enterprises with a means to raise capital by listing 
on the Exchange and thus encouraging an active market in listed securities based on 
prices when trading, providing facilities for the enterprises to take advantage of in their 
financial prices. 
 Securities Depository Centre (DSC) 
Another key player in the securities sector in Jordan is the Securities Depository Centre 
(SDC), a public utility institution established in Jordan by the Securities Law No. 23 
(1997). This was due to the law separating the functions of the Amman Financial 
Market (AFM) and creating the JSC, ASE and the SDC, which works under the JSCs 
supervision. It is the role of the SDC to enhance the confidence of investors in securities 
to enable them to follow-up their investments via a central registry for enhanced 
security. They also concern themselves with the reduction of risks related to settlement 
of trading transactions, which they achieve by implementing by-laws, instructions and 
procedures. 
The SDC is the only entity in Jordan that is legally empowered by the Securities Law 
No. 76 (2002) to oversee the registration and deposit of securities, the transfer of 
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ownership and safekeeping of securities and the clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions. As such, it abides by a legal personality with financial and administrative 
autonomy. As a means of allowing the SDC to perform its operations, a central registry 
and depository of authenticated shareholders and central settlement process was 
implemented. As such, this creates an electronic database of shareholder registers. 
Being one of the major institutions in the Jordan Capital Market, the SDC has been 
assigned the task of developing the Jordan Capital Market along with the JSC and ASE. 
4.3.2 Disclosure and accounting standards 
In order to achieve good corporate governance it is important for the company to adopt 
clear standards and full disclosure (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). Therefore, the 
company law, the insurance law, the banking law and the securities law require the 
companies to follow internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards. Prior to 
1997, there was no legally established accounting and auditing standard-setting body in 
Jordan, and the process of regulating accounting practice in Jordan was purely 
promulgated by the government (the Ministry of Industry and Trade), with a very minor 
role for the private sector, or the Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(Al-Akra et al., 2009). In 1997 Jordan started to adopt the international financial 
reporting standards (Word Bank, 2004). The IFRS in Jordan is required for all listed 
companies. According to Directives of disclosures, auditing, and accounting standards 
(1/1998) and the JSC Law (23/1997), all entities are subject to JSCs to implement 
International Reporting Standards (IFRS). Moreover, the JSC requires companies to 
present their annual audited financial statements within 90 days from fiscal year end. 
The law of financial security discusses deeply the disclosure regulations in public 
shareholding companies. Disclosure‘s importance arises because its cultural dimensions 
along with establishing legal rules, and its wider meaning is developing the financial 
sector in general. Jordan security commission started to ask companies to disclose their 
board members ownership and its top management salaries in spite of strong opposition 
by companies. Tarif (2003) found that more than 85% of companies reached a high 
commitment in disclosure. 
In order to improve and regulate the accounting profession in Jordan, Law No. 73 of 
2003 was issued to enhance corporate governance structure in Jordanian companies. In 
addition, the law supports the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting 
(JACPA) and established the High Council of Accounting and Auditing (Word Bank, 
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2004). Moreover, the Company Law provides auditors in the corporation with some 
corporate governance rules. These rules summarize what should be included in the 
auditor‘s report and how to appoint the auditors. The appointing of the auditors takes 
place at the annual general shareholder meeting and there are some requirements to 
replace the auditor and specific reasons which are related to the Company Law. The 
auditor provides the shareholders with a report about the financial position of the 
company during the last year by applying the international standards of auditing in the 
report (Shanikat and Abbadi, 2011). 
4.3.3 Effective supervision of the board of directors 
The board of directors is the apex of hierarchical corporate control systems, and its 
primary role is to monitor the management by agents on behalf of principals 
(shareholders) who elect its members. The board of directors plays a crucial role in 
managing the company to motivate and improve firm performance by providing 
supervision and monitoring inside the company to evaluate, advice, and reviewing the 
management (Gillan, 2006). An independent board is generally viewed favourably as 
part of an efficient governance mechanism, because independence from management 
clearly enhances the ability of the board to exercise its function of overseeing the former 
on behalf of principals (Liu and Fong, 2010).Thus the board of directors is essentially a 
monitoring mechanism to protect principals‘ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The Company Law in Jordan had announced some provisions and policies that may 
enhance the board and improve the performance of the company, including: 
 Each company is obligated to prepare its own financial statements within three 
months of the end of the company fiscal year. 
 To prepare the annual reports for the last year. 
 To prepare the forecasting planes for the next year. 
 Monitoring the annual general meeting. 
In addition, the Company Law is concerned with board meetings. For instance, any 
member inside the board who missed four meetings without any acceptable excuse or 
failed to attend to the board six times, even with acceptable excuse will lose his 
membership. Moreover, if the shareholders have 30% of the shares or more they have 
the right to dismiss any member inside the board if he or she is not performing his 
duties efficiently. Regarding the important role of the audit committee inside the board 
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in reviewing the financial statements, the annual reports, reviewing the external 
auditor‘s reports, exercise control on the accuracy of the accounting and regulations 
producers and ensure that the company applied the laws and the regulations. The 
Securities Law assures that each committee should at least meet once every three 
months. In addition, they might meet more often according to the circumstances. 
The Company Law and ASE considered shareholders who own 5% or more of shares 
are large shareholder. This action allows them to re-audit the internal and the external 
reports of the company to check for any violations. In addition, large shareholder will 
have the power to exert control and close monitoring on the management. Furthermore, 
the shareholders have the right to redress any violations that may have been conducted 
by either the general manager, the audit committee and the company board (Word Bank, 
2004). 
4.3.4 Jordan Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) 
As a new concept for the Jordanian business environment, corporate governance 
professionals are concerned with better performance and development of the companies. 
This concern creates to apply international corporate governance standards in order to 
improve the financial environment for the companies. In addition, applying 
international corporate governance standards is consistent with the principles of 
globalization, global competition and the openness of the economic. Applying the 
JCGC will show that the local market is implementing the requirements and the 
criteria‘s of transparency and accountability to protect the investors and traders. 
Moreover, JCGC will show that the Jordanian companies have the ability to deal with 
the worldwide corporations and markets. Accordingly, this will increase and enhance 
the confidence in the national economy. As a result, this is an indicator for the foreign 
investors and corporations to attract and motivate them to invest in the local market. 
Jordanian companies‘ obligations are constrained under the regulations to align with the 
business companies and corporate governance such as the Corporate Governance Code 
(CGC) and Company Law (CL). 
The Cadbury Report (1992) and OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
played an important role in the developing of corporate governance codes globally 
(Mallin, 2007). Various countries have followed the Cadbury Report by introducing 
different codes for the best practices of corporate governance. These codes tried to 
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implement Cadbury Report by providing variety of recommendations such as board 
structure and ownership structure. 
Jordan has adopted and followed the international corporate governance codes by 
introducing their own corporate governance code in 2006. These codes include many 
recommendations in line with international best practice. The code was draws upon to 
the OECD principles of corporate governance and the guidance were issued by the 
Basel Committee to enhance the banking organizations of corporate governance. In 
particular, the recommendations of the code were heavily informed by those of the 
OECD principles. 
The guide was issued in view of the development of the national economy, and in line 
with the efforts of the JSC to develop the national capital market. The major areas of 
enforcement include rules of corporate governance for shareholding companies that are 
listed in the ASE. It contains an established and clear framework that regulates the 
relations between the companies and management. These codes define their duties, 
rights and responsibilities. These rules are based mainly on the Companies Law, 
Securities Law and the international principles (e.g. OECD principles). Furthermore, the 
important role of the Central Bank (CB) cannot be ignored in promoting the role of 
corporate governance of financial and non-financial institutions in Jordan as one of the 
key players. The Central Bank of Jordan had issued the bank Director‘s Handbook of 
Corporate Governance in 2004. Moreover, the CB prepared the corporate governance 
code which helped in implementing the international corporate governance practices 
inside the Jordanian banks. 
Al-Basheer (2003) stated that the safe financial environment is the framework for good 
development corporate governance. Al-Jazi (2007) states that different laws related to 
corporate governance have been issued and implemented (e.g. Securities Law, 
Company Law, Insurance Law, Banking Law, Law of Competition and Monopoly, 
Commercial Law, Law of Privatisation and Law of Investment Promotion). These laws 
spotlight the issues that are related to corporate governance, which are: 
 The financial disclosure and the company‘s legal personality are independent to 
their shareholder. 
 These laws help in governing the conditions, procedures and the actions that 
may appear, such as transfer properties or acquisitions (e.g. the right for transfer 
of company and individual ownership, possession and mortgages). 
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 To pursue the legal structure of the companies and confirm that these companies 
have the following assemblies; audit committee, board of directors and general 
shareholders. 
The JCCG published in 2006 by the JSC covers the following areas: 
 Definitions of key terminology. 
 The board‘s structure and responsibilities. 
 Shareholder general meetings. 
 Shareholders‘ rights. 
 Guidelines for financial disclosures. 
 Accountability and auditing. 
 Ownership structure. 
In terms of the board of directors and ownership structure, the recommendation of the 
JCGC 2006 stipulate some provisions such as: (1) the board size should be between 5 
and 13, (2) the role of the CEO and the chairman should be separated, (3) at least 1/3 of 
the board should be non-executive directors and (4) shareholders who own 15% or more 
have the right to question the board of directors. 
The Disclosure Department in the JSC is the responsible department for applying and 
implementing the previous rules inside all the companies‘ applications to strength their 
performance in order to enhance and improve the national economy and the investment 
environment (JSC, 2005). Furthermore, in order to encourage foreign investors to invest 
in Jordan, Jordan has signed several promotion and reciprocal of investments 
agreements with the following countries: the UK, France, the US, Germany, Italy, 
Malaysia, Romania, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Yemen, Bulgaria, Austria, China, Spain, 
Syria, Poland, Kuwait and Singapore (Jordan Investment Board, 2013). Naturally such 
extensive international agreements require a sound legal framework and some degree of 
regulation from the government. Therefore, if the companies operate their business 
without efficient mechanisms of corporate governance, they might lose the advantage 
from attracting foreign investors and they probably will face challenges and difficulties 
to enter to the international market. 
In summary, firstly, Jordanian firms are trading in different industries, which generally 
affects corporate governance due to different practices between industries resulting from 
differences in capital structure, complexity of operations, ownership levels and business 
type (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Elsayed, 2007; Lim et al., 2007). This study therefore 
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includes the industry effect in order to find the impact of the industrial sector on firm 
performance. Secondly, Jordan started economic and financial reforms and adopted 
legislation to motivate and initiative accountability and transparency in the country, in 
order to build a safe financial environment for the local and foreign investors. In this 
sense, the study will investigate these changes and improvements of legislation by using 
annual dummy variables to investigate this effect on firm performance. It is expected 
that the development of the financial environment might improve the firm performance 
in Jordan. 
Thirdly, the board of directors is the apex of hierarchical corporate control systems, and 
its primary role is to monitor the management by agents on behalf of principals 
(shareholders); it was elected by shareholders. In Jordan, ownership is typically 
concentrated among large shareholders such as families and companies, which clearly 
can affect management decisions (ROSC Jordan, 2004). Nepotism is commonplace in 
appointment to management positions in Jordanian companies due to the influence of 
large shareholders (Al-Jazi, 2007). In this scenario, any attempts to introduce good 
corporate governance principles might be hampered by the inflexibility of organisations, 
the limited autonomy of managers, and the lack of managerial objectivity to monitor 
firm activities and to achieve objectives. For example, if the company has family 
ownership it is more likely that the CEO is also chairman. In addition, the company 
management will be less likely to appoint NEDs on the board to monitor their actions. 
Therefore, an efficient board can improve corporate governance by reducing the agency 
costs and solve the conflicts between the management and shareholders. In Jordan, the 
legislative perspective (JCGC, 2006) advocates that the size of the board should reflect 
a sufficient balance of skills and experience, ranging from five to thirteen members. In 
addition, to reduce the ability of the CEO to act against the interests of the shareholders, 
the JCGC (2006) advises separation of the chairman and CEO roles, and advocates that 
at least one-third of the board should comprise NEDs, in order to exert a monitoring on 
managers‘ decisions in the interest of shareholders; thus the study explores the effect of 
the board of directors. 
Furthermore, the prevalence of concentrated ownership in Jordan indicates that most 
firms are dominated by large shareholders, such as families and institutional investors 
(ROSC, 2004). Implications of this include that large shareholders might create power 
bases based on their voting rights, manipulating firm policies to control managers‘ 
actions for their own interests, thus increasing the agency problem and undermining 
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firm performance. On the other hand, large shareholders can be expected to monitor 
management decisions more closely due to their increased stake in the firm, which 
would reduce the agency problem and improve firm performance. Both of these 
alternatives are possible, thus the study investigates the impact of the concentrated 
ownership and owner identity (i.e. the nature of the owners) on firm performance. 
Finally, Jordan started economic and financial reforms to improve the accountability 
and transparency in the financial environment to increase and enhance the confidence in 
the national economy. Al-Jazi (2007) states that different laws related to corporate 
governance have been issued and implemented (e.g. Securities Law, Company Law, 
Insurance Law, Banking Law, Law of Competition and Monopoly, Commercial Law, 
Law of Privatisation and Law of Investment Promotion). This has resulted in increasing 
the foreign investors to the local market. Al-Muhtaseb (2009) Jordan is in the top three 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in terms of attracting foreign 
investment. In this regard the study will investigate the impact of the foreign ownership 
on the performance of the Jordanian companies. 
Thus, the study reviewed the theoretical framework and the empirical literature about 
corporate governance mechanisms, then the study reviewed the Jordanian background 
in order to modify if necessary some of the measures to answer the study questions. The 
next chapter will explain the source of the data and the way the variables how they have 
been construed. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has focused on corporate governance in Jordan to provide a widespread 
description of the Jordanian economic environment and corporate governance 
framework. This chapter reviewed the Jordanian economic environment in order to 
present the most important aspects of the corporate governance environment in Jordan. 
It presented the general background about the economic situation in Jordan and 
reviewed the industry and services sectors. Because Jordan is interested in attracting 
foreign investors and corporations, it was necessary to adopt series of reforms and 
legislations to underpin confidence of local and international investors in the local 
market and companies. In addition, implementing and applying the international codes 
and principles will enhance the accountability and transparency of the country. 
Accordingly, the most important elements of the Jordanian markets were analysed, 
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including the Securities Law related to monitoring, regulating and supervising the 
companies listed in the ASE (and the three key bodies the JSC, the ASE and the SDC). 
Moreover, Jordan has followed and adopts the internationals corporate governance 
codes by introducing their own corporate governance code in 2006. All of these actions 
have helped in raising the strength and the confidence that Jordan is adopting good 
corporate governance practises. The next chapter discusses the data measurement. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to examine the effect of corporate governance on the firm performance 
of Jordanian industrial and services firms from 2000 to 2010. Specifically, to investigate 
the role of the board of directors, ownership structure and foreign ownership on firm 
performance. Therefore, this chapter aims to provide a description of the data used in 
this study. First the sources of data are explained. Second the sample selection 
procedure is described. In addition, the criteria that have been adopted to construct the 
sample are explained. The variables that have been used in this study are divided into 
three categories (firm performance, corporate governance variables and control 
variables). For each category the data source and variable construction are explained. 
5.2 Sample 
This study covers the industrial and services Jordanian companies listed in the ASE that 
provided full information for the period (2000-2010). The list of companies listed in the 
ASE was obtained directly from the ASE official website. There are two main sectors in 
ASE, the financial companies sector and the non-financial companies sector. The 
financial sector consists of four types of industries (banks, insurance, diversified 
financial services and real estate) while the non-financial sector consists of two types of 
industries (industrial and services), as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Table 3: Summary of population structure in ASE 
Sector  Sectors No. firms in sector Percentage of population  
Non-financial 
companies  
Services  59 45.03 
Industrial  72 54.96 
Total   131  100 
 
The data used in this study was collected from two sources: the Osiris database and the 
Annual Reports of the Jordanian companies. The Osiris database has provided this study 
with the data that relates to the first two questions of this research (e.g. the role of the 
board of directors and the managerial structure). However, the data that collects 
ownership structure was manually collected from the Jordanian annual reports. Fraser et 
al. (2006) argue that company‘s annual reports are more accurate than other secondary 
data sources. In addition, they report that information and data based on annual reports 
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show a high level of reliability and quality. To avoid error during copying the data from 
annual reports, entries are double checked by the researcher. Both databases provided a 
summary of the balance sheet, income statements, financial ratios, number of directors 
and the name of the auditing companies. 
The whole population of industrial and services companies are listed in ASE consists of 
131 companies. The services and industrial sector include 19 industries in both of them 
as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Table 4: Summary of industry and services sector 
Sector Industry  No of firms in 
each industry 
Share of 
population  
Actual 
sample 
 
Services 
Health care 4 0.031 3 
Educational 6 0.046 5 
Hotels & tourism 12 0.092 11 
Transportation 14 0.110 12 
Technology & communications 2 0.020 2 
Media  2 0.020 1 
Utilities & energy 4 0.031 3 
Commercial 15 0.110 13 
 
Industria
l 
Pharmaceutical & medical 6 0.046 5 
Chemical 10 0.076 9 
Paper & cardboard 3 0.023 3 
Printing & packaging 2 0.020 2 
Food & beverage 11 0.084 11 
Tobacco & cigarettes  2 0.020 2 
Mining & extraction  17 0.130 14 
Engineering & construction 8 0.060 8 
Electrical 5 0.040 3 
Textiles, leather & clothing  6 0.046 6 
Glass & ceramics 2 0.020 2 
Total 131 1 115 
 
The study used 115 out of the 131 companies. These were chosen based on the 
following criteria: (1) no companies that were liquidated either voluntary or by 
obligation and (2) no companies that were acquired by or merged with another 
company. The study excluded the financial companies sector because firms in this 
sector are administered by different set of instructions and rules (Abed et al., 2012). 
Thus, this makes these firms incomparable to firms in the other sectors. In addition, they 
have been excluded because of unique characteristics of their financial statement 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Claessens et al., 2006; Al-Kouri, 2006; Andres, 2008; Al-
Najjar 2008; Estrin et al., 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2009; Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). 
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Following previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Cheng et al., 2008) this study used the 
same criteria that have been used by them in selecting the sample. Yermack (1996) and 
Cheng et al. (2008) argue that the two criteria above assisted in meeting the needs for a 
panel data analysis for firms with several sequential years of data. Furthermore, the 
sample ends in 2010 because this is the most recent year for which data was available at 
the time when data collection started. 
5.3 Performance Variables 
Historically, different measurements have been used in order to examine the firm 
performance by different studies (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Ittner and Larcker, 2003). 
Most of the studies examine the firm performance using a diversity of financial 
measures such as Tobin‘s Q (Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003), ROA (Yermack, 1996; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Shrader et al., 1997; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003), ROE (Bhagat et al., 1999; Adjaoud et al., 2007), ROI (Boyd, 1995; 
Adjaoud et al., 2007) and net profit margin (Bauer et al., 2004). 
The above measures can be categorised into two groups: market-based and accounting-
based measures. On one hand, Daily and Dalton (2003) suggest that the accounting-
based measures consider the current financial performance of the company. On the 
other hand, market-based measures consider the investor perceptions of the company 
potential performance. Each group has been criticised by different researchers. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argued that there is no consensus in the literature on which 
measure is the best indicator of financial performance. In addition, they report that 
every measure has its own strengths and weaknesses; thus there is no specific measure 
to be the best proxy for financial performance. 
ROA in terms of accounting profit was cited by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) as more 
representative of underlying business parameters in terms of year-to-year fluctuations 
than stock market rates of return, because the latter are more reflective of expected 
future developments rather than actual business conditions. This concept had been 
widely deployed by corporate governance studies (Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Klapper and Love, 2004). Historical reports such as accounting-based 
measures do not consider the future prospects of firm performance, but they are the 
most comprehensive indicators of the current status of firm performance. Market-based 
measures of firm performance are particularly problematic in the context of emerging 
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markets, where most firms are characterized by debt-financing rather equity financing. 
Therefore, market-based measures are unrepresentative of actual investor profits in this 
context (Kumar, 2004).The market share price of firms reflects their market value with 
the proviso that the capital market is efficient according to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) (Gompers et al., 2003). Since Jordan is one of the emerging market 
countries, the stock market is yet to be developed in a comparable manner with 
established ones. For instance, the impacts of publicly disclosed/available firm 
information will influence the market after a lag time which will manifest in share 
prices. Financial performance is subject to a great degree of internal control, however 
market valuation is subject to fluctuations beyond management control, such as changes 
in market valuations and stock declines (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; Grossman 
and Hoskisson, 1998). 
Black et al. (2006a) argue that the value of corporate governance is valued differently 
by the insiders and outsiders. For example, the accounting based measures of 
performance (ROA and ROE) concern control of the wealth effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms from the view point of the company management (insiders). 
However, the market based measures such as the Tobin‘s Q represent financial 
estimation of corporate governance structure by investors (outsiders). Wulf (2007) 
points out that accounting measurement maintain a straight relationship with the firm‘s 
strategies and performances. For example, 80% of studies that identified the significant 
variables affecting company‘s performances utilized ROE and ROA as main variables. 
In addition, different studies such as Zajac and Westphal (1996), Shrader et al. (1997), 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Carter et al. (2003) and Erhardt et al. (2003) used the ROA 
and ROE in examining the effect of the corporate governance on firm performance. 
Tobin‘s Q ratios used as proxies for market based measures is defined as the market 
value of equity divided by replacement cost (Yermack, 1996). Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) argue that Tobin‘s Q ratio measure the effectiveness with which firm 
management is capable to use its assets to create value for the shareholders. Market 
based measures such as Tobin‘s Q have been calculated differently by different authors. 
For example, Yermack (1996) calculated Tobin‘s Q by dividing the market value by 
replacement cost. However, Booth and Deli (1996) calculated the same ratio by dividing 
the market value by the total assets. Accordingly, if the two studies used the same 
period and the same sample, they would get different results for firm performance 
because of the methods of estimation and the valuation of the assets. 
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Although the firm performance can be examined from different perspectives such as 
Tobin‘s Q, however, we have the difficulties embroiled in computing Tobin‘s Q, such 
as computing the replacement cost which the companies do not report. 
Different researchers have pointed out some advantages of using accounting based 
measures in examining the firm performance. Generally, higher ROA and ROE denote 
an effective use of the firm assets and equities in increasing the value of the 
shareholders wealth by management. Moreover, another advantage of using ROA and 
ROE is that they exclude the problem of the company size. ROA and ROE present an 
effective and easy solution for the comparison between the companies (Lev and Sunder, 
1979). Furthermore, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) point that ROA and ROE might consider 
year-to-year fluctuations in implied business conditions better than stock market return. 
This is due to that a stock market rate of return reflects anticipated future changes that 
may hide the current fluctuations in the business conditions. 
However, the use of the accounting based measures has been criticised from different 
perspectives. Firstly, Ross etal. (2008) argue that accounting based measures ROA and 
ROE are historical measures. However, the earlier earnings might be weak reflections of 
accurate future profits. Krivogorsky (2006) points that accounting based measures ROA 
and ROE are grounded on historical cost accounting. Therefore, they are incapable to 
directly reflect present fluctuations in the valuations by the equity market. Secondly, 
Alexander et al. (2007), Mangena and Tauringana (2007) argue that accounting based 
measures are subject of changes and alterations in accounting methods, techniques and 
policies. Thirdly, Ross etal. (2008) point out that accounting based measures ignores 
risk. Finally, Alexander et al. (2007) found that accounting based measures fail to 
reflect environmental and industry differences such as employee and customer 
satisfaction. However, to minimise the potential impact of these weaknesses and 
limitations that have been discussed above, a list of control variables has been included 
in this study to justify the use of the accounting based measures of performance. 
From the point of view of the shareholders, return on equity is considered to be the most 
important ratio to measure the firm performance because it focuses on the return of the 
shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Mehran 1995). Similarly, ROA is an important 
measurement for the firm performance by taking under considerations the assets that are 
used by the company to support the firm activities. According to agency theory, 
managers are more likely to misuse the firm assets by working for their own interests 
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leaving less return for the shareholders. However, accounting based measure such as 
ROE and ROA are directly related to management‘s ability to efficiently utilise the firm 
assets. A lower ROE and ROA will indicate inefficiency. Therefore, both of the two 
measurements are important from the view of the shareholders to measure the firm 
performance. In this study ROE and ROA have been selected as proxies for firm 
performance from the accounting based measures. 
Return on assets is an indicator of how profit a company is or how efficient is the 
management as using its assets to generate earning, and is sometimes referred to as 
Return on Investment. It is calculated by dividing a company net income by its total 
assets: 
Return on Assets (ROA) = (Net Income) / (Total Assets). 
Return on Equity measures the profit of the company by revealing how much profit the 
company generates regarding to the amount of the money invested by the investor. It is 
calculated by dividing a company net income by its total equity. It is also known as 
Return on Net Worth: 
Return on Equity (ROE) = (Net Income) / (Total Equity). 
All of the financial information that related to ROE and ROA variables were extracted 
from the balance sheet that provided by Osiris database. 
5.4 Control Variables 
Beside the previous variables, control variables have been introduced to explain the 
variation of the firm performance. Different studies (Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 
1996; Shin and Stulz, 2000; Daines, 2001 and Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al.,; 
2006a; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a) used different control variables. As shown below in 
Table 5 a list of control variables that has been used in this study (e.g., firm size, 
leverage, liquidity, age, industry and annual dummies) has been listed. The researcher 
acknowledges that, it could also be argued that other relevant factors may exist. 
However, by reviewing the previous literature there is no specific formula for the 
control variables. Therefore, by following different studies it is common practice to 
include the above as control variables. 
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Table 5: Summary of control variables 
Control variables  
Firm Size (Log TA) 
Leverage  
Liquidity  
Age  
Industry 
Annual dummies 
5.4.1 Firm size 
Different researchers report an ambiguous relationship between the firm size and firm 
performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Nenova, 2003; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005).Short and Keasey (1999) and Joh (2003) argue that larger firms 
have better opportunity than the smaller ones in creating and generating funds internally 
and accessing external resources. In addition, larger firms might benefit from economies 
of scale by creating entry barriers with a positive effect on firm performance. 
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) points out that firm size may be used as a proxy for the 
agency problem. He reports that managers have motivation to increase the firm size 
beyond the target which will indicate more power, when the amount of assets under 
their control is larger. Fama and Jensen (1983), Booth and Deli (1996) and Boone et al. 
(2007) argue that as the firm size increases the firm becomes more diversified. This 
means that larger can explain the natural complexity of the company. Also, it means that 
larger firms need more advice on the board. In addition, larger firms are correlated with 
complex operations in order to pursue the company strategies more efficiently. 
Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2008) recommend larger firm sizes to benefit performance. 
This is because, large firms have better opportunity to raise funds and more diversified 
strategies. In addition it has wide variety of expertise management. Black et al. (2006b) 
show that the firm size positively affects firm performance. 
On the other hand, other researchers (e.g., Nenova, 2003; Garen, 1994; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996) report that large firms are subject to more inspections and scrutiny. 
Thus, it might be costly for the controlling families to extract private profits (Nenova, 
2003). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) report a negative relationship between the firm size 
and firm performance. They argue that larger firms might not be as efficient as the 
smaller firms due to reduced control by management over strategic and operational 
activities as firm size increases. Garen (1994) argues that the cost of complying with 
corporate governance codes requirements will be comparatively low for the larger 
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companies. However, this cost will increase if the companies are subject to public 
media scrutiny. This is because; they will be subject for high levels of media 
investigations than the smaller companies. (Garen, 1994). Finally, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that as the firm size increases the agency costs are likely to increase. The 
increase of costs is due to the need for more control that resulted from managerial 
discretion and opportunism. Moreover, the growth of the firm will result in increasing 
the internal control tools for forecasting and designing. This will raise the need for 
aligning the interest of the managers and the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In line with previous studies (e.g., Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Elsayed, 2007; Topak, 
2011; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Lehn et al., 2009) who used TA as a proxy for firm size 
this study will measure the firm size by using the natural logarithm of total assets (―Log 
TA‖). Total assets were extracted directly from the balance sheet provided by Osiris 
database. 
5.4.2 Leverage 
Different researchers have argued that leverage may affect the firm performance either 
positively or negatively. A positive effect might take place as a consequence for 
monitoring by lenders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that leverage play an 
important role in mitigating agency problem as an internal corporate governance 
mechanism especially free cash problems. Jensen (1986) argues that increasing the 
external debt may result in positive effect. Increasing the debt will constrain managerial 
discretion. Jensen (1986) reports that high levels of debt will discipline the managers to 
use the company free cash flows for non-profitable investments (opportunistic 
managers). Since managers are obligated to pay periodic repayments of interest and 
principal. Stiglitz (1985) notes that an effective control for the managerial behaviour is 
implemented mainly by lenders rather than shareholders. Similarly, Ross (1977) argues 
that increasing the leverage might be a good indicator for the company ability to serve 
large amounts of debt. Moreover, Modigliani and Miller (1963) expect positive 
association between leverage and the firm performance computed by tax shields. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that firm performance can be improved by using the 
debt in financing the company due to pursuing the monitoring by lenders. 
On the other hand, Myers (1977) argues that high amounts of leverage may affect the 
firm performance negatively according to the problem of underinvestment. This is 
because increasing the leverage will hinder the ability of the company to raise new debt. 
103 
Therefore, this will result in losing any possibility to acquire any investment 
opportunity. Furthermore, Myers (1977) and Stulz (1988) report that high levels of 
leverage will affect the market value of stocks which will result in higher financial risk. 
Moreover, they argue that from the governance viewpoint, high amounts of leverage 
will impede the firm performance by creating excessive interest and closer monitoring 
by creditors. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) argue that the lower the firm leverage the 
lower the probability of financial distress and firm with higher financial leverage tend to 
perform worse than firms with lower financial leverage. Leverage is defined as long 
term debt to total assets. Leverage was extracted directly from the balance sheet 
provided by Osiris database. 
5.4.3 Liquidity 
Chamberlain and Gordon (1989) and Jose et al. (1996) asserted that liquidity has an 
important effect on company survival; this is mainly due to its implications with regard 
to changes in sales dynamics, growth, financial costs reduction as well as it impacts on 
company risk level. Liquidity is important for company development, and it is an 
indicator of the company‘s market position and achievements. Fang et al. (2009) argue 
that liquidity reduces managerial opportunism and stimulates trade by informed 
investors, thus improving investment decisions through more informative share prices. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between liquidity and performance is more likely to 
be anticipated. Liquidity is defined as liquidity inside the company to meet its short 
term obligations and its short term financial distress. Liquidity was extracted from the 
balance sheet. In line with previous studies (Chamberlain and Gordon, 1989; Fang et al., 
2009; Jose et al., 1996), this study will measure the liquidity by using current ratio (CR) 
by dividing its current assets (CA) by its current liabilities (CL). It indicates that firms 
with high liquidity have the ability to absorb any external shocks and any internal 
obligations and reduce any possibility of financial distress. However, higher levels of 
liquidity will increase the opportunity cost of the company, that it has lost the possibility 
to invest these amounts to get generate return. 
5.4.4 Age 
Firm age has been used by a number of studies in terms of the number of years a firm 
has been incorporated (Berger and Udell, 1998; Boone et al., 2007; Borghesi et al., 
2007; Gregory et al., 2005). They pointed out that firm age is a valuable indicator of 
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expected growth opportunities. For example, Claessens et al. (2002) confirmed that 
older and larger firms have more liquid trading, better disclosure, receive more attention 
from analysts and have more diversified activities, leading to lower risk of financial 
distress but less growth opportunities. However, younger and smaller firms can have 
better growth opportunities but greater exposure to adverse market conditions. Evans 
(1987) observed that older firms are generally more experienced and skilled, but less 
dynamic and less flexible in adjusting to alterations or modifications in the business 
environment. Borghesi et al. (2007) and Boone et al. (2007) confirmed this, stating that 
older firms are incapable of quick response to any changes in the environment. In the 
same vein, Lipczinsky and Wilson (2001) reported that new firms are anticipated to earn 
less profit than older ones because they are less experienced in the market and because 
they are trying to establish their own presence; in addition, they are usually trying to 
cover their cost structure. However, older firms are contemporaneously reaching the end 
of their life cycle.Black et al. (2006) suggest that older firms are more likely to have 
finished their high-growth stage, while younger firms are faster growing. Accordingly, 
younger corporations, as measured by a shorter incorporation history, are more likely to 
have better growth opportunities. 
This research will use the same measurements as previous studies (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Boone et al., 2007; Borghesi et al., 2007; Gregory et al., 2005): age was defined 
as being from 2010 minus the establishment date of the company, in order to determine 
how many years it had been incorporated before 2010. Age was extracted from the 
Osiris database. 
5.4.5 Industry 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Lim et al. (2007) and Elsayed (2007) found that corporate 
governance practices vary between industries due to the differences in capital structure, 
complexity of operations, ownership levels and line of business. In addition, global and 
economic developments may impact differently on different industries. Furthermore, 
based on survey by CLSA (2000) in emerging markets, corporate governance standards 
vary across different industries. Following Hanifia and Cook (2002), Foroughi et al. 
(2011) and Mandaci (2010), the industry variable is used as the dummy variable. To 
avoid the dummy variable trap, one industry is excluded. The industry sector includes 
11 industries; however the service sector comprises 8 industries according to ASE 
classifications. The value of 1 is used if the firm is in the industry or 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.6 Annual effects 
Different studies have reported that corporate governance practices and firms‘ 
profitability change over time during the periods of economic boom and recession; for 
example, Tan et al. (2001) argued that the global financial crisis affected the financial 
performance of all companies around the world. Likewise, changes in the macro 
environment such as tax policies and government regulations may impact the corporate 
governance structure and financial performance (Padgett and Shabbir, 2005). As shown 
in chapter 4, Jordan started economic and financial reforms and adopted legislation to 
motivate and initiative accountability and transparency in the country, in order to build 
safe financial environment for the local and foreign investors. For example, the issuance 
of the JCGC (2006), the equal treatment of Jordanian and foreign investors, complete 
freedom of capital movement and no taxes on cash dividends or capital gains create an 
attractive investment structure and open economy. Therefore, it is expected that these 
changes and improvements of legislation will affect firms‘ performance positively. This 
study investigates this effect using dummy variables. Every dummy variable value is 
equal to one for every year and zero otherwise. 
5.5 Corporate Governance Variables 
5.5.1 Board size 
The empirical findings in previous studies are mixed regarding the relationship between 
board size and firm performance. Some studies (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998;Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996) found evidence 
consistent with the view of agency costs: that small boards are related with better firm 
performance. The previous studies argue that as board size increases, the problems of 
coordination and communication increase, thus decreasing the ability of board members 
to monitor management behaviour and thereby increasing the agency problem and 
resulting in lower firm performance. In the same vein, large boards will reduce the 
monitor and control function of the board by giving managers space to pursue their own 
interests rather than those of the principals. Large boards are more likely to be 
controlled by the CEO rather than the board controlling management, leading to a 
negative impact on firm performance. However, some studies (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lehn et al., 2009) found that large boards affect firm 
performance positively, consistent with the view of resource dependence theory, due to 
106 
improved linkages to the external resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In addition, 
large boards allow directors to exchange more highly qualified counsels and present 
extra scope for the possibility of correlation with different external linkages and access 
to resources. These resources could include access to new and better technologies, 
access to markets and access to raw materials among other things. Large boards also 
play an important role in improving and enhancing the outcomes of decisions, because 
of diversity in educations, sharing of ideas, contributions and industry experience, 
which might lead to high quality advices and thereby better firm performance (Lehn et 
al., 2009). 
Thus, from the mixed results, there is no consensus as to whether larger or smaller 
boards are better. Therefore, this study will investigate the relationship between the 
board size and the firm performance. Following Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Yermack 
(1996), Ahmed et al. (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2008), board size (labelled as 
BSIZE) is defined as the number of directors who are on the board, as shown below in 
Table 6. The number of directors was extracted from Osiris database. 
Table 6: Corporate governance variables 
Variables 
Labelled 
Definitions  
BSIZE The number of directors who are on the board. 
CEO Duality Is the CEO also Chairman? (YES=1, No=0). 
NEDs The percentage of the NEDs on the board to the number of total 
directors on the board. 
MO The percentage of equity ownership held by the management who run 
the operations of the firm. 
LargeSH5 The total of shares that are owned by shareholders who own 5% or 
more in the company without relying on their identity. 
OWNind/Fam The total percentage of shares (capital) that owned by 
individuals/families. 
OWNcomp The total percentage of shares (capital) that owned by companies. 
OWNgov The total percentage of shares (capital) that owned by government. 
 
5.5.2 CEO Duality 
Agency scholars such as Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued for separation of ownership and control in order to reduce 
agency problems and to improve firm performance. The agency theory supports the 
notion of separation between the CEO and the chairman, to increase board 
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independence from management, which (theoretically) results in better performance due 
to better monitoring and overseeing (Jensen, 1993). On the other hand, stewardship 
theory argues against separation, because it is based on duality; according to the 
stewardship paradigm, effective management is based on the principle of the unity of 
command, because when responsibilities and decisions are restricted to one person, 
more effective performance results, therefore it has positive impact on the firm 
performance (Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Donaldson and Daives, 1991; Arosa et al., 
2013). Moreover, Brickley et al. (1997) claimed that CEO duality will help in reducing 
the incomplete communication between the chairman and the CEO, hence reducing 
inconsistencies and conflicts in decision making. 
According to the Jordanian CGC (2006), the CEO and the chairman have different 
responsibilities, and accordingly, to avoid any conflict interests and maintain effective 
supervision of management, these two positions should be separated from each other. 
Different studies (e.g. Abor, 2007; Bozec, 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Gilh and Mathur, 2011; Sheikh et al., 2012) measured CEO duality as a 
dummy variable. In this study CEO duality is a dummy variable which will be created 
based on the CEO being chairman taking the value of one; otherwise the value of zero is 
taken, as shown in Table 6 above. This information was extracted from the Osiris 
database. This variable will investigate whether separating the two roles of chairman 
and the CEO affects the performance of the Jordanian companies positively or 
negatively. 
5.5.3 Non-executive directors 
As noted by Fama and Jensen (1983), boards are usually dominated by internal 
managers, whose performance is perceived to be enhanced if they can take decisions 
and exert maximum control, however in competitive environments such dominant 
insiders have less likelihood of surviving due to the lack of separation between decision 
management and decision control. This presents an argument for the presence of NEDs 
to ensure board independence from management by clearly segregating the control and 
management tasks. Additionally, internal managerial disagreements can be mediated by 
NEDs, as well as improving relations between internal management and other 
stakeholders. Therefore, NEDs are in better position to carry out the monitoring 
function than the executive directors. Jensen (1993) states the independence of NEDs 
helps in constructive criticism, because they will give their opinions without 
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sycophancy or coercion. In addition, NEDs will help in reducing information 
asymmetry between the shareholders and the executive directors. This will reduce the 
agency problem and hence increase the shareholders wealth. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) observed (based on resource dependency view) that independent directors 
improve information flow and networking with stakeholders and the community, and in 
terms of their knowledge by providing the management advices on strategic plans and 
investments and hence protect the firm resources and reduce uncertainty. On the 
contrary, Baysinger and Hookisson (1990); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argued that 
according to stewardship theory the NEDs are commonly part-time workers, this will 
undermine their ability to monitor and advise the board because of the lack of the 
information that they have, and the lack of information concerning daily activities 
inhibits NEDs‘ ability to apply their function to improve firm performance. Therefore, 
the insider directors are better to undertake the monitoring function to evaluate the top 
managers (Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990). 
Therefore, considering the NEDs from the perspectives of agency, resource dependence 
and stewardship theories, this study will investigate the impact of the NEDs on firm 
performance. Different studies (Arosa et al., 2012; Gordini, 2012; Khan and Awan, 
2012; Kumar and Singh, 2012; Weir et al., 2002) examined NEDs in terms of their 
percentage of board membership. In this study, NEDs were considered as a percentage 
of the number of total directors on the board, as shown in Table 6 above.  The number 
of NEDs was extracted from Jordanian annual reports. 
5.5.4 Managerial ownership 
According to agency theory, the convergence of interests (alignment interest) 
hypothesis different studies (e.g. Becht et al., 2003; Brickley et al., 1988; Davis et al., 
1997; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) argued that as managerial 
ownership increases (alignment interest), managers are less likely to transfer the firm 
resources away from value maximization. They report that increasing the management 
ownership will affect the firm positively by encouraging the managers to work in the 
best interest of the firm, which will align the interests of shareholders and managers, 
resulting in better firm performance because managers personally bear a large 
proportion of the costs of their actions. Managerial ownership is defined as the 
percentage of equity owned by management (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Florackis et al., 
2009; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Mehran, 1995; Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999; 
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Short and Keasey, 1999; Weir et al., 2002). Managerial ownership is labelled as (MO) 
as shown in Table 6 above. The MO was extracted directly from the Jordanian annual 
reports. In this context, the study will investigate the effect of the managerial ownership 
on the firm performance. 
5.5.5 Large shareholder 
As a substantial aspect of the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism, 
different researchers have examined the effect of ownership structure on the firm 
performance, mostly from the agency theory perspective. Most of these studies start 
from the argument presented by Berle and Means (1932), that there are two main 
features of corporations that may affect firm performance: the dispersion of shares 
between shareholders and the concentration of ownership. Corporate governance 
mechanisms differ around the world, which could impact on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance in different countries in regard to the degree 
of shareholders‘ protection. It has been observed that ownership concentration is high in 
emerging markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999).Lopez et al. (1998) 
argue that ownership concentration results from the different degrees of the legal 
protection for the minority shareholders in every country. In addition, Roe (2003) and 
Onder (2006) point out that the differences in the political factors; corporate culture and 
legal structure play an important role in explaining the ownership concentration in the 
developing countries on the firm performance. 
Miller et al. (2007) argue that that greater level of ownership concentrations allows the 
controlling shareholders to take the chance to use their majority of shares to gain private 
interest and incentive to expropriate the firm resources and reduce the value of the 
company. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that when ownership is 
concentrated, large shareholders may influence and control the management effectively. 
This is because large shareholders have better incentive and motivation to monitor and 
affect the manager‘s behaviour because of their substantial economic stakes. 
Shareholders with greater stakes in a company have greater incentive to control and 
monitor managers or insiders (Holderness, 2003). This represents the positive outcome 
of the self-interest of large shareholders, known as the shared benefits of control 
hypothesis. For example, large shareholders may exert influence in the appointment of 
independent directors or have advisory voting on executive pay packages. Grossman 
and Hart (1986) suggested that large shareholders bear monitoring costs, and their share 
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of benefits will be proportionate to their cash flow rights (dividends or capital gains), 
and the pursuant benefits of monitoring by large shareholders is accrued by all 
shareholders proportional to cash flow rights. Other factors being constant, a rise in 
blockholder stake endows large shareholders with a greater interest in increasing firm 
value (Holderness, 2003). 
As mentioned earlier in chapter three, firms in MENA are characterised by high 
concentration of ownership. Different studies used different cut-off levels to investigate 
the impact of the large shareholders based on the provisions and their Stock Exchange 
listing rules of their country. Based on the JCGC and the JCL classification of large 
shareholders as those who own 5% or more of a firm. This study will use the aggregate 
ownership of all large shareholders to investigate the effect of the large shareholders by 
5% cut-off level on firm performance, labelled as Largesh5. As shown in table 6, 
Largesh5 is the total percentage of shares that are owned by shareholders who own 
more than 5% in the company without relying on their identity. The percentage of large 
shareholders was extracted directly from the annual reports from the period 2000 to 
2010. 
5.5.6 Ownership identity 
Douma et al. (2006) argued that the identity, nature and behaviour of the large 
shareholder are important. This is because, the different interests of different parties 
(e.g. decision-making opportunities, investment objectives and resource endowments) 
which “determine their relative power, incentives and ability to monitor managers” 
(Douma et al., 2006). The different interests and actions of the large shareholders have 
significant impacts on corporate strategy and performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). For instance, individuals might be interested in capital gains, whereas companies 
might be interested in control. However, if companies are pension funds or insurance 
companies, they might also be interested in fixed income, to cover their cash flow 
requirements. Government might be more concerned over long-term investment. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shareholders with different identities who own 
large proportion of shares might impact the firm performance. The term companies‘ 
ownership includes banks, investment dealers, trust firms, pension fund and insurance 
companies. Previous research has explained how different shareholder types have 
different incentives and motivations (Douma et al., 2006; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Tihanyi et al., 2003), and three variables were created as shown in Table 6 above to 
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investigate the impacts on firm performance of: individual/family ownership (labelled 
as OWNind/Fam; companies ownership (labelled as OWNcomp; and government 
ownership (labelled as OWNgov. The total percentage of shares for each identity was 
extracted from the annual reports. 
5.6 Foreign Ownership 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) stated that foreign investors may perform monitoring and 
thus aid the development of emerging markets and their integration within the global 
economy. Hanousek and Svejnar (2004) found a positive impact of foreign ownership 
on corporate performance due to improved monitoring. Mitton (2002) and Lins (2003) 
both found that firm performance is positively related to outside ownership in emerging 
markets. Moreover, recent findings in Turkey (Aydin et al., 2007) showed that foreign 
equity investors have significant and positive effects on firm performance. The 
legislative reforms in particular (since the 1990s) have attracted more foreign capital 
investment in Jordan. Furthermore, the three investment laws of 2003 (replacing the 
1995 legislation) provide for equal treatment of Jordanian and foreign investors, a 
unique feature that distinguishes the Jordanian market among MENA countries. 
Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) reported that Jordan is in the top three countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in terms of attracting foreign investment. 
Al-Muhtaseb (2009) observed that average Arab foreign investment in Jordan is one of 
the highest in the region. Foreign investors prefer to invest in companies that follow 
certain procedures such as responsibilities and certain types of transparency, and 
whether the Jordanian companies are implementing corporate governance principles. 
Previous studies (Ghazali, 2010; Kirkpatrick et al., 2006; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003; 
Taylor, 1990; Taufil et al., 2013) argued that foreign ownership might affect firm 
performance, which this study investigates with regard to Jordanian firms. Foreign 
ownership (labelled as Foreignown) is defined as the total percentage of shares (capital) 
owned by foreign shareholders, as shown in Table 7 below. The total shares of the 
foreign investors were extracted directly from annual reports. 
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Table 7: Summary of the foreign ownership variable 
Variable Labelled Definition 
Foreignown The total percentage of shares (capital) that owned by foreign 
shareholders. 
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has described the data and measurement of this study, explaining the 
sample, the criteria to select the data and the sources of the data. Three main types of 
data are used in this study: firm performance variables, corporate governance variables 
and control variables. Out of 131 firms listed on the ASE as of 31/12/2010, the full data 
required was obtained for a sample of 115 companies. The data used in this study was 
collected from two sources: the Osiris database and the Annual Reports of the Jordanian 
companies. Firm performance was measured by using the accounting based measures 
such as ROE and ROA. In addition, the study used different control variables such as 
firm size, total debt, age, liquidity, industry and annual dummies. Corporate governance 
variables were examined by investigating the effect of board size, CEO duality, NEDs, 
managerial ownership, large shareholders and the identity of the large shareholders on 
the firm performance. Finally, we investigated the effect of foreign ownership on firm 
performance. The next chapter presents the research philosophy and the methodology 
used to achieve the research objectives. 
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CHAPTER 6:  METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the performance of the 
Jordanian industrial and services companies. In particular, it takes a governance 
perspective to investigate the effect of the board of directors and ownership structure on 
the firm performance. This chapter presents the research philosophy and methodology 
used to test the research framework. In addition, regression problems including 
multicolinearity, heteroscadasticity and serial correlation are diagnosed with standard 
statistical tools. Detection of problems will be addressed and rectified accordingly prior 
to the regression analysis. 
6.2 Research Philosophy 
Burrell and Morgan (1994) argue that researchers must select the proper paradigm for 
their study. The key matter of any research in social sciences is the philosophical 
assumption. This study takes the positivist paradigm in which the hypotheses are 
developed based on the notion of the impact of the corporate governance on the firm 
performance that can be investigated and empirically examined using the researcher‘s 
tools of analysis and the theoretical conjectures. Burrell and Morgan (1994) stated that 
positivists ―seek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching 
for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements‖. Saunders et 
al. (2009) affirmed that deduction is linked to positivism, and fulfils the need to 
describe the casual association between or among variables and the need to generalize a 
conclusion. Accordingly, the nature of this study implies implementing deductive rather 
than inductive approach for the following reasons (Saunders et al., 2009): 
 It tends to be informed by scientific principles rather that gaining further 
understanding of human-constructed meanings related to events. 
 It is used to testing hypotheses rather than to building new theory. 
 It identifies casual relationships amongst variables rather than clarifying the 
research context. 
 It uses quantitative data. 
 It is a more structured approach than inductive approach. 
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 The independence of the researcher is maintained, as this study relies mainly on 
analytical procedures rather than consideration of the experiences and opinions 
of others. 
 Given a sufficient sample size, deductive approach allows for the generalisation 
of conclusions. 
Adopting this approach requires performing the following sequential steps (Robson, 
2002): 
 Developing testable hypotheses regarding the association among variables by 
depending on well-defined theory; 
 Clarifying how these hypotheses will be tested as well as how the variables will 
be measured, by stating them in operational terms; 
 Examining the aforementioned operational hypotheses by adopting specific 
strategy, which is considered as an experimental research strategy in this study 
as it aims at dedicating the casual relationship among variables; 
 Testing certain result of inquiry that is eventually confirm the theory or expose 
the necessity for particular modification in the light of empirical results. 
In terms of the population, whereas the deductive approach is used, Burrell and Morgan 
(1994) proposed that deductive research is located in the functionalist paradigm, 
whereby the population is ruled by regulations and the epistemology uses the positivism 
that is more objective. The objectives of this study are developed based on the notion 
that the impact of corporate governance on the firm performance can be examined and 
tested empirically by using the research analysis tools. Accordingly, phenomena 
occurrence is specified by deducting the law of occurrence using positivism, which 
eventually explains the casual relationship among variables of study, as well as 
identifying predictable relationships explaining the occurrence of phenomena in 
replicable scenarios. This goal can be achieved by developing a hypotheses and 
designing research strategy in order to test these hypotheses (Hussey and Hussey, 2009; 
Saunders et al., 2009). 
In summary, the research philosophy of this study is informed by the fact that the study 
does not seek to produce a new theory but to test existing hypotheses based on analysis 
of quantitative data, thus the deductive approach is more appropriate for this research. 
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6.3 Research Methodology 
Punch (1998) observed that it is important to establish the appropriate research 
approach with regards to the research issues. Two types of research approaches have 
been employed by researchers around the world, namely the quantitative and the 
qualitative research methods. The qualitative method presents a descriptive and non-
numerical approach to collect the information in order to present understanding of the 
phenomenon (Berg, 2004). Babbie (2012) argues that the qualitative method is an active 
and flexible method that can study subtle nuances in the attitudes and behaviours for 
investigating the social processes over time. On the other hand, Hussey and Hussey 
(2009), Bryman (2012) and Berg (2004) point out that the quantitative approach uses 
different types of statistical analysis, and provides stronger forms of measurement, 
reliability and ability to generalise. Moreover, Berg (2004) points that the quantitative 
methods can deal with longer time periods with large number of samples leading to 
increasing the generalization capacity. Some researchers combine the two methods in 
order to obtain better results and explanations. However, the qualitative approach 
suffers from a number of problems. Firstly, it uses and selects a small sample which will 
not represent the whole population (Hakim, 1987). Secondly, transparency and 
reliability are still low in qualitative methods (Berg, 2004). Thirdly, qualitative methods 
are time-consuming. This may result in inefficient tools to get adequate explanations 
(Berg, 2004). 
Therefore, due to the difficulties of obtaining data through interviews from different 
companies and the weak response from these companies, this study applied the 
deductive positivism approach whereby the pre-existing theoretical basis is identified 
and relied upon in developing the hypotheses; the empirical findings demonstrate 
whether the tested hypotheses are proven or rejected. In order to achieve this objective, 
this study used the regressions as the main tool of analysis, in which the researcher 
pursues the positivist understanding of the conduct of methodological process that is 
―unaffected by individual perceptual differences‖ (Ardalan, 2012). Hair et al. (2009) 
state that ―the appropriate method of analysis when the research problem involves a 
single metric variable presumed to be related to two or more independent variables‖. 
Therefore, multiple regression analysis is chosen as the main tool of analysis in this 
study. Multiple regression model is one of the most common methods of analysis that 
have been used by previous researchers (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Claessens et al., 
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2006; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a) to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
6.4 Panel Data 
The main types of data that are generally available for empirical analysis are cross 
section, time series and panel. In cross-section data, values of one or more variables are 
collected for several sample entities, or units, at the same point in time. In time series 
data observe the values of one or more variables over a period of time. In panel data the 
same cross-sectional units (say firm or families or states) is surveyed over time. In 
short, panel data have space as well as time dimensions (Gujarati, 2003). 
All the previous studies used different types of regression approaches, usually panel. 
Baltagi and Giles (1998); Gujarati (2003); Green (2003) state the following advantages 
of panel data;  
• Using prior or extraneous data. 
• Combining time series and cross-sectional data. 
• The omission of variables displaying high collinearity. 
• Obtaining new or transforming existing data. 
Two main panel data regression models (the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model) have different assumptions about the error term. The fixed effect model 
assumes that the individual effect term is constant. However, the random effect assumed 
that the individuals effect to be random disturbances drawn from probability 
distribution. Green (2003, p. 285) stated that a general panel data regression model is 
written as: 
                    
Where: 
   is the dependent variable. 
    are the independent variables. 
 and  are coefficients. 
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    is an unobserved individual specific effect 
       are indices for individuals and time. 
   is the error term. 
The heterogeneity or the individual effect is       where    contains a constant term and 
a set of individual or group specific variables. These might be observed (e.g. sex, race 
and location) or unobserved (e.g. individuals heterogeneity in skill or preference and 
family specific characteristics) which are taken to be constant over time   (Green, 
2003). As it stands, this model is a classical regression model. If    is observed for all 
individuals, then the entire model can be treated as an ordinary linear model and fit by 
least squares (Green, 2003). The various cases we will consider are: 
Pooled regression: if    contains only a constant term, then the then ordinary least 
squares provides consistent and efficient estimates of the common intercept   and the 
slope vector of  . In this instance, the model reduces to: 
                  
Panel data models can be also specified as fixed effects or a random effect that helps in 
capturing the effects of firm and time specific heterogeneities. 
 Fixed effect 
If    is unobserved, but correlated with     then the estimator of   is biased and 
inconsistent as a consequence of omitted variables. The fixed effect model provides 
consistent estimates in this case and it is specified as:  
                  
Where: 
   is the dependent variable (  = entity) and ( = time). 
  is the coefficient for the independent variable. 
   Represents one independent variable. 
   (  =1….n) is the unknown intercept for each entity (n entity-specific intercepts). 
   is the error term. 
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Where           embodies all the observable and specifics an estimable conditional 
mean. This fixed effects approach takes   to be a group specific constant term in the 
regression model. It should be noted that the term fixed effect does not vary over time 
(Green, 2002). Fixed effect is suitable as: 
―Fixed effect shows the relationship between predictor and outcome 
variables within an entity (country, person, company, etc.). Each entity 
has its own individual features that may impact on the predictor 
variables. This is the rationale behind the assumption of the correlation 
between entity‘s error term and predictor variables. Fixed effect removes 
the effect of those time-invariant characteristics from the predictor 
variables. Another important assumption of the fixed effect model is that 
those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the individual and 
should not be correlated with other individual characteristics. Each entity 
is different therefore the entity‘s error term and the constant (which 
captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with the 
others. If the error terms are correlated then fixed effect is no suitable 
since inferences may not be correct. Thus, it might be recommended to 
use random effect‖. (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005) 
 Random effect 
If the unobserved individual heterogeneity, however formulated, can be assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the included variables, a random effects model is appropriate. Then 
the model can be formulated as: 
                   
That is, as a linear regression model with a compound disturbance that may be 
consistently, albeit inefficiently, estimated by least squares. This random effects 
approach specifies that   is a group specific random element, similar to    except that 
for each group there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each 
period. Again, the crucial distinction between these two cases is whether the unobserved 
individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, 
not whether these effects are stochastic or not (Green, 2003). Kohler and Kreuter (2005) 
stated that the rationale behind random effects model is ―that unlike the fixed effects 
model, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the 
predictor or independent variables included in the model‖. Green (2003) states that ―the 
crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved 
individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, 
not whether these effects are stochastic or not‖. 
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The fixed effects model is a restricted version of the random effects model (in which the 
variance of the random effects is shrunk to zero). This may suggest that the random 
effects specification is preferable (since it is more general). The larger number of 
parameters in the random effect specification can however result in a loss of efficiency, 
particularly when the additional variability implied by these random effects is not 
supported by the data. Therefore, it is recommended to test the random effect against the 
fixed effect. Due to the nested structure of the two models this can be done via 
Hausman test. An important assumption for choosing random-effect estimation is that 
the unobserved heterogeneity should not be correlated with the independent variables. 
Based on the test statistic results presented in chapter seven, random effects models are 
estimated. 
In order to decide between a random effects and fixed effects model, researchers often 
rely on the Hausman (1978) specification test (Greene 2008). The Hausman test is 
designed to detect violation of the random effects modelling assumption that the 
explanatory variables are orthogonal to the unit effects. If there is no correlation 
between the independent variable(s) and the unit effects, then estimates of   in the fixed 
effects model (   ) should be similar to estimates of   in the random effects model 
(   ). The Hausman test statistic   is a measure of the difference between the two 
estimates: 
            [                ]
            
Where: 
   are the coefficient estimates of the time-varying covariates from the fixed effects 
model. 
   are the corresponding estimated coefficients from the random effects model. 
       ) is the estimate of the asymptotic (large sample) variances and covariance of 
the     estimated coefficients. 
       ) is the analogous quantity for the estimate of    . 
Under the null hypothesis of or thogonality,   is distributed chi-square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of regressors in the model. A finding that p < 0.05 is taken 
as evidence that, at conventional levels of significance, the two models are different 
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enough to reject the null hypothesis, and hence to reject the random effects model in 
favour of the fixed effects model. 
If the Hausman test does not indicate a significant difference (p > 0:05), it does not 
necessarily follow that the random effects estimator is safely free from bias, and is 
therefore to be preferred over the fixed effects estimator. In most applications, the true 
correlation between the covariates and unit effects is not exactly zero. Thus, if the 
Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis, it could be because the true correlation 
is not zero and, hence, because the random affect estimator is unbiased. Rather, the test 
does not have sufficient statistical power to reliably detect departures from the null. 
When using the random effects model, there will still be bias (if perhaps negligible) in 
estimates of , even if the Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis. Of course, in 
many cases, a biased estimator (i.e., random effects) can be preferable to an unbiased 
estimator (i.e., fixed effects), if the former provides sufficient variance reduction over 
the latter, as just described. The Hausman test does not aid in evaluating this trade off. 
In random effect models it is possible to include time invariant variables. However, in 
the fixed effect model these variables are absorbed by the intercept. Random effects 
assume that the entity‘s error term is not correlated with the predictors which allows for 
time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. In random effect models 
it is important to specify these individual features that might impact the predictor 
variables. Therefore, omitting such variables might lead to bias in the model. Random 
effects allow one to generalize the interpretations beyond the sample used in the model 
(Kohler and Kreuter, 2005). 
6.5 Specification Tests 
There is a potential endogeneity between the dependent variable and some of the 
explanatory variables (e.g. leverage), which could lead to biased estimates. However, 
testing for endogeneity in panel models is a complicated matter; the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman test estimates augmented regression, by which one needs to identify the 
potentially endogenous variables as well as valid instruments for them. If the structure 
of the endogenous variables in incorrectly specified, the instruments provided for the 
test are invalid (or weak), which can severely bias the testing procedure itself and lead 
to invalid inferences. To circumvent the concerns on endogeneity, the study used one 
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period lagged independent variables to explain financial performance to avoid the 
drawbacks of endogeneity. 
Furthermore, prior to carrying out our multiple regression analysis, this study examined 
whether the general assumption required were fulfilled. Firstly, we examined the 
variables for multicoliniarity. The issue of multicolinearity appears if two or more 
variables are highly correlated which might affect the estimation of the regression 
parameters (Hair et al., 2009). Gujarati (2003) illustrates that the existence of 
multicolinearity makes the assessment and the hypothesis testing about regression 
coefficients indeterminate. This is because multicolinearity makes the regression 
coefficient unstable and difficult to interpret. In addition, the standard errors for the 
coefficients are magnified making the coefficient statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, multicolinearity can cause the coefficients to change signs, and makes it 
more difficult to identify the correct model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
commonly used to identify the presence of multicollinearity. VIF illustrate the degree 
for every independent variable that been explained by other independent variable to 
eliminate collinear variables. In other word, the change in one variable will change the 
coefficient. If VIF is bigger than 10 this indicates there is a problem with 
multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). 
It should be noted that the variance of the estimator for a typical regression coefficient 
(say   ) can be shown to be the following (Wooldridge, 2000): 
       = 
  
   (    
 )
 
Where: 
     ∑ (       )
  
    and   
  is the unadjusted    when you regress    against all the 
other explanatory variables in the model, that is against a constant   ,   , ……    , 
    , ….   . 
Suppose there is no linear relation between   and the other explanatory variables in the 
model. Then   
  will be zero and the variance of    will be  
  /   . Dividing this into the 
above expression for        , the variance inflation factor will be written as: 
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It is readily seen that the higher VIF, the higher the variance of   and the greater the 
chance of finding   insignificant, which means that there is a problem with 
multicollinearity. Thus, these measures can be useful in identifying multicollinearity. 
The procedure is to choose each right hand side variable (that is, explanatory variable) 
as the dependent variable and regress it against a constant and the remaining 
explanatory variables. We would thus get K-1 values for VIF. If any of them is high, 
then multicollinearity is indicated. Gujarati (2003) observed that identifying 
multicollinearity is in fact only the begging of the process, and it must be followed with 
solution of the problem. There are no formulaic guides on how to achieve this, but some 
general recommendations include: 
1- Using extraneous or prior information. 
2- Combining cross-sectional and time series data. 
3- Omitting a highly collinear variable. 
4- Transforming data and obtaining additional or new data. 
Secondly, serial correlation test is conducted. Serial correlation in panel data models 
biases and causes the results to be less efficient. Serial correlation occurs when one 
observation‘s error term (  ) is correlated with another observation‘s error term (  ): 
Corr(  ,   )   , thus we say the errors are serially correlated. In other words, serial 
correlation occurs when error terms from different time periods (or cross-section 
observations) are correlated. Therefore, it can be said that the error term is serially 
correlated. Serial correlation occurs in time-series studies when the errors associated 
with a given time period carry over into future time periods. This usually happens 
because there is an economic relationship between the observations, such as in time 
series data when observations are measurements of the same variables at different points 
in time, or in cluster sampling when observations are measurements of the same 
variables on related subjects (e.g. more than one member of the same family, more than 
one firm operating in the same company) (Stata command guide). In order to identify 
serial correlation, this study conducts Wooldridge serial correlation test (2002). 
By reviewing the linear model, 
                           ………….(1) 
Where: 
  = 1, 2,…., N 
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  = 1, 2,….., T   
Where     is the dependent variable,     is a (1    ) vector of time varying covariates. 
  is a (1    ) vector of time invariant covariates.  ,   and    are 1       
parameters.   is the individual level effect.    is the idiosyncratic error. If the    are 
correlated with the     or the   , the coefficient on the time varying covariates    can be 
consistently estimated by a regression on the within-transformed data or the first 
differenced data. If the    are uncorrelated with the    and   , the coefficients on the 
time-varying and time-invariant covariates can be consistently and efficiently estimated 
using the feasible generalized least squares method known as random-effects regression. 
All of these estimators assume that E [      ]    for all s   t i.e., that there is no serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors, which would cause the standard errors to be 
biased and the estimates to be less efficient. 
Wooldridge‘s method uses the residuals from a regression in first-differences. Note that 
first-differencing the data in the model in (1) removes the individual-level effect, the 
term based on the time-invariant covariates and the constant, 
                                  
                    
Where   is the first difference operator. 
Wooldridge‘s procedure begins by estimating the parameters    by regressing      on 
     and obtaining the residuals    . Central to this procedure is Wooldridge‘s 
observation that, if the     are not serially correlated, then Corr      ,       )= -0.5. 
Given this observation, the procedure regresses the residuals     from the regression 
with first-differenced variables on their lags and tests that the coefficient on the lagged 
residuals is equal to −.5. To account for the within-panel correlation in the regression of 
    on       the VCE is adjusted for clustering at the panel level. Since cluster implies 
robust, this test is also robust to conditional heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2000). 
Thirdly, we conduct a heteroskedasticity test. Heteroskedasticity is a violation of this 
assumption. It occurs if different observations‘ errors have different variances, such as 
Var (εi) = σi 2. Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the disturbance is not 
constant. If the squared residuals get larger or smaller as a particular independent 
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variable gets larger or smaller, then probably we will suffer from heteroskedasticity. 
This study uses Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (Stata command guide). 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) version of the BP test is a general principle for testing 
hypotheses about parameters in a likelihood framework. The hypothesis under the test is 
expressed as one or more constraints on the values of parameters. To perform an LM 
test only estimation of the parameters subject to the restrictions is required. This is in 
contrast with Wald tests, which are based on unrestricted estimates, and likelihood ratio 
tests which require both restricted and unrestricted estimates. The name of the test is 
motivated by the fact that it can be regarded as testing whether the Lagrange multipliers 
involved in enforcing the restrictions are significantly different from zero. The term 
―Lagrange multiplier‖ itself is a wider mathematical word coined after the work of the 
eighteenth century mathematician Joseph Louis Lagrange. The LM testing principle has 
found wide applicability to many problems of interest in econometrics. Moreover, the 
notion of testing the cost of imposing the restrictions, although originally formulated in 
a likelihood framework, has been extended to other estimation environments, including 
method of moments and robust estimation. 
Let L    be a log-likelihood function of a      parameter vector  , and let the score 
function and the information matrix be 
       
     
  
 
         [
     
     
] 
Let    be the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of   subject to an      vector of 
constraints        . If we consider the Lagrangian function 
              
Where   is an      vector of Lagrange multipliers, the first-order conditions for    are 
  
  
                   
  
  
           
125 
Where                     
The Lagrange Multiplier test statistic is given by 
      
   
         
   
     
Where                              . Then the term    
   
   is the score from 
the statistic whereas      
   
     is the Lagrange multiplier form of the statistic. They 
correspond to two different interpretations of the same quantity. 
The score function      is exactly equal to zero when evaluated at the unrestricted 
MLE of  , but not when evaluated at   . If the constraints are true, we would expect 
both    and    to be small quantities, so that the region of rejection of the null 
hypothesis           is associated with large values of LM. Under suitable 
regularity conditions, the large-sample distribution of the LM statistic converges to a 
chi-square distribution with     degrees of freedom, provided the constraints 
       are satisfied. This result is used to determine asymptotic rejection intervals 
and  -values for the test. 
6.6 GLS estimator 
Generalized least squares (GLS)is a technique for estimating the unknown parameters in 
a linear regression model. The GLS is applied when the variances of the observations 
are unequal (heteroscedasticity), or when there is a certain degree of correlation 
between the observations. A GLS regression is more suitable in that it corrects for the 
omitted variable bias in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in pooled 
time series data. Pooled OLS estimator is consistent and unbiased only if the errors in 
each time period are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the same time 
period. When this is not the case, ordinary least squares can be statistically inefficient, 
or even give misleading inferences. We applied GLS to estimate Random-Effects 
models. This methodology allows researchers to examine variations among cross-
sectional units simultaneously with variations within individual units over time (Gaur 
and Delios, 2006). 
For a given correlation matrix , the generalized least squares estimator of   would be 
 ̂   [       ]  [       ] 
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The matrix   can be written as 
       
Where   is the     matrix [   ], then: 
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Where     denotes the    the element of    . This provides a specific form for the 
estimator, 
 ̂   [∑∑        
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6.7 Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology used to conduct the research. This study applied 
the deductive positivism approach where the pre-existing theoretical basis is identified 
and relied upon in developing the hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis is chosen as 
the main tool of analysis in this study. In order to capture the effects of firm and time 
specific heterogeneities panel data models can be specified as fixed effects or random 
effects. Moreover, this chapter examined the specification tests that might affect the 
corporate governance variables which may result in problems from understanding the 
significance of individual independent variables in the regression model. 
The next chapter presents the results and discussions of the descriptive statistics and the 
regression model. 
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CHAPTER 7:  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 6, a model was constructed to test the effect of corporate 
governance on the Jordanian firm performance and the results are presented here. This 
chapter presents the descriptive statistics and the results and discussion. Section 7.2 
reports the results of the descriptive statistics for the data that used in the analysis of this 
study. Section 7.3 will report and discuss the regression results. 7.3.1 Specification test 
results. 7.3.2 Control variables results 7.3.3 Results and discussion of board of directors 
on firm performance 7.3.4 Results and discussion of managerial ownership and 
ownership structure on firm performance 7.3.5 Results and discussion of foreign 
ownership on firm performance 7.4 Summary 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section deals with the descriptive statistics for the data that used in the analysis of 
this study. Some of the main features of the data will be described quantitatively (e.g. 
central tendency of the statistics such as mean, max and min, data dispersion such as 
standard deviation). The whole table for the descriptive statistics of this study is 
presented in appendix one. However, for ease of presenting and easier for the reader, we 
will present the descriptive statistics separately with the appropriate table extracted from 
the original table. 
 Firm performance 
Table 8 below reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. The table 
shows that the ROE ranges from a minimum of -8.33% to a maximum of 4.60% with an 
average of -4.4% for the overall sample. The ROA ranges from a minimum of-91.38% 
and maximum of 88% with average of 60% for the combined sample. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of firm performance measurement 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
ROE (%) 936  -8.33  4.60 -4.38  5.19 
ROA (%) 948 -91.38  87.75  0.59  14.31 
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 Control variables 
Table 8 below presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables. The total assets 
range from a minimum of 1,160,000 million to a maximum of 75,193,260 million with 
an average of 6413311. The average of debt ratio (leverage) and liquidity ratio is 36% 
and 3.44% respectively. The average age of the firms is 29.3 years which is similar to 
the mean of 28.8 years reported by Claessens et al. (2000) and smaller from the 
Germany firms of 82 years reported by Andres (2008). 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of control variables 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TA ($ Millions)  956 1160000 75193260 6413311 329268 
 Leverage (%) 956 0 5.75 0.36 0.37 
Liquidity Ratio (%) 956 0.01 65.48 3.44 5.99 
Age (Years) 956 5 83 29.31 15.82 
 
 Corporate governance variable 
In Table 10 below the statistics for board size show that in general the mean board size 
is eight directors, with a minimum of two and a maximum of thirty for the whole 
sample of the 115 listed Jordanian industrial and services companies. By checking the 
frequency of the board size manually, only one company has thirty directors on the 
board, and the rest of the companies had between two and thirteen. This confirms that 
the listed firms in Jordan, on average, have met the requirements of the Corporate 
Governance Code 2006 and the Company Law (1997), commensurate with the 
recommendations of Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), based on their 
investigation of firm performance in relation to board size. They recommended eight or 
nine directors, and specified that ten should be the maximum number. This relatively 
small size is due to the effect of more people inhibiting the process of making decisions 
(i.e. causing indecisiveness or incoherent decisions due to the fissiparous decision-
making process among many parties). Interestingly, it has been found that firms in 
developing countries typically have smaller board sizes (possibly related to nepotism, as 
discussed previously). The average board size similar in Egypt and Malaysia is eight 
directors (Elsayed, 2007; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), while the average board size in the 
US is 12.25 (Yermack, 1996). However, the board size is significantly smaller in 
Australia, averaging 6.6 (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics of board of directors 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
BSIZE 956 2 30 8.33 3.26 
CEO Duality 956 0 1 0.66 0.46 
NEDs 956 0.11 0.88 0.24 0.19 
 
As shown above in table 10, the results show that on average 66% of firms in the 
sample has CEO duality, which indicates greater influence of the CEO/Chairman on the 
board. In Jordan, particularly in family-controlled businesses, it is common that the 
chairman holds the position of CEO, especially if he was the founder of the firm. The 
presence of CEO duality in the Jordanian listed firm means that they are not fulfilling 
the requirements and the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) or the 
Jordanian CGC (2006), both of which recommend splitting these two roles. 
As shown in table 10, an average of 24% of board members are NEDs, ranging from 
11% to 88%. Previous studies have shown that the more NEDs are present on a board, 
the more independent the board is, with correspondingly reduced information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Black et al. 2006a). Brickley et al. 
(1997) found that boards tend to perform better with the monitoring and advisory 
function of NEDs on behalf of shareholders. The proportion of the NEDs in Jordanian 
boards is relatively small (e.g. compared to other countries: the US mean = 54%, 
Yermack, 1996; Malaysia mean = 50%, Haniffia and Hudaib, 2006). Thus, the average 
composition of boards having 24% of NEDs is less than recommended by the Jordanian 
Corporate Governance Code (2006), which stipulates there should be at least a third (i.e. 
33%) of NEDs, and well below international norms. 
 Managerial ownership, ownership structure and foreign ownership 
Table 11 below depicts the descriptive statistics for the various types of ownership for 
the full sample. Managerial ownership among Jordanian firms ranges from 23% to 42%, 
with an average of 32%. Managerial ownership has been suggested as a potential 
incentive to align the interests of managers with those of principals and thus to 
maximize firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The average shows that the 
percentage of managerial ownership is higher in Jordan than in developed markets, 
probably related to family/concentrated ownership and nepotism, as discussed 
previously. Yermack (1996) reported an average of 9% managerial ownership of US-
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listed firms, while Weir et al., (2000) reported an average of 3% in a sample of UK-
listed firms. 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of managerial ownership, ownership structure and 
foreign ownership 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MO 956 0.23 0.42 0.32  0.06 
LargeSH5 956 0 99 0.43 0.22 
OWNind/Fam 952 0 100 45.08 28.29 
OWNcomp 956 0 99.99 38.58 26.09 
OWNgov 956 0 100 8.09 16.87 
Foreignown 956 0  99  0.087  0.17 
 
The statistics show that the average share stakes of the firms in the sample held by large 
shareholders (LargeSH5) comprise 43% at the 5% ownership threshold. 
Individual/family ownership represents 45% of the capital of Jordanian firms. This 
compares to 38% for 150 listed firms in Malaysia (Tam and Tan, 2007). Furthermore, 
on average companies and government owns 38% and 8% of the capital of the 
Jordanian firms respectively. There is a notably low proportion of government 
ownership in Jordan compared to other countries in MENA, largely due to on-going 
economic liberalisation (i.e. privatisation) since 1996 as part of the economic reform 
programme. Privatization in Jordan has been found to be a notably successful case in 
the Middle East (World Bank Group, 2006) and it is vigorously encouraged by the 
government in order to promote economic growth. Notable examples of this include the 
Telecommunication Corporation, which in 2000 became a public shareholding 
company, followed by other utilities such as water and transport. Finally, the average of 
the foreign ownership is 9% ranges from 0 to 99%. 
7.3 Results and Discussion 
This section will deal with the main inferences which were drawn from the model 
regression. We are going to present our results separately according to our research 
questions into five sections (i.e. specification test results, control variable results, board 
of director variables results, ownership variables results and foreign ownership result). 
This does not mean that each section was run in the model separately; it is simply to 
facilitate the presentation of results and to make the findings more understandable by 
focusing on each type of effect. We are going to consider that the results are highly 
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significant at 0.01, significant at 0.05 and marginally significant at 0.1, which applies to 
all of the following tables and results. The coefficient value and P-value in brackets will 
be presented. The whole table that contains all the results together of this study is 
presented in appendix two. However, we are going to present our results section by 
section with the appropriate table extracted from the original table. 
7.3.1 Specification test results 
In order to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the firm performance this 
study used panel data. However, some econometric issues needed to be addressed that 
related to panel data. By using Breusch and Pagan Lagrang multiplier test the result of 
the test is highly significant as shown below in Error! Reference source not found.. The 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrang multiplier test has a Null of poolability (Gujaratti, 2003). 
Therefore, its result rejects the null, suggesting that panel regression is necessary. Panel 
data models can be specified as fixed effects or a random effect that helps in capture the 
effects of firm and time specific heterogeneities. In order to decide between the random 
effects against the fixed effect we performed Hausman test. The test statistic result is 
not statistically significant as shown below in Table 12. Hence we cannot reject the Null 
of random effects. Consequently, we estimate random effects models. 
Table 12: Panel model test 
Breusch and Pagan LM Test chi2(1) = 71.42 
P-value = 0.00 
Hausman Test chi2(14)= 8.11 
P-value = 0.84 
 
Firstly we consider the issue of multicollinearity that appears if two or more variables 
are highly correlated which might affect the estimation of the regression parameters 
(Hair et al., 2009). The variance inflation factor (VIF) is commonly used to identify the 
presence of multicollinearity. If VIF is bigger than 10 this means that there is a problem 
with multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). The results of the VIF test as shown in appendix 
3 ranged between 1.03 and 5.28. All the variables are less than 10 thereby; our model 
does not suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
Secondly, we need to conduct serial correlation test because serial correlation in panel 
data models biases and causes the results to be inefficient. In order to identify serial 
correlation, this study conduct Wooldridge serial correlation test (2002). Our results as 
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shown below in Table 13, the variables are serially correlated in all circumstances. 
Finally, we need to conduct the heteroskedasticity test. This study uses Breusch-Pagan 
test for heteroskedasticity. The results shown below Table 13 indicate heteroskedasticity 
problems. The results required to use the cluster-robust standard error estimator in order 
to control heteroskedasticity. By using this robust standard error estimator (cluster), we 
assumed that observations should be independent across clusters (Rogers, 1993). 
Table 13: Specification tests results 
 ROE ROA 
Wald (chi-square) 
(P-value) 
6932.32 
(0.000) 
3445.70 
(0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 
for heteroskedasticity (P-value) 
4408.78 
(0.000) 
532.34 
(0.000) 
 
Wooldrige-test for autocorrelation 
(P-value)  
5.114 
(0.0258) 
16.703 (0.0001) 
 
7.3.2 Control variables results 
The effects of the control variables on firm performance have different results across the 
performance variables (ROE and ROA). 
 Total assets 
As shown earlier in chapter five, TA is used as a proxy to measure the firm size. In line 
with earlier studies, total asset (TA) is transformed into logs, to reduce their skewness 
or kurtosis and mitigate influence of the outlier data points. Table 14 below reports a 
positive and strong statistically significant effect of the firm size on ROA and ROE. 
This positive result indicates that large firms may benefit from economies of scale and 
scope (Joh,2003). The size of a firm reflects its ability to achieve economies of scale as 
well as a market power. In addition, the larger a firm the more likely to use it economies 
of scale in order to develop production process to be efficient leading to positive effect 
on firm performance. Therefore, big firms have greater ability to secure finance. 
Furthermore, large firms are in better position to generate funds internally and access 
external resources (Short and Keasey, 1999). Meek et al. (1995) point out that in terms 
of market development and business risk, large firms tend to be more complex, more 
diversified and have larger information sets than small firms. Furthermore, positive 
effect indicates that larger firms are more likely to have broader activities, value 
creation sources, production range and influence on the market. Also, this means that 
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large firms can borrow on better conditions since large firms tend to own larger assets 
which can be used as collateral. 
 Leverage 
The measure of leverage that used in this study is the percentage of long-term debt to 
total assets. The results shown in table 14 reports a negative and highly significant 
affect only on ROA: higher levels of debt will cause a decrease in firm performance. In 
other words, the results indicate that the higher the debt ratio, the lower the ROA. It 
might be that firms face higher levels of debt due to the increasing cost of operations, 
which might reflect their ability to fulfil their obligations to pay higher interest rates 
(Dechowetal.,  1996). Higher levels of debt might limit firms‘ ability to raise new credit, 
resulting in losing valuable investment opportunities. This means that high levels of 
debt have a negative influence on the amount of dividends paid, because firms with high 
levels of debt will pay lower dividends in order to avoid external resources of finance. 
Additionally, high levels of debt can indicate financial distress, causing constraints on 
borrowing, as banks are unwilling to lend extra money due to their financial position, 
while potential investors and existing shareholder confidence may be undermined 
(ChenandJaggi,2001; Stulz, 1988). 
Table 14: Control variables results 
Control variables ROE ROA 
Log Total assets  20.56996 
(0.031)** 
7.23987 
(0.000)*** 
Total Debt (Leverage) -.000046 
(0.696) 
-2.69e-06 
(0.000)*** 
Liquidity  -2.40e-06 
(0.622)  
1.81e-07 
(0.687) 
Age  .4088442 
(0.266) 
.0369829 
(0.333) 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
 Liquidity 
Liquidity was found to insignificant in explaining firm performance. Firms with high 
liquidity ratio show their ability to face external shocks. Thus, high liquidity might 
absorb economic shocks and alleviate financial distress. In addition, firms with higher 
liquidity have greater opportunities to invest than companies with lower amounts of 
liquidity. 
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 Age 
Firm age was found to be insignificant in terms of performance. Firm age was taken as 
the number of years firms had been incorporated before 2010. It was expected that the 
smaller the firm‘s age, the higher its business risk and the less mature the company, 
therefore higher firm age was expected to correlate with improved financial 
performance. The results show a positive relationship between the firm age and firm 
performance, however it was insignificant. The positive relationship shows that older 
firms outperform younger firms to a limited extent. 
 Annual effects 
Because of the gradual improvements of the Jordanian financial environment during the 
period 2000 to 2010 it was expected that there would be a positive annual effect on firm 
performance. However, the results shown in table 15 indicate a positive and significant 
effect only in 2005. The possible explanation for this positive effect is the liquidation of 
3700 companies from the market. In 2007 the Jordan Companies Control Department 
(JCCD) pointed out the number of companies liquidated in 2005 was 3700, with total 
capital of JD 1.67 billion. The majority of those companies had been liquidated due to 
capital decline, shareholders‘ loss, as well as poor management. Therefore, by 
liquidating these firms the market was pruned and left with better organised firms. This 
is reasonable since companies have business relations with each other, therefore on 
average it is more likely that firms will perform better. In addition, liquidation of large 
numbers of companies disciplines other companies and induces them to perform better. 
Table 15: Annual effect results 
 ROE  ROA 
d2001 -3.240528 
(0.407) 
.8562205 
(0.368) 
d2002 -7.486261 
(0.181) 
-1.883421 
(0.231) 
d2003 1.62957 
(0.684) 
.4112314 
(0.705) 
d2004 1.694666 
(0.397) 
1.137405 
(0.179) 
d2005 5.892105 
(0.101) 
3.5008 
(0.000)*** 
d2006 1.31449 
(0.629) 
-.0724548 
(0.957) 
d2007 5.748674 
(0.276) 
.272582 
(0.840) 
d2008 -4.569798 
(0.196) 
-1.40411 
(0.293) 
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 ROE  ROA 
d2009 3.450705 
(0.246) 
-.3653438 
(0.713) 
d2010 -7.933553 
(0.345) 
.5049139 
(0.586) 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
 Industry 
With regard to industry, dummies as shown in table 16 had insignificant results in terms 
of accounting-based measures except for the educational and paper sectors with ROA, 
which had significant positive and negative relationships (respectively). The positive 
sign of these sectors indicate that, on average, firms performed better compared with 
their counterparts in the other sectors. On the other hand, the negative relationship 
indicates that firms in these sectors perform worse compared to their counterparts in 
other sectors. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Lim et al. (2007) and Elsayed (2007) stated 
that corporate governance practices vary between industries due to the differences in the 
capital structure, the complexity of operations, ownership levels and line of business. 
Table 16: Industry variables results 
 ROE ROA 
Health -2.829959 
(0.723) 
-.7391161 
(0.871) 
Educational 6.613757 
(0.591) 
9.880238 
(0.065)* 
Hotels -4.102294 
(0.705) 
3.242674 
(0.492) 
Transporting 2.329414 
(0.819) 
3.513176 
(0.477) 
Technology -49.04758 
(0.154) 
5.192437 
(0.354) 
Media -37.32361 
(0.264) 
-14.15601 
(0.209) 
Utilities 22.12184 
(0.304) 
-.2325165 
(0.969) 
Commercials -8.263967 
(0.685) 
3.740754 
(0.558) 
Pharmaceutical -1.219226 
(0.902) 
1.573883 
(0.813) 
Chemical 14.37657 
(0.230) 
7.41495 
(0.157) 
Paper -77.88969 
(0.004)*** 
-19.38513 
(0.044)** 
Printing -57.17938 
(0.300) 
-13.4128 
(0.521) 
Food -1.141534 
(0.918) 
2.672251 
(0.615) 
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 ROE ROA 
Tobacco -6.702806 
(0.651) 
4.218124 
(0.408) 
Mining -5.33554 
(0.655) 
4.332407 
(0.373) 
Engineering -6.32308 
(0.581) 
2.382145 
(0.645) 
Electrical 5.514459 
(0.556) 
4.746745 
(0.300) 
Textiles 3.425846 
(0.736) 
2.366423 
(0.621) 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
7.3.3 Results and discussion of board of directors on firm performance 
 Board size 
No significant impact of board size on firm performance was indicated, as shown in 
table 17. Most prior studies that investigated the impact of board size on firm 
performance found either a negative or a positive relationship. For example, Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996) and Gertner and Kaplan (1996) argued 
that reducing board size helps in avoiding any free rider problems or poor coordination 
and communications, which result from larger boards. As board size increases, 
increased problems of coordination and communication result, leading to decreased 
ability of the board to control management, thereby increasing agency problem 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998). Large board size results in different opinions and less efficient 
decision making or control over managers; in other words, it is difficult for board 
members to agree on specific decisions when the number of board members is high, 
while small boards are more likely to formulate and agree on specific opinions, and thus 
might be more effective in monitoring management and consequently maximize the 
value of shareholders. 
On the other hand, Miller (2003); Gales and Kesner (1994); Dalton et al. (1999); 
Hillman and Hillman and Dalziel (2003); Lehn et al. (2009) argue that larger boards are 
better than the small ones in improving firm performance. They argue that in small 
boards the powerful position of the CEO enable him to override the decisions made by 
the board members in accordance with their own interests leading to increase the agency 
and correspondingly undermining the performance of the firm (Miller, 2003). In 
addition, from the resource dependence theory perspective, large boards have improved 
linkages and networking with external sources of skills, expertise and capital to benefit 
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from. In addition, large boards allow directors to exchange highly qualified counsels 
and present extra scope for the possibility of correlation with different external linkages. 
Large board size also plays an important role in improving and enhancing outcomes of 
decisions because of ideas-sharing and contributions, which might increase the 
likelihood of better firm performance (Lehn et al., 2009). Therefore, firms with larger 
and more diverse boards are more likely to decrease the conflicts between the 
management and shareholders, leading to increased shareholder returns and thus 
improved firm performance. 
The results of this study contradict those of some prior studies. The possible explanation 
for this result might due to the board of directors‘ characteristics, such as the ownership 
structure. According to the ROSC (2004), most Middle Eastern countries are 
characterised by highly concentrated ownership (e.g. families, companies or the 
government). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Porta et al. (1999) asserted that 
developing countries suffer from high ownership concentrations and weak protection of 
shareholders rights. Boards in Jordanian firms are generally heavily dominated by large 
block holders, typically members of a single family or a clique of families. This might 
result in appointing management and members on the board based on the basis of 
friendship and nepotism rather than experience and skills. Such cliques can use their 
power to influence management decisions and undermine the monitoring and 
coordination of the board, rendering the board impotent with regard to its impact on 
management and firm performance. 
Table 17: Board of directors variables results 
Board of directors ROE ROA 
BSIZE 1.318516 
(0.275) 
.4673652 
(0.132) 
CEO Duality 26.72576 
(0.065)* 
6.389529 
(0.002)*** 
NEDs -.2725834 
(0.008)*** 
-.1208736 
(0.007)*** 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
 CEO duality 
With respect to the effect of the CEO duality, the results shown in table 17 indicate 
positive, significant and highly significant impacts on ROE and ROA respectively. The 
evidence of the positive relationship of the CEO duality and firm performance from this 
study supports the stewardship perspective, which states that firm performance will 
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improve with chairman-CEO duality. This positive relationship indicates that CEO 
knowledge about the company can improve investment opportunities and strategic 
directions, allowing optimized decision-making. Therefore, the CEO-chairman can 
render his knowledge available to the directors, allowing them to play their advisory 
role more effectively. Furthermore, duality reduces conflicts and confusion that arise 
between chairmen and the CEOs when these roles are not combined, with the result that 
firms with CEO duality have more consistent, effective and cohesive strategic decision 
making and implementation. Splitting the roles encourages opposition and rivalry while 
duality avoids any potential conflict. In other words, CEO duality provides unified 
leadership to the company, which facilitates greater understanding of the company 
operations and decisions. In the context of emerging markets, CEO duality is a common 
phenomenon in small business settings, especially in conditions or environments 
characterized by scarce resources and in companies typically owned by families. 
These results are consistent with those of previous studies (Boyed, 1995; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Elsayed, 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002), which found a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance. The company might face new challenges 
and potential opportunities when implementing new strategies and operations. 
Therefore, a CEO-chairman is more likely to face these challenges due to his greater 
knowledge, experience and understanding of such circumstances relating to his position 
compared to NEDs (Weir et al., 2002). In addition, CEO duality allows focusing deeply 
on the firm‘s long-term objectives with the minimum level of interference from board 
members, which improves performance. This is due to the rapid management decision-
making that results from the provision of unambiguous and clear corporate leadership 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Furthermore, CEO duality helps 
in reducing the costs related to extra compensations or managerial remunerations 
(Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). Moreover, CEO duality improves the accountability of 
the firm by providing easier methods to identify and to blame the CEO with any poor 
performance (Abor, 2007; Bozec, 2005). 
However, this result is inconsistent with the agency theory perspective, which advocates 
the separation of the CEO and chairman roles. Agency theory argues that CEO duality 
represents a problem because the same person will be held responsible for the company 
performance and for evaluating efficiency. From the agency perspective, CEO duality 
might result in inefficient supervision for the management due to opportunistic 
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behaviour leading to increased agency problems. This will enable the CEO to control 
the board and reduce the board monitoring function for his own private benefits of 
control at the expense of the principals. In other words, CEO duality enables the CEO to 
be entrenched on the board, because the chairman has responsibility to set the board 
agenda and to facilitate access to information. Therefore, CEO duality leads to the 
entrenchment of the executives or the CEO, and reduce the ability of independent 
directors to monitor. Thus, it is more likely that CEO duality negatively influences the 
functioning of the board, with the result that the interests of the managers and 
shareholders are not aligned, thus increasing the agency problem and inhibiting the 
natural value maximization/firm performance onus. 
This is inconsistent with the Cadbury Report (1992), the OCED principles (2004), the 
UK Combined Code and the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (2006), all of which 
recommend splitting the roles of CEO and chairman. Additionally, it disagrees with the 
results of previous research (Chahine and Tohme, 2009; Dahya et al., 1996; Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991), which found a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance due to entrenchment and reduced board monitoring function, giving the 
CEO free reign to pursue private interests at the expense of shareholders, increasing the 
agency problem and decreasing firm performance. 
Boyed (1995) stated that the effects of CEO duality might be related to firm size. In the 
Jordanian context, where firms tend to be smaller, CEO duality could be useful to 
provide strong management, supervision, coherence and strong leadership direction. 
Moreover, in Jordan the chairman is often the founder of the company, and is therefore 
more likely to be the CEO, since he is more experienced and more knowledgeable about 
the company. Also, most of the firms in the Middle East and emerging markets 
generally are dominated by large shareholders such as families (ROSC, 2004). 
Therefore, it is more likely that the existence of CEO duality in the Jordanian firms can 
be normal and thus not necessarily entail the negative impacts associated with this 
phenomenon in more mature markets in different cultural contexts (e.g. in the West). 
Furthermore, Jordanian firms operate in a relatively simpler business environment, 
unlike larger firms in the markets of developed countries. Thus, CEO duality may be 
useful and advantageous for different purposes: (1) it will speed up the decision-making 
process and (2) it will improve communications between the board members and cut 
bureaucracy within the firm‘s structure. 
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Splitting the roles in small companies may create internal power conflicts among 
management, especially with simpler organizational structures and smaller product lines 
and/or markets to deal with. Moreover, small firms with limited resources need quicker 
responses to market prospects, flexibility and the capability to minimize and control 
costs in order to succeed and survive. In addition, the financial costs and administrative 
costs might exceed the benefits from splitting the two roles of the CEO and the 
chairman in small firms. However, for large firms and more complex business, splitting 
the roles of the CEO and the chairman can be justifiable, because the potential profits 
and benefits will exceed the costs of power allocation between the two roles. 
 NEDs 
The shown in table17, there was a negative and highly significant impact of NEDs on 
ROE and ROA. The result is inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis of agency 
theory, which holds that the presence of a larger proportion of NEDs in the board adds 
value to the firm by providing the firm with independent decisions and judgments 
(Cadbury Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009), playing an important role 
in the board as a source of experience, monitoring services, reputation and expert 
knowledge (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, this is 
consistent with some previous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 
1998; Weir and Laing, 2003; Yermack, 1996), which reported that firms with higher 
proportions of NEDs are more likely to experience lower performance because NEDs 
are part-time workers, unfamiliar with the operations and company business, who are 
unable to comprehend the complications and difficulties that face the company. The 
possible explanations for these results might be: 
1. NEDs are usually part-time workers or even ceremonial functionaries, which 
undermines their ability to monitor and advise the board because of the lack of 
the information that they have, and their lack of knowledge and experience of 
daily activities reduces their ability to apply their function efficiently. In 
addition, they are less incentivized to fulfil their responsibilities; 
2. They might have other commitments which might affect their devotion to 
undertake effective monitoring. For example, the NEDs might be executive 
directors in other companies, which will undermine their incentive to execute 
their role and duties efficiently; 
3. They might be unfamiliar with all the operations and business in the company, 
which results in their inability to comprehend the complications and difficulties 
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that face the company. In other words, they might lack of the necessary 
knowledge and expertise of the technical business issues; 
4. There might be some private connections between the chief executive director 
and the NEDs; therefore this reduces the contributions of the latter, especially if 
they are appointed for long periods in the company. Therefore, NEDs do not 
have the efficient role of monitoring on the executive management because of 
they lack the necessary information for making decisions to improve firm 
performance. 
The results concerning NEDs are quite interesting; the negative relationship of the 
NEDs on firm performance does not necessarily mean that the international codes and 
recommendations on the NEDs are wrong. As explained earlier in chapter three, in the 
Middle Eastern countries and emerging markets, most firms are dominated by large 
shareholders such as families (ROSC, 2004). This might result in the domination of 
boards by family members, who might lack the necessary knowledge and expertise 
concerning technical business issues. In addition, the NEDs might not be sufficiently 
independent to perform their monitoring role effectively, or they may be compromised 
by close relationships with managers and thus unable to interfere in management 
decisions. 
7.3.4 Results and discussion of managerial ownership and ownership structure on 
firm performance 
This section categorises the results into three subsections in order to present clear 
understanding and better view of the effect of managerial ownership, large shareholders 
and the identity of the shareholder. The results for these variables are presented below 
in table 18. 
Managerial/director ownership 
It can be observed from table 18 that the results of managerial ownership exhibit a 
significant positive relationship only on ROE. This result supports the alignment of 
interest hypothesis. When the managers own shares in the company, they become 
stakeholders and peers of their fellow shareholders (i.e. principals), thus they stand to 
lose financially from their own mismanagement, which is presumed to encourage 
improved performance on behalf of principal. Therefore, as managerial ownership 
increases the interests of shareholders and managers become more aligned and there is 
less incentive for opportunistic behaviour at the expense of shareholders. Jensen and 
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Murphy (1989) assert that ―the most powerful link between shareholder wealth and 
executive wealth is direct ownership of shares by the CEO‖. This is because as their 
managerial ownership increases, managers are less likely to switch or to transfer the 
firm resources for value maximization. Thus, this economic incentive is more likely to 
align the interests of the shareholders with the managers to reduce the agency conflict 
and improve firm performance. This is in-line with previous studies, which reported a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance(Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Krivogorsky, 2006; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999); they argued that 
a positive correlation between the managerial ownership and firm performance indicates 
that owning shares aligns the interests of managers and external (non-executive) 
shareholders, resulting in a positive effect in performance. Hence, this result is 
consistent with agency theory, which holds that the incentive effect makes the directors 
perform in the best interest of the company. Therefore, this will reduce any conflict 
between the management and the shareholders and will reduce agency costs, improving 
performance. 
Table 18: Managerial ownership and ownership structure variables results 
Ownership variables ROE ROA 
MO 82.59738 
(0.061)* 
15.22806 
(0.251) 
LargeSH5 -2.121011 
(0.000)*** 
-.8231661 
(0.000)*** 
OWNind/Fam -.0673711 
(0.436) 
.0029175 
(0.890) 
OWNcomp .1310687 
(0.064)* 
.0705605 
0.026)** 
OWNgov -.0826491 
(0.666) 
.0099916 
(0.873) 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
 Large shareholder 
Based on the results of table 18,LargeSH5 was found to have a negative and highly 
significant effect. The negative relationship between large shareholders (i.e. 
concentrated ownership) and firm performance might be explained by Demsetz (1983), 
who argued that a high proportion of shares being owned by large shareholders induces 
the latter to be more concerned about their own interests than those of other 
shareholders, thus undermining overall firm performance. In addition, the controlling 
large shareholders, who in fact control the management if they are not the same 
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personnel, have the ability to access private managerial information and thus they have 
an advantage over smaller shareholders due to their controlling power to extract the 
company wealth for their own personal benefit. This seems to outweigh the potential 
benefits of such ownership structures (e.g. more effective monitoring of management by 
large shareholders due to their increased stake and influence). Furthermore, this result 
can be explained by Gibson (2003), who stated that larger shareholders are more likely 
to expropriate the shareholder wealth and affect the firm performance negatively when 
they are managers or creditors, because they have the potential for private gains aside 
from their general interest as shareholders, such as spending funds on projects that 
benefit them while being unprofitable for the firm, or diverting company resources. 
Moreover, beside their expropriation for the firm resources, large shareholders might 
employ accounting techniques to conceal their behaviour and to obscure actual firm 
performance to evade any disciplinary measures or repercussions (Korczak and 
Korczak, 2009). Large shareholders also adversely affect the firm performance by 
choosing less effective internal governance mechanisms. For instance, where there is a 
lower proportion of NEDs on the board and where the chairman and the CEO positions 
are not split, large shareholders have the motivation to maintain weak internal controls 
to facilitate their expropriation of firm resources (Lasfer, 2006). 
Some previous studies also found a negative relationship between large shareholders 
(concentrated ownership) and firm performance (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Edwards 
and Weichenrieder, 1999; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Weir et al., 2002). They 
observed that the private benefits of control for large shareholders are usually at the 
expense of minority shareholders, suggesting that the former typically seek their own 
private benefits regardless of firm value. Also, Burkart et al. (1997), contend that too 
much ownership concentration overly pressurizes and constrains management, reducing 
the management‘s ability to take value-maximizing investment decisions. Therefore, the 
results reject the efficient monitoring hypothesis (that large shareholders have the ability 
and incentive to exert control and to compel management to take actions to improve the 
company performance). 
However, our results are inconsistentwith the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1986); 
Stiglitz (1985); Leech and Leahy (1991) who argued that large and controlling 
shareholders contribute to the mitigation of the agency problems because they have the 
incentives, motivations and capacity to monitor the managers for the shared benefit of 
control (i.e. the mutual benefit of all shareholders, whether large or small). They support 
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the monitoring hypothesis, whereby large shareholders may help to reduce the free-rider 
problem of small investors, and therefore increase the value of the firm. They illustrate 
that as ownership concentration increases, the degree to which benefits and costs are 
borne by the same owner increases, hence it can be inferred that large shareholders are 
more likely to be active in corporate governance to prevent information asymmetry 
between principals and agents, due to their larger stakes in firms and the greater risk 
they incur by their larger ownership. Fama and Jensen (1983) showed that large 
stakeholders have better incentive in the participation in the corporate monitoring and 
decisions. This might be because the benefits that they will get are greater than the 
monitoring costs. 
The result of the negative relationship might be expected by the fact that the situation 
becomes more complex when there are more major shareholders, and correspondingly 
more diverse interests among the large shareholders, with the possibility of both 
positive and negative outcomes for firm performance (Pound, 1988). The fundamental 
problem of concentrated ownership is the opportunities for nepotism that arise from it. 
Business organisations in Middle Eastern countries (including Jordan) are characterised 
by high concentration of ownership, often in the form of family-controlled businesses. 
A clear example of this in family-controlled firms is the desire of majority shareholders 
to pass on control and majority ownership of the firm to subsequent generations 
(Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). Another reason for this relationship might be the 
behaviour of each large shareholder which influences the impacts of various kinds of 
other large shareholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). 
 Individual/family ownership 
Based on the results of table 18, the findings show that OWNind/Fam has a negative but 
insignificant effect on firm performance measured by ROE and ROA. This negative 
relationship contradicts the notion that family ownership aligns the interests of 
principals and agents. For the CD submission replace the underline sentence with this 
sentence but for the examiner purposes keep the underline sentence.Potential drawbacks 
of family ownership relate to the potential disconnect between the controlling family‘s 
personal interests and firm (i.e. small shareholder) interests, which could have effects 
such as a tendency to take sub-optimal investment decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1985), 
as well as utilising opportunities for personal enrichment such as benefiting from insider 
benefits like private rents at the expense of firm value maximization, thus working 
against the interests of minority shareholders and the company(Faccio et al., 2001). 
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Additionally, nepotism is rife in family-controlled firms, with family members or their 
personal associates appointed to key managerial and executive positions. In other 
words, the poor managerial talent and the low expertise of family members can result in 
difficulties to enter new markets and new investment opportunities. Inappropriate 
selection of family members as functionaries will directly or indirectly affect firm 
performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2005, 2009). DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2000) confirm that by large stakes of companies being owned by family 
cliques motivates them to act in their own private interests instead of the company 
interest, to the detriment of minority shareholders. This information asymmetry and 
blatant probability of exploitation means that outside investors are anticipated to seek 
assurance from insiders that proper corporate governance mechanisms are applied to 
protect their interests, and to solicit greater disclosure from such firms to assess risk. 
 Company ownership 
Based on the results of table 18, OWNcomp has a significant and positive relationship 
with firm performance. This supports the efficient monitoring hypothesis, whereby 
companies are presumed to have more power, expertise and incentives and are more 
likely to act rationally to monitor management performance to improve firm 
performance. As argued by previous studies (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Nesbitt, 
1994; Smith, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), companies are more motivated and 
efficient to monitor management than other types of investors due to: 
1. Their ability to bear higher costs resulting from collecting appropriate 
information about the company and the management behaviour; 
2. Their greater expertise and power to act rationally. Their skills will influence the 
management decisions either directly through their ownership or indirectly by 
trading their shares. Accordingly, their position helps them to reduce the agency 
conflict and to increase the value of the shares, thereby affecting firm 
performance positively (Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Gillan and Starks, 2003); 
3. They have the ability and the power to monitor the board decisions due to their 
large stakes in the company, which might result in safeguarding the interests of 
minority shareholders. This can be achieved by concentrating on the projects 
that will add value to the firm since, this is their own aim in investing (Pedersen 
and Thomsen, 2003). 
This refutes the strategic alignment hypothesis proposed by previous studies (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Claessens et al., 2002; Koh, 2007; Porta et al., 1999; Pound, 1988; 
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Villalonga and Amit, 2006), which found that company ownership might affect the firm 
performance negatively due to the potential that is could be more profitable for 
company ownership to cooperate with firm managers in order to protect their business 
relationships rather than to challenge their decisions for particular firm benefits. They 
argue that this is more likely to happen when the value of the business with the firm is 
greater than the value of the equity held by the company. For example, companies 
might own large portion of shares in a company while simultaneously acting as the 
main insurer. This may result in a negative effect, because it is not favourable to vote 
against incumbent management, since this may imperil the business relationship with 
the firm (Pound, 1988). Therefore, their loyalty to the incumbent management, without 
influencing the management decisions, might result in a negative effect, because it is 
not favourable to vote against incumbent management, since this may imperil the 
business relation with the firm (Pound, 1988). 
The possible explanation for this positive relationship might be attributed to the 
orientation and the investment decisions by the companies‘ ownership, which might 
affect the management behaviour. In Jordanian listed firms, there is a high level of 
shares held by companies (e.g. insurance companies, banks and pension funds such as 
the Social Security Corporation Investment Unit) (Al Fanik, 2006). The average 
shareholding of companies is 38.59%. Companies are more likely to affect the 
management decisions and the firm positively because some types of the companies 
(e.g. banks and insurance companies) are interested in cash flows; in other words, 
company investors need cash flows because their shareholders (e.g. share policy holders 
or depositors) might withdraw their funds at short notice (e.g. banks). Also, some types 
of companies, such as insurance companies and pension funds, are interested in periodic 
income to cover their cash flow requirements. Therefore, due to the large stakes of 
shares held by such companies they are motivated to exert closer monitoring and control 
over firm management behaviour and actions to make sure that managers do not misuse 
firm assets for their own interests. In other words, companies need to monitor the 
management decisions to ensure the safety of their investments. Accordingly, they 
provide a fiduciary role for their beneficiaries and for the minority shareholders in the 
firm. Thus, it is more likely this will reduce the agency problem, leading to better firm 
performance. In addition, the representatives of these companies on the board are 
professional, skilled and have a high level of expertise, which can help firms make the 
best investment choices and strategies. 
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 Government ownership 
Based on the results of table 18, it appears that there is a negative relationship between 
government ownership and firm performance, though the results are not statistically 
significant, supporting the non-profit-maximizing goal of government owners. The 
negative relationship is consistent with findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Ramaswamy (2001) and Orden and Garmendia (2005), who argued that government 
ownership is inefficient in improving firm performance and is subject to agency 
problems. Such problems result from the tendency of government 
bureaucrats/politicians to control the firm in relation to their own objectives instead of 
profit maximization. In addition, the negative effects of government ownership are due 
to poor human resource policies, tribalism, nepotism, lack of respect for rules, code of 
practice and the regulations of the country and the private expediency of appointments. 
By ignoring adding value to the firm, shareholders ultimately bear the cost of any 
potential losses (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, it is more likely that 
government ownership might increase the agency problem and affect the firm 
performance negatively. This is because the main concern is usually social benefit 
rather than profit, and the priority for profit maximization is not a necessity for 
governments. For example, government ownership may consider avoiding 
unemployment to be more important than increasing the value of company assets; thus 
if there was a choice between redundancies within a firm to improve efficiency, 
government would be expected to block such measures. 
7.3.5 Results and discussion of foreign ownership on firm performance 
Based on the results of table 19, foreign ownership was found to have a significant 
positive relationship with firm performance on ROE only. This affirms that foreign 
investors have the ability and the incentive to intervene (i.e. monitor and control) 
corporate governance to effect monitoring or complement existing poor monitoring by 
domestic investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Similarly, Hanousek et al. (2004) found 
that the greater incentive for monitoring among foreign investors leads to a positive 
impact on corporate performance. Mitton (2002) and Lins (2003) also found that foreign 
investment has positive impacts on firm performance in emerging markets. 
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Table 19: Foreign ownership results 
Ownership variables ROE ROA 
Foreignown .2024374 
(0.090)* 
.0678711 
(0.131) 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
This is consistent with previous research (Ghazali, 2010; Kirkpatrick et al., 2006; 
Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003; Sulong and Nor, 2010; Taufil et al., 2013; Taylor, 1990), 
which found that foreign ownership influences firm performance positively due to 
improved access to financial resources and managerial talent. In addition, they reported 
that foreign investors increase firm value by controlling managerial behaviour. 
Furthermore, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) asserted that technology transfer results in 
better firm performance, and this is enhanced by foreign investment. Moreover, 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) found that the presence of foreign institutional investors is 
associated with improved corporate governance, by eliminating poorly performing 
CEOs from the management. Douma et al. (2006) found that foreign investors are 
significant positively related to Tobin‘s Q and insignificant with ROA, which indicates 
that foreign investors are more concerned about their market return. This may imply that 
foreign investors could force and influence the management to improve corporate 
governance and transparency in firm operations. In other words, foreign investors have 
superior monitoring ability to decrease agency costs and thereby improve firm 
performance. This contrasts with the view of Giannetti and Simonov (2006), Doidge et 
al. (2007) and Leuz et al. (2010), who reported that foreign investors might not improve 
firm performance due to information asymmetry, differing national economic 
environments and differences in corporate governance application and culture. 
The possible explanation for this might be that foreign owners can be expected to 
monitor management more closely due to the intrinsically greater risk they bear by 
investing in foreign markets; as part of this concern, foreign investors often favour the 
use of performance-based incentives, which induce managers to act in the interests of 
principals (i.e. remuneration to mitigate the agency problem). Additionally, foreign 
investors can bring access to new practices and technology, enabling increased cost and 
operational efficiency, which might contribute to improved firm performance. Finally, 
the legislative reforms in particular (since the 1990s) have attracted more foreign capital 
investment in Jordan. Furthermore, the three investment laws of 2003 (replacing the 
1995 legislation) provide for equal treatment of Jordanian and foreign investors, a 
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unique feature that distinguishes the Jordanian market among MENA countries. While 
most countries in MENA have legislation guaranteeing extensive favouritism for 
natives in numerous respects (e.g. percentage of ownership and workforce), such 
restrictions have been removed in Jordan, so that foreign investors can invest in 
different economic sectors with no restrictions on ownership percentage, enjoy 
complete freedom of capital movement and no taxes on cash dividends or capital gains, 
leading to an attractive investment structure and open economy. Another reason might 
be the issuance of the Jordanian corporate governance code JCGC in 2006 toward to 
improve the firm performance of the Jordanian firms and to encourage the foreign 
investors to invest in the Jordanian firms. Table 20 below shows the percentage of 
investment by local and foreign investors in all sectors for the period 2000-2010. 
Table 20: Percentage of investment by local investors and foreign investors in all 
sectors for the period 2001-2010 
Year Domestic investment Foreign investment Total investment Foreign investment 
to total investment 
2000 354,895,964 438,378,862 793, 274,826 0.55 
2001 472, 252,675 409,101,192 881,353,867 0.46 
2002 169,638,002 131,393,530 301,031,532 0.44 
2003 177,945,533 83,714,925 261,660,458 0.32 
2004 322,674,046 95,652,803 418,326,849 0.23 
2005 473,694,140 276, 288,994 749,983,134 0.37 
2006 987,993,342 845,648,078 1,833,641,420 0.46 
2007 1,171,509,771 1,049,665,857 2, 221,175,628 0.47 
2008 1,374,421,322 560,381,680 1,934,803,002 0.28 
2009 1,114,116,593 706,941,417 1,821,058,010 0.39 
2010 1,436,535,109 224,109,100 1,660,644, 209 0.13 
All investment shown in Jordanian Dinars; JD1= US$1.42 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the empirical results regarding the impact of the 
internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm financial performance. Specifically, 
the chapter presented the findings and the discussion of the descriptive analysis 
undertaken in this study, and dealt with the main inferences drawn from the multiple 
regressions (namely control variables, board of directors, ownership structure and 
foreign ownership). In order to ensure the presentation of the findings and the 
discussions is straightforward, the tables are presented separately according to the 
research objectives. The whole tables that contain all the results together of this study 
are presented in appendices one and two. 
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CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main research findings, discusses the limitations of the 
study, highlights its contributions, and presents recommendations for future studies. 
8.2 Research Findings 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of the corporate governance on the 
firm performance of Jordanian industrial and services companies during the period 2000 
to 2010. The study examined the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms via 
board of directors (e.g., board size, CEO duality and the presence of NEDs) and 
ownership structure (e.g., large shareholders or controlling shareholders, the identity of 
shareholders and the managerial ownership). In addition, the study has investigated the 
impact of foreign investors on firm performance. The data set used in this study to 
examine these internal mechanisms was extracted from the Jordanian annual reports and 
Osiris database. The study ended up with a sample of 115 listed firms in ASE during the 
period 2000 to 2010. Multiple regression panel data analysis is chosen as the main tool 
of analysis in this study. The statistical method used to test these impacts was 
Generalised Least Square (GLS) Random Effects models.  
The data of the internal corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors and 
ownership structure) and accounting based measures on firm performance revealed a 
mixed set of results in terms of agency perspectives. The results of this study are 
categorised into two sections. The first section presents the main findings related to the 
board of directors (e.g. board size, CEO duality and NEDs) and the second section 
presents the findings related to the ownership structure (e.g. ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership, the identity of ownership and foreign ownership) and its impact 
on firm performance.  
8.2.1 Board of directors 
In terms of board size our findings fail to reveal any significant impacts of the board 
size on firm performance. Boards in Jordanian firms are generally heavily dominated by 
large block holders, typically members of a single family or a clique of families. This 
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might result in the appointment of management and members for the board on the basis 
of friendship and nepotism rather than experience and skills. Such cliques can use their 
power to influence management decisions and undermine the monitoring and 
coordination of the board, rendering it impotent with regard to impact on management 
and firm performance. 
CEO duality showed a positive relationship with performance, a finding that is in 
contrast to the agency perspectives. Agency theory argues that CEO duality represents a 
problem because the CEO, who is responsible for the company performance, is the 
same person who is responsible for evaluation of the efficiency. Furthermore, duality 
increases CEO responsibilities, therefore, this situation will reduce the possibility of 
evaluating the firm effectively. This is because the power is concentrated in the hand of 
just one executive which will result in lower firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a). Our findings also provide support to stewardship theory which outlines that the 
holding of both the CEO and chairman position by the same person will improve firm 
performance because the monitoring of the company is undertaken more clearly. It 
might be quite useful for Jordanian companies to have CEO duality because it provides 
strong management, supervision, more coherence and strong leadership direction. 
Moreover, in Jordan, the chairman is often the founder of the company and is, therefore, 
more likely to be the CEO, since he is more experienced and more knowledgeable about 
the company. Jordanian firms operate in a relatively simpler business environment, 
unlike larger firms in the markets of developed countries. Thus, CEO duality may be 
useful and advantageous for different purposes: (1) it will speed up the decision-making 
process; and (2) it will improve communications between the board members and cut 
bureaucracy within the firm‘s structure. 
Our findings show a negative relationship between NEDs and firm performance, thus 
our results are inconsistent with agency theory. The possible explanation for this result 
might be that the NEDs are commonly part-time workers; this will undermine their 
ability to monitor and advise the board because of the lack of the information that they 
have which will reduce the NEDs‘ ability to apply their function efficiently. In addition, 
because they are part-time workers they are less incentivized to fulfil their 
responsibilities. Also, they might have other commitments which might affect their 
devotion to undertake effective monitoring. Furthermore, they might be unfamiliar with 
all the operations and business in the company. Finally, there might be some private 
connections between the chief executive director and the NEDs which, therefore, might 
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reduce the contributions of the latter. This is especially the case if they have been 
appointed for long periods in the company.  
8.2.2 Ownership structure 
The findings related to managerial ownership and firm performance show a positive 
relationship which is consistent with the alignment of interest hypothesis. According to 
agency theory, as managerial ownership increases (alignment interest), managers are 
less likely to transfer the firm resources away from value maximization. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) stated that the incentive of director/managerial ownership is expected 
to motivate agents to create total surplus, because as managerial ownership increases the 
interests of the shareholders and managers become more aligned, thus the incentive for 
opportunistic behaviour decreases. In other words, the greater the stake managers have 
in a firm (i.e. share ownership), the greater the costs they will incur for not maximising 
the wealth of shareholders. Our result is consistent with, for example, the findings of 
Owusu-Ansah (1998), Palia and Lichtenberg (1999), Weir et al. (2002), Krivogorsky 
(2006), Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007),  Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) who have all reported a positive impact of managerial 
ownership on firm performance.  
In terms of ownership concentration, our study showed evidence that there is a negative 
relationship between the large shareholders and firm performance. Our results are 
consistent with the findings of McConnell and Servaes (1990), Burkart et al. (1997), 
Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999), Weir et al. (2002) and Dyck and Zingales (2004). 
This result shows that higher ownership concentration could induce the prioritisation of 
self-interest by large shareholders and the consequent expropriation of firm resources 
(i.e. wealth), resulting in decreased firm performance. In other words, with concentrated 
ownership there is more incentive for majority/dominant shareholders to avoid 
information disclosure and such firms are likely to have weak monitoring controls 
(which facilitate expropriation), reducing the management's ability to take value-
maximizing investment decisions leading to lower firm performance. Therefore, our 
results are inconsistent with the efficient monitoring hypothesis and the findings of 
Stiglitz (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Leech and Leahy (1991) that show that 
large and controlling shareholders contribute to the mitigation of the agency problems 
because they have the incentives, motivations and capacity to monitor the managers for 
the benefit of the shareholders. The negative impact of concentrated ownership might be 
153 
attributed to the opportunities for nepotism that arise from it. Business organisations in 
Middle Eastern countries (including Jordan) are characterised by high concentration of 
ownership, often in the form of family-controlled businesses. In family-controlled firms 
the desire of majority shareholders is to pass on control and majority ownership of the 
firm to subsequent generations (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010).  Another reason for 
this relationship might be the behaviour of each large shareholder which influences the 
impacts of other kinds of various large shareholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). 
With respect to Individual/Family ownership, this study found a negative relationship 
with insignificant effect on firm performance. This might be due to poor managerial 
talent; low expertise of family members can result in difficulties in entering new 
markets and taking new investment opportunities. Inappropriate selection of family 
members as functionaries will directly or indirectly affect firm performance 
(Gulbrandsen, 2005, 2009; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). In other words, family 
ownership acts in its own private interests instead of the company interest, to the 
detriment of minority shareholders which will result in lower firm performance. 
In terms of the companies‘ ownership, the results of this study show a positive 
relationship with firm performance. This result supports the efficient monitoring 
hypothesis that companies have the power, greater expertise and incentives and are 
more likely to act rationally to monitor management behaviour and to enhance firm 
value. However, the results are inconsistent with the findings of Pound (1988) who 
claims that it might be more profitable for the company management or they may be 
forced to cooperate with the firm managers in order to protect their business 
relationships. The positive relationship might be attributed to their ability to bear high 
costs that result from the collecting of the appropriate information about the company 
and the management behaviour. In addition, they have more expertise and power to act 
rationally. Therefore, their skills will influence management decisions either directly, 
through their ownership, or indirectly, by trading their shares. Accordingly, this might 
lead to improved firm performance.  
With respect to government ownership, this study failed to reveal any significant impact 
on firm performance. However, the relationship was negative, supporting the non-
profit-maximizing goal of government owners. This might be due to the tendency of 
government bureaucrats/politicians to control the firm in relation to their own objectives 
instead of profit maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ramaswamy, 2001; Orden 
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and Garmendia, 2005). In addition, the negative effects of government ownership are 
due to poor human resource policies, tribalism, nepotism, lack of respect for rules, the 
code of practice and regulations of the country, and the private expediency of 
appointments. 
Finally, the results showed that foreign ownership had a significant positive relationship 
on firm performance. This finding confirms that foreign investors have the ability and 
the incentive to intervene (i.e. monitor and control) corporate governance to affect 
monitoring or complement the existing poor monitoring by domestic investors (Gillan 
and Starks, 2003).In addition, our finding was consistent with those of Taylor (1990), 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Kirkpatrick et al. (2006); Ghazali (2010); Sulong and 
Nor (2010) and Taufil et al. (2013) who found that foreign ownership influences the 
firm performance positively. They showed that foreign investors give companies access 
to financial resources, and managerial talent. In addition, they reported that foreign 
investors increase firm value by controlling managerial behaviour. This might be due to 
the legislative reforms, particularly since the 1990s, which have attracted more foreign 
capital investment into Jordan. Furthermore, the three investment laws of 2003 
(replacing the 1995 legislation) have provided for the equal treatment of Jordanian and 
foreign investors, a unique feature that distinguishes the Jordanian market among the 
MENA countries. While most MENA countries have legislation guaranteeing extensive 
favouritism for natives in numerous respects (e.g. percentage of ownership and 
workforce), such restrictions have been removed in Jordan, so that foreign investors can 
invest in different economic sectors with no restrictions on ownership percentage, and 
enjoy complete freedom of capital movement with no taxes on cash dividends or capital 
gains, leading to an attractive investment structure and open economy. 
8.3 The Limitations of the Study 
While the findings of any research are important, they invariably suffer from several 
limitations. Firstly, for example, the size of the sample is a limitation, with the sample 
of this study investigating only non-financial companies. Financial companies have 
been excluded because firms in this sector are administered by a different set of 
instructions and rules (Abed et al., 2011). Therefore, the size of the whole sample was 
reduced from 276 firms to 115 firms.  
Secondly, this study does not examine the impact of board sub-committees for 
Jordanian companies because no data are available from annual reports and the Osiris 
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database concerning them. The researcher endeavoured to contact the companies to 
conduct interviews by calling and emailing them in order to collect information 
regarding whether they have such committees and their composition. However, of 115 
companies approached, only 19 responded, most of the companies that did respond 
acknowledged that they didn‘t have these committees on the board. This is because 
companies were voluntarily required to have board committees before 2006. In 2006 the 
Jordanian corporate governance code stipulated that the board of directors must form 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees. The effect of this stipulation started to 
take place at the beginning of 2007. In addition, the terms for the board committees are 
still new for these companies so not all of them have started to establish these 
committees on their boards. Most of the companies that do not have these committees 
might be due to the nature business of the company. For example, the nature of business 
for some companies is not complicated and, thus, there is no need for such committees 
on the board. In addition, if the size of company is small there is no need to establish 
such committees on the board. Furthermore, the JCGC is voluntary, so there is not 
statistical information available from the Jordanian company control department to 
ascertain the extent to which companies have actually implemented this 
recommendation. This means that the authorities should undertake a series of regulatory 
actions and monitoring to force companies to have these committees which might help 
increase the effectiveness of board in monitoring the managers and help improve the 
firm performance. 
Since this study began in 2000 the researcher was unable to examine the effect of these 
committees; however, it is clear that board committee structure in Jordan is a rich area 
for further investigations.    
A third limitation is the inclusion of only three variables of board structure, i.e. the 
board size, NEDs and CEO duality. Attempts were made to contact companies in 
various ways however, as noted above; there was a weak response rate, though a 
broader understanding of the characteristics of a board could be gleaned from an 
appreciation of the education level, gender and nationality of its members, for example. 
Objectively quantifiable variables were selected, however, to avoid bias within the 
results, and the three variables chosen have been shown as key ones within previous 
studies. It is, therefore, considered that the corporate board is an important mechanism 
affecting firm performance, however the study recommends that future research should 
work out the effect of various, further board characteristics upon firm performance.  
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Finally, this study investigated the impact of the corporate governance on firm 
performance just only from the accounting based measures perspective. The lack of data 
related to the replacement costs prevented this study from investigating the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance measured by Tobin‘s Q. Market-based 
measures of firm performance are particularly problematic in the context of emerging 
markets, where most firms are characterized by debt-financing rather equity financing. 
Therefore, market-based measures are unrepresentative of actual investor profits in this 
context (Kumar, 2004). The market share price of firms reflects their market value with 
the proviso that the capital market is efficient according to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) (Gompers et al., 2003). Since Jordan is one of the emerging market 
countries, the stock market is yet to be developed in a comparable manner with 
established ones. For instance, the impacts of publicly disclosed/available firm 
information will influence the market after a lag time which will manifest in share 
prices. Although the firm performance can be examined from different perspectives 
such as Tobin‘s Q. However, we have the difficulties embroiled in computing Tobin‘s 
Q, such as computing the replacement cost which the companies do not report. 
8.4 Research Contributions 
Corporate governance has become a significant area of research; it takes a focus upon 
the various arrangements that are used within governance to control corporations for the 
purposes of maximisation of the wealth of the shareholders and/or owners. A literature 
review reveals this importance, and highlights problems with conflict of interest 
between shareholders and the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).Therefore, 
effective corporate governance should fundamentally guarantee shareholders‘ value by 
ensuring the appropriate use of firms‘ resources, enabling access to capital and 
improving investor confidence (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Thus, good corporate 
governance structure will ensure better decision making and efficient management 
leading to the likelihood of better firm performance. The majority of research 
concerning corporate governance and its effect on firm performance has been 
undertaken in developed countries and markets, particularly the UK and the US, but 
relatively little is known about corporate governance in the Middle East, where different 
cultural and economic considerations prevail. This study is the first to investigate the 
impact of the internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance of the 
industrial and services listed firms in ASE for the period 2000 to 2010. Therefore, by 
using corporate governance data extracted directly from Osiris database and the 
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company annual reports, the findings of this study will enhance our understanding of 
corporate governance in terms of agency theory in developing country specifically 
Jordan. 
This study makes several new contributions. First, drawing on the agency theory, this 
study investigated the impact of the board of directors as one of the important corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance in Jordan. A focus on Jordan is important 
because it allow us to investigate the link between the board of directors and firm 
performance by using the agency theory under special institutional background of 
Jordan. In addition, given that the increases number of the listed companies in the ASE 
(from 163 to 277 during the period 2000 to 2013) required and promoted efforts to 
enhance the effectiveness of the board for Jordanian companies to improve the firm 
performance. This study is the first to test the effect of the board size, CEO duality and 
NEDs on the performance of the Jordanian companies. 
The second contribution is concerned with the empirical investigation of the impact of 
the managerial ownership on firm performance. Based on the argument derived from 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), that the conflict between managers and 
shareholders can be reduced through managerial ownership, to the researcher‘s 
knowledge this study is the first to investigate the impact of managerial ownership on 
firm performance in Arab countries, specifically Jordan. Thus, the empirical findings of 
this study will contribute to the understanding of the role of the agency problem in 
Jordan and the Middle East in general. 
The third contribution is concerned with the empirical investigation of the relationship 
between the ownership structure and firm performance in the context of Jordan. The 
study examined the role played by two aspects of ownership structure: 
 The total of shares owned by the largest shareholder with 5% or more 
(ownership concentration). 
 The total of shares owned by the different types of shareholders. 
The final contribution is concerned with the empirical investigation of the impact of the 
foreign investors on firm performance. The previous studies in emerging markets 
reported that on average the domestic institutional investors are relatively limited or 
ineffective in improving firm performance. This is attributed to the notion that domestic 
institutional investors in developing countries might cooperate with the management to 
protect their potential business relations at the expense of their governance role. Up to 
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the researcher knowledge, this study is the first to test this impact in Jordan. By 
examining this impact this, which will particularly relates to contribute to our 
understanding about of the impact of the foreign investors in on affecting the firm 
performance. 
8.5 Further Studies 
There are several potential opportunities to be considered in the future for further 
studies and improvements. Firstly, in order to enhance the Jordanian banking system, 
the Central Bank of Jordan has issued the Bank Corporate Governance Code. The code 
draws upon international best practice, in particular the OECD principles of corporate 
governance and, in the same vein, in order to enhance the insurance system, was issued 
by the Board of Director of the Insurance Commission pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph (B) of Article (45) and paragraph (B) of Article (108) of the Insurance 
Regulatory Act No. (33) Of 1999 and the Amendments Thereof (Insurance Companies 
Code). Therefore, it is worthwhile to study the impact of corporate governance on 
financial firms. The sample of the study ought to be increased and the results from such 
an investigation would enhance understanding through providing another perspective of 
the effect on financial firms.  
Secondly, further research is needed to investigate the impact of the role of the board of 
directors on firm performance, particularly to investigate the effect of the level of 
education, the gender, experience and the age of board members upon firm 
performance. This will provide a better understanding of the determinants of board 
effectiveness for the Jordanian listed firms. Filling the gaps in these areas will provide a 
better understanding of board practices and their effects on firm performance. Thirdly, it 
would be interesting to investigate the impact of various board committees (e.g., audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees) on the firm performance. Further studies on 
their effects could explore in more depth the effect of each committee on performance 
of the Jordanian listed firms.  
Fourthly, the average growth rate of the Jordanian economy during the last ten years has 
averaged 8.1%, which made Jordan one of the fastest growing economies in the region. 
However, this fast growth resulted from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. More recently, 
Jordan‘s economic problems have been exacerbated since 2011 due to the reduction in 
the supply of cheap gas from Egypt. This resulted in Jordan having to pay an extra 2.5 
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billion a year for fuel and diesel from the global market. The drain on the country‘s 
meagre economic resources, and higher state expenditure resulting from the presence of 
over 600,000 refugees fleeing the violence in Syria, has put the brakes on a debt-
burdened economy already facing severe fiscal strains. These economic conditions 
might affect the financial decisions of local and foreign investors alike. Subsequently, 
since the data collection of this study had a cut-off point in 2010, further study is needed 
to explore the impact of corporate governance on firm performance under the different 
economic conditions. According to Johnson and Mitton (2003), during periods of 
economic downturn, the possibility of shareholders expropriating firm resources will be 
higher.  
Corporate governance includes all the structures formed into Boards of Directors that 
enable them to reach independent decision-making, which should be free from any 
personal interventions or work for special (non-firm) interests. This kind of policy is 
meant to reflect positively on the institutionalization of the decisions made within the 
institution and work for the best interests of shareholders who have invested their 
money and fully entrusted it to the Boards of Directors. 
The adoption of corporate governance principles is more than a thought or creation of a 
code that the companies should adopt. Establishing new companies and creating new 
positions for these companies, together with instructions, for example, does not mean 
that we are applying corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate governance should 
ensure better decision-making policies, maximise profits and reduce the risk of human 
interference activities such as fraud, robbery, super-star culture or ‗the only star‘ who 
commits no mistakes. In addition, corporate governance should maintain shareholders' 
rights and profits and provide the best measures for financial stability and management 
efficacy. The application of Corporate Governance Principles can best serve Jordan's 
brittle economic interests and work in parallel for the benefit of private companies or 
shareholders. Hence, an urgent need has emerged for the best proper application of 
Corporate Governance Principles in Jordanian companies. 
Implementing corporate governance principles will lead to a better avoidance of 
pervasive ccorruption cases and nepotism and help to attract more local and foreign 
investment. Thus, creating such a better investment environment would offer more 
employment opportunities and improve the standard of living as a whole. The concept 
of corporate governance has many direct and indirect references in many legal clauses 
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and items; to name but a few, there is the Companies Act 22 for the year 1997 and its 
amendments, the Securities Act 76 for the year 2002, the Bank Law No. 28 for the year 
2000, and the law that regulates accounting for the legal profession (Law No. 73 for the 
year 2003). Those legal references have made it possible to apply corporate governance 
principles in Jordanian companies as a whole and paved the way for more developed 
amendments of those legal clauses and acts. Perhaps the positive remarks of this 
application of standards will offer guaranteed basic rights for both owners of capital and 
shareholders leading to better participation in decision-making and voting in their 
business institutions. However, existing Jordanian laws and acts are unclear when it 
comes to the role and responsibilities of the executive and non-executive directors 
within the scope and mission of the Board of Directors. Moreover, the concept of NEDs 
is not fully practiced under the current Jordanian legislation. Moreover, the appointment 
of members in various committees, including auditors, executive members and so on, 
lacks the criteria for transparency and credibility.  
Despite the on-going endeavours of the Jordanian government (e.g. the Central Bank 
and Jordan Companies Control Department) to ensure the activation of corporate 
governance standards and institutionalizing of decisions made into policies, it can still 
be observed that numerous local companies are still far from following those 
‗correctional‘ standards, as evidenced by priority being given to personal interventions 
and the deliberate marginalization of shareholders‘ enshrined rights to participate in 
decision-making policies. Moreover, it has been officially reported that the companies 
concerned have an implicit opposition to the government's economic reform plan and 
have displayed illegal behaviour that eventually led to their financial hardship and 
bankruptcy. 
It can be concluded that corporate governance needs cooperation between the public and 
private sectors to create more competitive democratic markets, help maintain local 
investment in the Kingdom, and to attract foreign investors. The reality is painful as a 
lot of boards are formed in the same old way even if the exterior layer is normal and 
appears to work for the best interests of shareholders. It is generally agreed, however, 
that government interventions usually arrive late and are not proactive, or even 
preventive, measures. Due to this, the occurrence of wrong decisions is pervasive and 
they frequently occur on a daily basis. Continuous failures have made Jordan's economy 
as brittle as any poor developing country. Indeed, these alarming facts call for more 
government control and adherence to official regulations. An interesting fact is that the 
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fine set by Jordan's government for violation of the terms of the Corporate Governance 
Principles is only JD 500. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of descriptive statistics of dependent, 
independent and control variables 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
health 956 0 1 0.03 0.157 
educational 956 0 1 0.05 0.21 
hotels 956 0 1 0.09 0.282 
transportation 956 0 1 0.07 0.261 
technologycommunication 956 0 1 0.02 0.143 
media 956 0 1 0.01 0.091 
utilitiesenergy 956 0 1 0.03 0.177 
commercialservices 956 0 1 0.1 0.306 
pharmaceutical 956 0 1 0.04 0.193 
chemical 956 0 1 0.07 0.252 
paper 956 0 1 0.03 0.183 
printing 956 0 1 0.02 0.15 
food 956 0 1 0.12 0.322 
tobacco 956 0 1 0.01 0.12 
mining 956 0 1 0.13 0.331 
engineering 956 0 1 0.07 0.252 
electrical 956 0 1 0.03 0.16 
textiles 956 0 1 0.06 0.239 
glass 956 0 1 0.03 0.163 
d2001 956 0 1 0.07 0.254 
d2002 956 0 1 0.08 0.269 
d2003 956 0 1 0.08 0.279 
d2004 956 0 1 0.09 0.283 
d2005 956 0 1 0.09 0.289 
d2006 956 0 1 0.1 0.296 
d2007 956 0 1 0.1 0.303 
d2008 956 0 1 0.11 0.313 
d2009 956 0 1 0.11 0.315 
d2010 956 0 1 0.11 0.313 
ROE 936 -833.1 460.46 -4.38 51.96 
ROA 948 -91.38 87.57 0.59 14.31 
TA 956 1160000 75193260 64133.11 329268.8 
leverage 956 0 5.75 0.36 0.37 
Liquidity ratio 945 0.01 65.48 3.44 5.99 
Age 956 5 83 29.31 15.819 
BSIZE 956 2 30 8.33 3.26 
CEO Duality 956 0 1 0.66 0.04 
NEDs 956 0.01 0.88 0.24 0.19 
MO 956 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.06 
LargeSH5 956 0 0.99 0.43 0.22 
OWNind/Fam 950 0 100 45.08 28.29 
OWNcomp 956 0 99.99 38.58 26.09 
OWNgov 956 0 100 8.09 16.87 
Foreignown 956 0 0.99 0.087 0.17 
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Appendix 2: Summary of multiple regression results 
 ROE ROA 
Log Total assets  20.56996 
(0.031)** 
7.23987 
(0.000)*** 
Total Debt (Leverage) -.000046 
(0.696) 
-2.69e-06 
(0.000)*** 
Liquidity  -2.40e-06 
(0.622) 
1.81e-07 
(0.687) 
Age  .4088442 
(0.266) 
.0369829 
(0.333) 
BSIZE 1.318516 
(0.275) 
.4673652 
(0.132) 
CEO Duality 26.72576 
(0.065)* 
6.389529 
(0.002)*** 
NEDs -.2725834 
(0.008)*** 
-.1208736 
(0.007)*** 
MO 82.59738 
(0.061)* 
15.22806 
(0.251) 
LargeSH5 -2.121011 
(0.000)*** 
-.8231661 
(0.000)*** 
OWNind/Fam -.0673711 
(0.436) 
.0029175 
(0.890) 
OWNcomp .1310687 
(0.064)* 
.0705605 
(0.026)** 
OWNgov -.0826491 
(0.666) 
.0099916 
(873) 
Foreignown .2024374 
(0.090)* 
.0678711 
(0.131) 
Health -2.829959 
(0.723) 
-.7391161 
(0.871) 
Educational 6.613757 
(0.591) 
9.880238 
(0.065)* 
Hotels -4.102294 
(0.705) 
3.242674 
(0.492) 
Transporting 2.329414 
(0.819) 
3.513176 
(0.477) 
Technology -49.04758 
(0.154) 
5.192437 
(0.354) 
Media -37.32361 
(0.264) 
-14.15601 
(0.209) 
Utilities 22.12184 
(0.304) 
-.2325165 
(0.969) 
Commercials -8.263967 
(0.685) 
3.740754 
(0.558) 
Pharmaceutical -1.219226 
(0.902) 
1.573883 
(0.813) 
Chemical 14.37657 
(0.230) 
7.41495 
(0.157) 
Paper -77.88969 
(0.004)*** 
-19.38513 
(0.044)** 
Printing -57.17938 -13.4128 
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 ROE ROA 
(0.300) (0.521) 
Food -1.141534 
(0.918) 
2.672251 
(0.615) 
Tobacco -6.702806 
(0.651) 
4.218124 
(0.408) 
Mining -5.33554 
(0.655) 
4.332407 
(0.373) 
Engineering -6.32308 
(0.581) 
2.382145 
(0.645) 
Electrical 5.514459 
(0.556) 
4.746745 
(0.300) 
Textiles 3.425846 
(0.736) 
2.366423 
(0.621) 
d2001 -3.240528 
(0.407) 
.8562205 
(368) 
d2002 -7.486261 
(0.181) 
-1.883421 
(0.231) 
d2003 1.62957 
(0.684) 
.4112314 
(0.705) 
d2004 1.694666 
(0.397) 
1.137405 
(0.179) 
d2005 5.892105 
(0.101) 
3.5008 
(0.000)*** 
d2006 1.31449 
(0.629) 
-.0724548 
(0.957) 
d2007 5.748674 
(0.276) 
.272582 
(0.840) 
d2008 -4.569798 
(0.196) 
-1.40411 
(0.293) 
d2009 3.450705 
(0.246) 
-.3653438 
(0.713) 
d2010 -7.933553 
(0.345) 
.5049139 
(0.586) 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels 
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Appendix 3: Results of VIF test 
Variable VIF 
mining 5.28 
food 5.18 
commercial~s 4.64 
hotels 4.23 
transporta~n 3.64 
chemical 3.43 
engineering 3.32 
textiles 3.04 
educational 2.77 
utilitiese~y 2.44 
paper 2.42 
pharmaceut~l 2.26 
owncomp 2.14 
technology~n 2.10 
electrical 1.96 
health 1.95 
ownind 1.94 
printing 1.91 
owngov 1.87 
tobacco 1.77 
ta 1.76 
leverage 1.67 
bsize 1.51 
ned 1.39 
foreignown 1.38 
liquidity 1.37 
mo 1.31 
merdia 1.26 
age 1.25 
d2010 1.21 
d2009 1.20 
d2007 1.18 
d2006 1.18 
largesh5 1.16 
d2004 1.16 
d2002 1.15 
d2001 1.14 
d2003 1.06 
d2008 1.05 
d2005 1.05 
ceoduality 1.03 
Mean VIF 2.07 
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Appendix 4: Names and industries of the 115 sampled firms 
COMPANY’S NAME ABBREVIATION SYMBOL CODE MARKET 
Health Care Services 
THE CONSULTANT & 
INVESTMENT GROUP  
CONSULTING GROUP  CICO 131207 2 
IBN ALHAYTHAM HOSPITAL 
COMPANY 
IBN ALHAYTHAM H.  IBNH 131279 2 
INTERNATIONAL FOR 
MEDICAL INVESTMENT  
INT CO MED INV  ICMI 141021 2 
Educational Services 
ITTIHAD SCHOOLS  ITTIHAD SCHOOLS  ITSC 131093 1 
AL-ISRA FOR EDUCATION 
AND INVESTMENT "PLC"  
ISRA EDUE AIFE 131220 2 
PETRA EDUCATION 
COMPANY 
PETRA EDUCATION  PEDC 131221 2 
PHILADELPHIA 
INTERNATIONAL 
EDUCATIONAL 
INVESTMENT COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA UNI  PIEC 131222 2 
AL-ZARQA EDUCATIONAL 
AND INVESTMENT  ZARQA EDUC OSIRIS  
ZEIC 131051 2 
THE ARAB INTERNATIONL 
FOR EDUCATION AND 
INVESTMENT.  
ARAB INT INV EDU  AIEI 131052 2 
Hotels and Tourism 
AL- SHARQ INVESTMENTS 
PROJECTS(HOLDING)  
AL SHARQ INV  AIPC 131078 2 
JORDAN PROJECTS FOR 
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT  
JOR PROJ TOUR DEV  JPTD 131211 2 
WINTER VALLEY TOURISM 
INVESTMENT CO.  
WINTER VALLEY TOUR  WIVA 131235 1 
JORDAN HOTELS & 
TOURISM  
JOR HOTEL TOURS  JOHT 131003 2 
ARAB INTERNATIONAL 
HOTELS  
ARAB INTL HOTEL  AIHO 131005 2 
JORDAN HIMMEH MINERAL  HIMMEH MINERALS  HIMM 131014 2 
MODEL RESTAURANTS 
COMPANY PLC  
MODEL RESTAURANTS  FOOD 131272 2 
AL-TAJAMOUAT FOR 
TOURISTIC PROJECTS CO 
PLC  
TAJ TOURIST PROJ  TAJM 131019 1 
SURA DEVELOPMENT & 
INVESTMENT PLC  
SURA  SURA 131283 2 
MEDITERRANEAN TOURISM 
INVESTMENT  
MEDITER. TOURISM  MDTR 131035 2 
Transportation 
JORDAN EXPRESS TOURIST 
TRANSPORT  
JORDAN EXPRESS  JETT 131080 1 
TRANSPORT& INVESTMENT 
BARTER COMPANY  
TRANSPORT BARTER  NAQL 131208 1 
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COMPANY’S NAME ABBREVIATION SYMBOL CODE MARKET 
ALIA- THE ROYAL 
JORDANIAN AIRLINES PLC.  
ROYAL JORDANIAN  RJAL 131213 1 
MASAFAT FOR SPECIALISED 
TRANSPORT  
MASAFAT 
TRANSPORT  
MSFT 131243 1 
RUM GROUP FOR 
TRANSPORTATION & 
TOURISM INVESTMENT  
RUM GROUP  RUMM 131262 1 
JORDAN NATIONAL SHIPPING 
LINES  
SHIPPING LINE  SHIP 131012 1 
UNITED GROUP FOR LAND 
TRANSPORT CO. P.L.C  
UNITED GROUP  UGLT 131288 2 
UBOUR LOGISTIC SERVICES 
PLC  
UBOUR  TRUK 131290 2 
 
TRUST INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPORT  
TRUST TRANS.  TRTR 131055 2 
UNIFIED TRANSPORT & 
LOGISTICS COMPANY  
UNIFIED TRANSPORT  UNIF 131066 2 
Technology and Communication 
JORDAN TELECOM  JORDAN TELECOM  JTEL 131206 1 
BATELCO JORDAN  BATELCO JORDAN  FTGR 131060 2 
Media 
ARAB PRINTERS AND 
DEVELOPERS  
ARAB DEVELOPERS  APRW 131075 2 
Utilities and Energy 
JORDAN ELECTRIC POWER  JOR ELECTREIC PWR  JOEP 131004 1 
IRBID DISTRICT 
ELECTRICITY  
IRBID ELECTRICITY  IREL 131010 2 
JORDAN PETROLEUM 
REFINERY  
JOR PETROLM REF  JOPT 142041 1 
Commercial Services 
SPECIALIZED TRADING & 
INVESTMENT  
SPCZ.TRDG&INVST  SPTI 131081 1 
SPECIALIZED JORDANIAN 
INVESTMENT  
SPEC.INV JOR  SIJC 131086 1 
BINDAR TRADING & 
INVESTMENT CO . P.L.C  
BINDAR  BIND 131219 2 
 
DARWISH AL-KHALILI AND 
SONS CO. PLC  
D-KHALILI AND  DKHS 131223 2 
OFFTEC HOLDING GROUP 
PLC  
OFFTEC HOLDING  OFTC 131228 1 
 
SOUTH ELECTRONICS  SOUTH ELECTRONICS  SECO 131230 2 
NOPAR FOR TRADING AND 
INVESTMENT  
NOPAR FOR TRADING  NOTI 131238 2 
JORDANIAN DUTY FREE 
SHOPS 
JOR DUTY FRE SHP  JDFS 131022 2 
JORDAN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING CENTER  
JORDAN INTL TRAD  JITC 131023 1 
AFAQ FOR ENERGY CO. 
P.L.C  
AFAQ ENERGY  MANE 131286 2 
MIDDLE EAST FOR 
DEVELOPMENT & TRADE  
MID EAST FOR DEV  MEDV 131033 2 
JORDAN TRADE FAC  FIRST NAT VEG OIL  JOTF 131062 2 
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COMPANY’S NAME ABBREVIATION SYMBOL CODE MARKET 
AL AHLIA ENTERPRISES  AHLIA ENTERPRISES  ABLA 131064 2 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Industries 
MIDDLE EAST PHARMA. & 
CHMICAL IND. & MEDICAL 
APPLIANCES  
MID PHARMA IND  MPHA 141073 1 
THE JORDANIAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
MANUFACTURING  
JORDAN PHARMA  JPHM 141204 2 
HAYAT PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRIES CO.  
HAYAT PHAR. IND.  HPIC 141210 1 
ARAB CENTER FOR 
PHARM.& CHEMICALS  
ARAB PHARMA CHEM  APHC 141023 1 
ARAB FOOD AND MEDICAL 
APPLIANCES 
 
ARAB FOOD & MED  AFOO 141050 2 
Chemical Industries 
NATIONAL TEXTILE AND 
PLASITIC INDUTRIES  
NAT TEXTILE  NATT 141062 2 
COMPREHENSIVE MULTIPLE 
PROJECT COMPANY  
COMPREHENSIVE  INOH 141086 1 
THE ARAB PESTICIDES & 
VETERINARY DRUGS MFG. 
CO.  
ARAB PESTICIDES  MBED 141209 1 
JORDAN CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRIES  
JOR INDSTR CHEM  JOIC 141026 2 
UNIVERSAL CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRIES  
UNIV CHEM IND  UNIC 141027 2 
RAFIA INDUSTRIAL  RAFIA INDUSTRIAL  RAFI 141030 2 
JORDAN SULPHO-CHEMICALS  
JOR SELPHO CHEM 
OSIRIS 64 
JOSL 141040 2 
NATIONAL CHLORINE 
INDUSTRIES  
NAT CHLORINE  NATC 141054 1 
JORDAN INDUSTRIAL 
RESOURCES  
JORDAN IND.RES.  JOIR 141055 1 
Paper and Cardboard Industries 
ARAB COMPANY FOR 
INVESTMENT PROJECTS  
ARAB INVEST PROJ  APCT 141003 2 
JORDAN PAPER AND 
CARDBOARD FACTORIES  
JOR PAPER CARDBG  JOPC 141017 2 
NATIONAL INDUSTRIES  NATIONAL INDSTR  NATI 141025 2 
Printing and Packaging 
AL-EKBAL PRINTING AND 
PACKAGING  
QBAL INV. CO  EKPC 141100 1 
UNION ADVANCED 
INDUSTRIES  
UNION ADV INDST  UADI 141110 2 
 
Food and Beverages 
NATIONAL POULTRY  NAT‘L POULTRY  NATP 141084 2 
192 
COMPANY’S NAME ABBREVIATION SYMBOL CODE MARKET 
THE ARAB INTERNATIONAL 
FOOD FACTORIES  
ARAB INT‘L FOOD  AIFF 141092 2 
NUTRI DAR  NUTRIDAR  NDAR 141094 2 
MODERN FOOD IND & 
VEG.OIL  
MODERN FOOD  MFID 141095 2 
JORDAN VEGETABLE OIL 
INDUSTRIES  
JOR VEG OIL IND  JVOI 141141 2 
FIRST NATIONAL 
VEGETABLE OIL INDUSTRIES 
CO.  
FIRST NAT VEG OIL  FNVO 141205 2 
AFIA INTERNATIONAL 
COMPANY - JORDAN  
AFIA INT CO-JORDAN  AICG 141206 2 
JORDAN POULTRY 
PROCESSING & MARKETING  
JORDAN POUL PROC  JPPC 141002 2 
JORDAN DAIRY  JORDAN DAIRY  JODA 141004 2 
GENERAL INVESTMENT  GENERAL INVEST  GENI 141029 2 
AL-QARIA FOOD & 
VEGETABLE OIL INDUSTRIES 
CO. P.L.C  
AL-QARIA  UCVO 141044 2 
UNIVERSAL MODERN 
INDUSTRIES  
UNIV MOD INDCO  UMIC 141052 1 
Tobacco and Cigarettes 
UNION TOBACCO & 
CIGARETTE INDUSTRIES  
UNION TOBACCO  UTOB 141074 1 
JORDAN TOBACCO & 
CIGARETTES  
JOR TOBACCO/CIG  TBCO 141140 2 
Mining and Extraction Industries 
JORDAN STEEL  
JOR STEEL OSIRIS 86 
JOST 141070 1 
NATIONAL ALUMINIUM 
INDUSTRIAL  
NAT‘L ALUM IND  NATA 141091 1 
INVESTMENTS AND 
INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES 
CO. PLC (HOLDING CO)  
INV AND INTEG 
INDUST  
INTI 141117 2 
JORDAN MAGNESIA  JOR MAGNESIA CO  JMAG 141130 2 
 
JORDAN COMPANY FOR 
ELECTRICITY AND OIL 
SHALE  
JOSECO  JOSE 141216 2 
JORDAN MARBLE COMPANY 
P.L.C.  
JORDAN MARBLE  JMCO 141221 2 
NORTHERN CEMENT CO.  NORTHERN  NCCO 141224 2 
GENERAL MINING COMPANY 
PLC  
GENERAL MINING  GENM 141005 2 
ARAB ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY 
/ARAL  
ARAB ALUM IND  AALU 141006 2 
NATIONAL STEEL INDUSTRY  NATIONAL STEEL  NAST 141011 2 
JORDAN PHOSPHATE MINES  JOR PHOSPHATE MN  JOPH 141018 1 
THE JORDAN CEMENT 
FACTORIES  
JOR CEMENT FACT  JOCM 141042 1 
THE ARAB POTASH  ARAB POTASH CO  APOT 141043 2 
JORDAN ROCK WOOL 
INDUSTRIES  
JOR ROCK WOOLID  JOWL 141045 2 
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Engineering and Construction 
ARAB ENGINEERING 
INDUSTRIES  
ARAB ENG.IND.CO.  AREN 141060 2 
RUM ALADDIN INDUSTRIES  RUM ALADDIN IND.  IENG 141077 2 
ARABIAN STEEL PIPES 
MANUFACTURING  
ARAB STEEL PIPES  ASPMM 141098 1 
GENERAL ENGINEERING 
INDUSTRIES  
GEN.ENG.INDSTRS  GEIN 141101 2 
AL-QUDS READY MIX  AL-QUDS READY MIX  AQRM 141208 2 
GENERAL LIGHTWEIGHT 
CONCRETE INDUSTRIES  
LIGHT CONCRETE  GLCI 141211 2 
THE JORDAN PIPES 
MANUFACTURING  
JOR PIPES MANFACT  JOPI 141019 1 
JORDAN WOOD INDUSTRIES / 
JWICO  
JOR WOOD INDUSTR  WOOD 141038 2 
Electrical Industries 
ARAB ELECTRICAL 
INDUSTRIES  
ARAB ELECT IND  AEIN 141072 1 
UNITED CABLE INDUSTRIES  UNITED CABLE 
INDUSTRIES  
UCIC 141215 1 
NATIONAL CABLE & WIRE 
MANUFACTURING  
NAT/CABL/WIRE/MF  WIRE 141039 1 
Textiles, Leather and Clothing 
CENTURY INVESTMENT 
GROUP  
CENTURY INV.GRP  CEIG 131097 1 
UNITED INTEGRATED FOR 
MULTIPLE INDUSTRIES AND 
INVESTMENTS  
UNITED INTEGRATED  UNTG 141107 2 
ARAB WEAVERS UNION 
COMPANY P.L.C 
ARAB WEAVERS  ARWU 141212 2 
JORDAN CLOTHING 
COMPANY P.L.C 
JOR CLOTHING CO.  CJCC 141213 1 
THE JORDAN WORSTED 
MILLS  
JOR WORSTED MILL  JOWM 141014 2 
JORDAN TANNING  JORDAN TANNING  JOTN 141020 2 
AKARY FOR INDUSTRIES 
AND REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENTS  
AKARY  WOOL 141031 2 
Glass and Ceramic Industries 
UNITED GLASS INDUSTRIES  UNITED GLASS IND  UNGI 141075 2 
INTERNATIONAL CERAMIC 
INDUSTRIES  
INDL CERAMIC  ICER 141078 1 
JORDAN CERAMIC 
INDUSTRIES  
JOR CERAMIC FAC  JOCF 141015 2 
 
 
 
